Wednesday, May 02, 2012

Right of privacy between spouses: can your spouse open your social media accounts or read text messages on your smartphone without your consent?

Quick answer: No.

Reason: “Marital right of privacy” as explained by the Supreme Court in the case of “Cecilia Zulueta versus Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin” (G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996).

Notice that the Zulueta case was decided way back in 1996 when very few Filipinos knew about the Internet. The World Wide Web had just been invented (in 1989) by Tim Berners-Lee; there was only Mosaic, the predecessor of our present-day browsers. But the Supreme Court’s ruling on the “marital right of privacy” still applies today.

Facts of the case:

Cecilia is married to Alfredo, a medical doctor. Thinking that Alfredo is involved in extramarital affairs, Cecilia entered his clinic on March 26, 1982. In the presence of her mother, a driver, and Alfredo’s secretary, she forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in the clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Alfredo and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, canceled checks, diaries, Alfredo's passport, and photographs.

Cecilia wanted to use the documents and papers in two cases that she had filed against Alfredo: (1) legal separation; and (2) disqualification from the practice of medicine.

Alfredo files case against Cecilia with the Regional Trial Court of Manila

Alfredo asked the RTC to order Cecilia to return all the seized documents and papers. The RTC ruled in Alfredo’s favor, ordering Cecilia to return the documents and papers and to pay damages. It also prohibited Cecilia and her lawyer from using the documents and papers as evidence in the cases that she had filed against Alfredo.

(Alfredo later filed a disbarment case against Cecilia’s lawyer when he used the documents and papers in the case for Alfredo’s disqualification from the practice of medicine.)

Cecilia brought her case up to the Court of Appeals, but the court also ruled against her.

Supreme Court ruling on “marital right of privacy”

The Court ruled against Cecilia, saying that:

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.”Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. [boldfacing supplied]

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Related issues:

1. The Supreme Court’s ruling mentions “the duty of fidelity that each [spouse] owes to the other.” This refers to Article 68 of the Family Code which states: “The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.”

(The Family Code mentions “love” only twice: Article 68 and Article 220.)

2. If your spouse has opened and read, without your consent, your physical letters or your social media accounts, can you file a case against him or her under Article 290 of the Revised Penal Code?

Answer: No.

Reason: Marital exemption

The Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding P500 shall be imposed upon any private individual who in order to discover the secrets of another, shall seize his papers or letters and reveal the contents thereof.

If the offender shall not reveal such secrets, the penalty shall be arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500.

The provision shall not be applicable to parents, guardians, or persons entrusted with the custody of minors with respect to the papers or letters of the children or minors placed under their care or study, nor to spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of them.

Notice that the last paragraph above expressly states that Art. 209 does not apply to “spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of them.”

3. “What happens to your social media accounts after you die?” (The Sun)

4. “The marital right to privacy in relation to the system of absolute community” (ACCRA Law)

Monday, April 02, 2012

Heirs and inheritance (Part 15): Who inherits from a man or woman who died single and with no last will?

Situation 1: The man or woman who died single has living (a) legitimate parents or ascendants – grandparents, or great-grandparents, and (b) siblings, but with no illegitimate children.

Articles 985, 986, and 987 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines (NCC) are the governing laws in this situation.

Art. 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives.

Art. 986. The father and mother, if living, shall inherit in equal shares.

Should one only of them survive, he or she shall succeed to the entire estate of the child.

Art. 987. In default of the father and mother, the ascendants nearest in degree shall inherit.

Should there be more than one of equal degree belonging to the same line they shall divide the inheritance per capita; should they be of different lines but of equal degree, one-half shall go to the paternal and the other half to the maternal ascendants. In each line the division shall be made per capita.
1. Only the man or woman’s parents or ascendants (whether paternal or maternal) will inherit; the siblings (the “collateral relatives” in Art. 985) are excluded.

2. Based on the principle “nearer excludes farther”, parents will exclude the grandparents from inheriting, and grandparents will exclude great-grandparents.

Situation 2: The man or woman who died single has no living ascendant, but is survived by (a) siblings, and (b) illegitimate children.

Articles 988, 989, and 990 NCC are the governing laws in this situation.
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by right of representation.

Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their deceased grandparent.
1. Only the illegitimate children will inherit; the siblings are excluded from inheriting.

2. If any of the illegitimate children had died earlier, their own children will inherit by right of representation.

Situation 3: The man or woman who died single has living (a) legitimate ascendants like parents or grandparents, (b) siblings, and (c) illegitimate children.

Article 991 NCC is the governing law in this situation.
Art. 991. If legitimate ascendants are left, the illegitimate children shall divide the inheritance with them, taking one-half of the estate, whatever be the number of the ascendants or of the illegitimate children.
1. Only the ascendants and the illegitimate children will inherit; the siblings are excluded.

2. Proportion: 50% of the estate to be divided among the illegitimate children; 50% to be divided among the surviving ascendants.

3. Based on the principle “nearer excludes farther”, parents will exclude the grandparents from inheriting, and grandparents will exclude great-grandparents.

Situation 4: The man or woman who died single is illegitimate, and is survived by (a) siblings, and (b) either or both biological parents.

Article 993 NCC is the governing law in this situation.
Art. 993. If an illegitimate child should die without issue, either legitimate or illegitimate, his father or mother shall succeed to his entire estate; and if the child’s filiation is duly proved as to both parents, who are both living, they shall inherit from him share and share alike.
1. Only the biological parents will inherit; they will exclude the man or woman’s siblings from inheriting.

2. In a lot of situations, the illegitimate child is raised and supported by only one parent. If you are an illegitimate child, how can you prevent the other parent from inheriting under Article 993? You must execute a last will disinheriting that parent under Article 920 NCC.

Situation 5: The man or woman who died single has (a) no living ascendants, (b) no illegitimate children, but is survived by (c) brothers or sisters – whether full blood or half blood, and (d) legitimate nephews or nieces.

Articles 1003, 1004, 1005, 1006, 1009, and 1010 NCC are the governing laws in this situation.
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.

Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who are the children of the decedent’s brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.

Art. 1006. Should brother and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.

Art. 1007. In case brothers and sisters of the half blood, some on the father’s and some on the mother’s side, are the only survivors, all shall inherit in equal shares without distinction as to the origin of the property.

Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for the brothers and sisters of the full blood.
1. Brother and sisters of the full blood are entitled to double the share of brothers and sisters of the half blood (Art. 1006).

2. Please read my post titled “Can nephews and nieces inherit from their unmarried uncles or aunts?

Situation 6: The man or woman who died single has no living (a) ascendants, (b) illegitimate children, (c) brothers or sisters, (d) nephews or nieces, but is survived by (e) collateral relatives like uncles or aunts, and cousins.

Articles 1009 and 1010 NCC are the governing laws in this situation.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.

Art. 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line.
1. Principle of “nearer excludes farther” applies; the relative nearer in degree will exclude the relative farther in degree.

2. Children of first cousins are not entitled to inherit by right of representation.

Situation 7: The man or woman died single with no living parents or ascendants, siblings, nephews or nieces, or with no qualified collateral relatives.

The State will inherit the whole estate under Articles 1011 to 1014 NCC.

Wednesday, February 08, 2012

Kris Aquino and James Yap cannot adopt Bimby jointly or sequentially; only one of them can adopt Bimby

Several days ago, Kris Aquino revealed in a Boy Abunda interview that her marriage to James Yap has been declared void by a Quezon City court. Kris also revealed that, for purposes of inheritance, she is planning to adopt Bimby and her other illegitimate son, Josh.

Reason why Baby James is illegitimate

Based on misinformation, some people in Internet chat rooms and in Facebook are saying that all children born in a void marriage are illegitimate. We must distinguish:

1. If a marriage is declared void because of Article 36 of the Family Code (“psychological incapacity”), then a child is considered legitimate under Article 54. The article states:

Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
2. The court declared Kris and James’s marriage void because of Article 35 of the Family Code (“lack of authority of the solemnizing officer”). As a consequence, Bimby, better known as “Baby James”, is illegitimate.

On the other hand, Josh is illegitimate because his parents, Kris and Philip Salvador, were not married.

Please read my article “Legal lessons from the Kris Aquino - James Yap breakup: legal separation, annulment, declaration of nullity, essential and formal requisites of marriage”.

Is the consent of the father of an illegitimate child required in adoption?

Section 9, paragraph (b) of RA 8552 states that the written consent of the biological parent/s is necessary. UP College of Law professor Danilo L. Concepcion in his article “Domestic Adoption: Law and Procedure” (IBP Journal, March 2009, Vol. 34, No. 1) states that the reason why RA 8552 requires such consent is that their parental authority over the child (the prospective adoptee) will be terminated.

Several women have e-mailed about this kind of situation. Either they do not know where the biological father of their illegitimate children is or the father is making things difficult for them. One woman even told me that the biological father asked her for money in exchange for his written consent.

Prof. Concepcion argues (and I agree with him) that since an illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother under Article 176 of the Family Code, then the consent of the biological father is not necessary.
Prof. Concepcion states that the problem is with the wording of the law. He says that instead of “biological parent/s” the law should have used “legal parent/s” instead.

Why should an unwed mother adopt her own child?

To a lot of Filipinos, Kris’s plan to adopt Baby James and Josh doesn’t make sense. Well, let me explain.

Legally speaking, the relationship between Kris and her children, or between any unwed mother and her child, for that matter, is illegitimate. In order for an unwed mother to legitimize her relationship with her illegitimate child, she has to file a petition under RA 8552, our domestic adoption law.

What if an unwed mother gets married subsequently to the biological father?

The legal remedy would not be adoption under RA 8552 but legitimation under Articles 177 to 182 of the Family Code (that is, if there were no legal obstacles when the child was conceived or born).

What if an unwed mother gets married to a man (not the biological father) who wants to adopt her child?

RA 8552 provides that husband and wife must adopt jointly. In this situation, the result would be (1) the relationship between the mother and the child will become legitimate, and (2) the man will acquire parental authority over the child.

The problem in this situation is when the biological father refuses to give his consent to the adoption. As I explained in my article on adoption, RA 8552 requires the consent of the biological father.

February 2011, I wrote to more than a dozen members of Congress asking them to consider filing a bill clarifying or amending RA 8552 so that the biological father’s consent will no longer be necessary. It’s now February 2012 and I still have not received any reply from these members of Congress.

Instead of waiting for a law clarifying or amending RA 8552, a mother or her husband can file a petition for declaratory relief before a competent court asking that the term “biological parent/s” be interpreted to mean “legal parent/s”.

If Kris adopts Bimby, will James Yap later on be able to adopt him?

No. Both the Family Code and RA 8552 state that, as a rule, a person who has already been adopted cannot be adopted again. The Family Code states it negatively while RA 8552 states it positively. Here’s the comparison:

Article 187, Family CodeSection 8, RA 8552
The following may not be adopted:

(1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child during minority.

(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and

(3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded.
Who May Be Adopted. — The following may be adopted:

(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for adoption;

(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;

(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy;

(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority;

(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or

(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died:
Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s).

Can Kris adopt Bimby without the consent of James Yap?

This issue is very interesting. RA 8552 does provide that an unwed mother can adopt her own child to raise the child’s status to that of a legitimate child. But, as I discussed above, RA 8552 also provides that the biological father’s consent is necessary. The issue of consent most often arises when the mother gets married and her husband wants to adopt her child. In this situation, courts require that the prospective adopter present the notarized affidavit of consent of the biological father.

But if Kris wants to adopt Bimby by herself, would she still need James’s consent? Kris will do a lot of women a big favor if she goes ahead with the adoption without asking for James’s consent. Perhaps then, if James refuses to give his consent, the issue can reach the Supreme Court.

Can Kris and James Yap jointly adopt Bimby?

No. RA 8552 and the Family Code speak of “joint adoption” by husband and wife.

By invoking the “best interest of the child doctrine,” can Kris and James file for Bimby’s adoption at the same time and in the same petition?

This novel and interesting possible remedy faces both practical and legal problems:

1. Right now, James Yap only has visitation rights over Bimby. If he is able to adopt Bimby, he will have parental authority over Bimby. Will Kris agree to James being able legally to decide on all matters relating to Bimby?

2. The Family Code speaks of parental authority in several ways:
  • an unwed mother’s exclusive parental authority over her child;
  • the spouse’s joint parental authority over their children;
  • the parental authority of a man and woman whose marriage has been declared void because of Article 36;
  • the parental authority of a man or woman whose spouse has died;
  • substitute parental authority by grandparents;
  • special parental authority of a school, its administrators, and teachers.
As you can see, the Family Code does not speak of parental authority by two unmarried persons over their common child.

If Kris adopts Baby James, will he later on be able to inherit from PNoy and the other Aquino siblings?

No. The legal effects of adoption, like the right to inherit, only apply to Kris and Baby James.

Should Kris adopt Bimby and Josh for purposes of inheritance?

It depends on whether Kris wants to get married again and have children with her husband.

1. If Kris gets married again and has children with her husband, then she should adopt Baby James and Josh. Why? So that Article 176 of the Family Code will not apply. Under Article 176, the legitime of an illegitimate child is only 50% of what a legitimate child is entitled to. If Kris adopts Baby James and Josh, they will be able to inherit from her as legitimate children.

2. If Kris does not plan to get married again, then she does not have to adopt Baby James and Josh. Why? Because Baby James and Josh are already protected financially by the provisions on intestate succession under the New Civil Code of the Philippines (NCC).

If Kris dies without a last will, then under Article 988 of the NCC, Baby James and Josh will inherit all of her estate. Since her parents Ninoy and Cory are dead, Baby James and Josh are her only compulsory heirs. The NCC excludes PNoy and the other siblings from inheriting from Kris. Please read my article “Heirs and inheritance (Part 3): Rights of illegitimate children when their parent dies without a last will”.

Another alternative for Kris in providing financially for Baby James and Josh is for her to execute a last will under Article 901 of the NCC; she can designate all of the so-called “free portion” to Baby James and Josh.

Monday, December 19, 2011

Senate impeachment rules in Chief Justice Corona’s trial (Plain English / Plain Language revisions)

What is Plain Language?

Related posts:

Plain English, Plain Language or Plain Writing for government offices and private companies in the Philippines

Plain Language revisions: DSWD Travel Clearance for Minors

Plain Language revisions: Public Attorney’s Office guidelines

Plain Language revisions: PVAO educational benefits

Plain Language revisions: RA 9994 Expanded rights of senior citizens

Plain Language revisions: PDIC notice to Banco Filipino depositors

Plain Language revisions: BSP Circular No. 702, Series of 2010 on protection of credit card holders

Plain Language revisions: DepEd Order No. 88 s. 2010
Before the start of Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez’s impeachment trial several months ago, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated in media interviews that the Senate “Rules Of Procedure On Impeachment Trials” should be written in plain language. Sen. Santiago said this was necessary for the public to understand the rules and because not all senators were lawyers.

Among other things, Sen. Santiago said that needless words (like “hereinunder”) must be omitted. She also said that the rules used old-fashioned English. Sadly, Sen. Santiago’s suggestions were not followed.

(Sen. Santiago is the author of two bills that require health insurance documents and all government communications, except regulations, to be written in plain language.)

With all due respect for the Senate, I am posting these Before and After revisions of its Rules of Impeachment (1) for the benefit of millions of Filipinos who are expected to follow on TV and radio the impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato Corona starting January 2012; and (2) to show what the impeachment rules could look like when written in Plain Language.

If there are discrepancies between the official Senate rules of procedure and my revisions, you must follow the official Senate rules.

BeforeAfter
I. When the Senate receives articles of impeachment pursuant to Article XI, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution, the President of the Senate shall inform the House of Representatives that the Senate shall take proper order on the subject of impeachment and shall be ready to receive the prosecutors on such time and date as the Senate may specify.
I. When the Senate receives articles of impeachment under Article XI, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution, the Senate President must inform the House of Representatives that the Senate will take proper order on the subject of impeachment and will be ready to receive the prosecutors on the time and date the Senate will specify.


Vague expression: What does “take proper order on the subject of impeachment” mean?

“Pursuant to” is legalese; it’s better to use “under” or “in accordance with” as Martin Cutts suggests in his “Plain English Lexicon.”

The word “shall” is repeatedly used in the Senate Rules of Impeachment. As Prof. Joseph Kimble has observed, the meaning of “shall” is ambiguous, changing from sentence to sentence. US courts have ruled that “shall” can mean (1) has a duty to; (2) should; (3) is; (4) will; or (5) may. To avoid this ambiguity, the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now use should, may, or must instead of “shall,” except in the rule on summary judgment (Michigan Bar Journal, December 2007). In these revisions, I replaced “shall” with what the context called for.

BeforeAfter
II. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside but shall not vote. Notice shall be given to him by the President of the Senate of the time and place fixed for the consideration of the articles of impeachment, with a request to attend. The Chief Justice shall be administered the oath or affirmation, prescribed under these Rules, by the President of the Senate and shall preside over the Senate during the consideration of said articles and upon the trial of the person impeached.

The President of the Senate shall preside in all other cases of impeachment and, for that purpose, placed under the prescribed oath or affirmation by any person authorized by law to administer an oath.



II. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court will preside but cannot vote.

The Senate President must notify the Chief Justice of the time and place fixed for considering the articles of impeachment and request him or her to attend.

The Senate President must administer the oath or affirmation prescribed under these Rules to the Chief Justice.

The Chief Justice must preside over the Senate during the consideration of the articles of impeachment and the trial.

The Senate President must preside in all other cases of impeachment. He or she must be placed under the prescribed oath or affirmation by any person authorized by law to administer an oath.

Question: What exactly is involved in “considering” the articles of impeachment? The words “consideration,” “considering,” and “consider” are used several times in the impeachment rules. Does “considering the articles of impeachment” refer only to that stage when the senators took their oath and ordered the issuance of the summons for Chief Justice Corona? Or does it refer to the whole impeachment trial? The phrase “shall preside over the Senate during the consideration of said articles and upon the trial of the person impeached” seems to indicate that there are two different stages. But Rule III says that the Senate must continue in session until it has rendered final judgment; this seems to indicate that these are not different stages.

Passive voice: Notice shall be given to him by the President of the Senate of the time and place fixed for the consideration of the articles of impeachment, with a request to attend.” I changed most passive voice sentences into the active voice. For example, this sentence became “The Senate President must notify the Chief Justice of the time and place fixed for considering the articles of impeachment and request him or her to attend.”

BeforeAfter
III. Before proceeding to the consideration of the articles of impeachment, the Presiding Officer shall administer the prescribed oath or affirmation to the Members of the Senate then present and to the other Members of the Senate as they shall appear, whose duty it shall be to take the same.

Upon presentation of the articles to the Senate, the Senate shall specify the date and time for the consideration of such articles. Unless the Senate provides otherwise, it shall continue in session from day to day (except Saturdays, Sundays, and nonworking holidays) until final judgment shall be rendered, and so much longer as may, in its judgment, be necessary.

Senators shall observe political neutrality during the course of the impeachment trial. “Political neutrality” shall be defined as exercise of public official’s duty without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or preference.
III. Before the Senate considers the articles of impeachment, the Presiding Officer must administer the prescribed oath or affirmation to the senators. All senators must take the oath or affirmation before they can participate in the impeachment proceedings.

Upon presentation of the articles to the Senate, it must specify the date and time to consider the articles. Unless the Senate provides otherwise, it must continue in session from day to day (except Saturdays, Sundays, and nonworking holidays) until it has rendered final judgment, or beyond if necessary.

Senators must observe political neutrality during the course of the impeachment trial. “Political neutrality” is the exercise of a public official’s duty without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or preference.

The phrase “Before proceeding to the consideration of the articles of impeachment” at the beginning of this Rule is a misplaced modifier. It appears that it is only the Presiding Officer (or the Senate President in this case) who will consider the articles of impeachment, not the whole Senate. I changed the phrase into the active voice: “Before the Senate considers the articles of impeachment”. (Again the question pops up, what does “consideration” or “consider” mean?)

The second paragraph states Upon presentation of the articles to the Senate.” Who makes the presentation to the Senate? The Presiding Officer?

The words “same,” “said,” and “such” should not be used as modifiers or as pronouns because they are vague. Bryan A. Garner, editor in chief of Black’s Law Dictionary, includes these words in his Dirty Dozen list. In the impeachment rules “same” as a pronoun is used five times; “said” is used seventeen times; and “such” is used nineteen times. (Please see the table below listing the various times “same,” “said,” and “such” are used in the impeachment rules.)

On the word “same,” Garner says:
Many lawyers use “same” as a pronoun because they think they are being precise. For example: “Once the indemnitee receives such notice, the indemnitee shall acknowledge same.” Use “it” instead of “same” (“it” is not less precise).

Ordinary pronouns are better than “same” because they differentiate singular from plural – “same” doesn’t.
On the word “such,” Garner explains:
“Such” is inherently ambiguous. To the educated non-lawyer, it means “of that kind”. To the lawyer, it means “the very one just mentioned”. “Such” can oftentimes be replaced by “the”.
On the word “said,” Scott P. Stolley in Michigan Bar Journal, August 2003 clarifies:
It is a crutch word that lends awkwardness, not precision. There is no need to say ‘‘To the Honorable Judge of Said Court.’’ Just say ‘‘To the Honorable Court.’ Don’t say: ‘‘The said witness saw the said defendant run the light.’’ Simply say ‘‘The witness saw the defendant run the light.’’
Rule III should instead have been devoted strictly to matters like (1) organizing the Senate into an impeachment court; (2) taking by the senators of their oath or affirmation; (3) issuing the summons; and (4) political neutrality.

Question: After the trial, if the Senate votes to remove Chief Justice Corona from his office, how will its judgment be executed? The Senate impeachment rules do not have any provision on the execution of judgment.

BeforeAfter
IV. The Presiding Officer shall have the power to make and issue, by himself or by the Secretary of the Senate, all orders, mandates, and writs authorized by these Rules or by the Senate, and to make and enforce such other regulations and orders in the premises as the Senate may authorize or provide.
IV. The Presiding Officer, by himself or by the Secretary of the Senate, has the power to issue and enforce all orders, mandates, writs, regulations, and orders authorized by these Rules or by the Senate.

Redundant expressions: (1) “make and issue”; (2) “make and enforce”; and (3) “authorize or provide.”

BeforeAfter
V. The Senate shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses, to enforce obedience to its orders, mandates, writs, and judgments, to preserve order, and to punish in a summary way contempts of, and disobedience to, its authority, orders, mandates, writs, or judgments, and to make all lawful orders, rules, and regulations which it may deem essential or conducive to the ends of justice. And the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate, under the direction of the President of the Senate, may employ such aid and assistance as may be necessary to enforce, execute, and carry into effect the lawful orders, mandates, and writs of the Senate.
V. The Senate has the power to:
  1. compel witnesses to attend;
  2. enforce obedience to its orders, mandates, writs, and judgments;
  3. preserve order;
  4. punish in a summary way contempt of, or disobedience to, its authority, orders, mandates, writs, or judgments; and
  5. make all orders, rules, and regulations it may consider essential to the ends of justice.
The Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate, as directed by the Senate President, may employ the aid of government agencies in enforcing the orders, mandates, and writs of the Senate.

Redundant expressions: “aid and assistance,” “enforce, execute, and carry into effect,” “essential or conducive.”

Vague: “Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate, under the direction of the President of the Senate, may employ such aid and assistance”. Aid and assistance from whom or from where?

The first sentence of Rule V has about 60 plus words. I broke up this long sentence into a vertical list. Prof. Kimble says in his article “Lessons in Drafting from the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” (Michigan Bar Journal, August 2007):
“The vertical list is one of the drafter’s—and reader’s—best friends. Probably no other technique is more useful for organizing complex information, breaking it down into manageable chunks, avoiding repetition, and preventing ambiguity.”
This Rule incorrectly uses the word “deem.” Garner in his book on language and writing says that “the word deem should create a legal fiction, not state a truth.” In “Synthesis: Legal Reading, Reasoning and Writing in Canada” (by Margaret Elizabeth McCallum, Christina L. Kunz, Deborah A. Schmedem), the authors recommend:
Avoid use of the term “to deem” as a substitute for “to think” or “to consider”. The word means “to treat [a thing] as being something that it is not, or possessing certain qualities it does not possess”. In this technical sense, “deem” is used in statutes to create a legal fiction; for example, a statute that requires applications to be originals signed by the applicant may provide that faxed applications will be deemed to be originals.
The phrase “all lawful orders, rules, and regulations which it may deem essential or conducive to the ends of justice” incorrectly uses the relative pronoun “which” instead of “that.” In formal American English, “that” is used for restrictive clauses while “which” (surrounded by commas) is used for non-restrictive clauses. A clause is non-restrictive if it merely provides additional information and can be removed without changing the meaning. In British English, there is no distinction between “that” and “which.” Most Filipinos, unaware of the difference between restrictive and non-restrictive clauses, use “which” instead of “that.” (I have also made this mistake on several occasions.) But to achieve precision in government communications, we must follow the American English distinction between the relative pronouns “that” and “which.” (Please read Jose Carillo’s English Forum article “Learning to use the relative pronouns confidently.”)

BeforeAfter
VI. The President of the Senate or the Chief Justice when presiding on the trial may rule on all questions of evidence including, but not limited to, questions of materiality, relevancy, competency or admissibility of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the Senate, unless a Member of the Senate shall ask that a formal vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the Senate for decision after one contrary view is expressed; or the Presiding Officer may at his/her option, in the first instance, submit any such question to a vote of the Members of the Senate. The motion for a vote and the contrary opinion shall not take more than two (2) minutes each, with a one minute rebuttal allowed for the proponent of the motion. The provisions of the Rules of the Senate and the revised Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily whenever applicable.VI. The Presiding Officer may rule on:
  1. questions of evidence such as materiality, relevancy, competency or admissibility; and
    • incidental questions.
    The ruling will stand as the judgment of the Senate. But if a senator asks that a formal vote be taken on the ruling, the Presiding Officer must submit the ruling for the Senate’s decision, after one contrary opinion has been expressed.

    The motion for a vote and the contrary opinion must not take more than two minutes each, with a one minute rebuttal allowed for the motion’s proponent.

    Instead of ruling by himself or herself, the Presiding Officer can choose to submit any question for the Senate’s vote.

    When an issue is not covered by these Rules, the Senate can resort to its Rules and the revised Rules of Court.

    The first sentence of Rule VI is an ultra long sentence, with about 100 words. I revised it by dividing it into three sentences, with the first sentence using a vertical list.

    The phrase “such as, but not limited to” is legalese and can be changed to “such as” without any negative legal effect.

    The word “suppletorily” is jargon. Instead of the sentence “The provisions of the Rules of the Senate and the revised Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily whenever applicable.”, I changed it to “When an issue is not covered by these Rules, the Senate can resort to its Rules and the revised Rules of Court.”

    BeforeAfter
    VII. Upon the presentation of articles of impeachment and the organization of the Senate as hereinbefore provided, a writ of summons shall be issued to the person impeached, reciting or incorporating said articles, and notifying him/her to appear before the Senate upon a day and at a place to be fixed by the Senate and named in such writ, and to file his/her Answer to said articles of impeachment within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt thereof; to which the prosecutors may Reply within a non-extendible period of five (5) days therefrom; and to stand to and abide by the orders and judgments of the Senate.

    Such writ shall be served by such officer or person named in the order thereof, not later than three (3) days prior to the day fixed for such appearance of the person impeached, either by the delivery of an attested copy thereof to the person impeached, or if personal service cannot be done, service of the writ may be made by leaving a copy with a person of sufficient age and discretion at his/her last known address or at his/her office or place of business; and if the service of such writ shall fail the proceedings shall not thereby abate, but further service may be made in such manner as the Senate shall direct. If the person impeached, after service, shall fail to appear, either in person or by counsel, on the day so fixed or, appearing, shall fail to file his answer to such articles of impeachment, the trial shall proceed nevertheless as upon a plea of not guilty. If a plea of guilty shall be entered, judgment may be entered thereon without further proceedings.






    VII. The Senate must issue a writ of summons to the person impeached. The writ must:
    1. recite or incorporate the articles;
    2. notify the person impeached to appear before the Senate on the day and place fixed by the Senate;
    3. order the person impeached to file an Answer to the articles within a non-extendible period of ten days from receipt of the summons, with copy furnished to the panel of prosecutors; and
    4. order the person impeached to abide with the orders and judgments of the Senate.
    The officer or person charged with serving the writ must serve it not later than three days before the day fixed for the appearance of the person impeached either by:
    1. delivering an attested copy of the writ to the person impeached; or
    2. if personal service cannot be done, by leaving the copy with a person of sufficient age and discretion at his or her last known address, office, or place of business.
    If the writ cannot be served in the ways stated above, the Senate can direct that the summons be served in some other manner.

    The trial will proceed even if:
    1. the person impeached, after due service of the writ, fails to appear either in person or by counsel, on the day fixed in the summons; or
    2. the person impeached fails to file his Answer to the articles of impeachment.
    After the prosecutors have received the Answer, they have a non-extendible period of five days to file their Reply.

    This Rule should have been incorporated into Rule III (or placed after it). The phrase “Upon the presentation of articles of impeachment and the organization of the Senate as hereinbefore provided” raises two questions: One, as I have noted before, who presents the articles of impeachment to the Senate? Does presenting the articles refer to the submission of the articles to the Senate by the House of representatives? Or does it refer to the Presiding Officer informing the Senate that the articles have been submitted to it?

    Two, “organization of the Senate” into what? Into an impeachment court, of course, but this is not clearly provided. To what Rule does hereinbefore provided” refer to? As I said above, Rule III should have been clearly devoted to matters like (1) organizing the Senate into an impeachment court; (2) taking by the senators of their oath or affirmation; (3) issuing the summons; and (4) political neutrality.

    The sentences in this section are too long. I made them simpler by using numbered lists.

    Vague: What does “to stand to ... the orders and judgments of the Senate” mean?

    The phrase “prior to” is legalese. As Prof. Kimble suggests, the simpler word “before” should be used instead.

    The provisions on (1) the filing of a Reply by the prosecutors and (2) entering of a plea of guilty should have been placed in the other Rules.

    BeforeAfter
    XII. The Secretary of the Senate shall record the proceedings in cases of impeachment as in the case of legislative proceedings, and the same shall be reported in the same manner as the legislative proceedings of the Senate.
    XII. The Secretary of the Senate must record and report the proceedings in impeachment cases in the same manner as the legislative proceedings of the Senate.

    Rule XII is verbose: the word “proceedings” is used three times in a single sentence, and the second part of the sentence (after the word “and”) can easily be incorporated into the first part.

    I changed the phrase “in cases of impeachment” to “impeachment cases.” Prof. Kimble says in his article “Lessons in Drafting from the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” (Michigan Bar Journal, November 2007) says that we should root out unnecessary prepositional phrases and question every of.

    BeforeAfter
    XIII. Counsel for the parties shall be admitted to appear and be heard upon an impeachment: Provided, That counsel for the prosecutors shall be under the control and supervision of the panel of prosecutors of the House of Representatives.
    XIII. The person impeached and the panel of prosecutors of the House of Representatives can be represented by their lawyers. The lawyer for the panel of prosecutors must be under its control and supervision.


    The phrase “Counsel for the parties shall be admitted to appear and be heard upon an impeachment” is a formalism. I changed the word “counsel” to the ordinary term “lawyer.”

    Kimble down with provided thatI removed the proviso (Provided, That ...). Prof. Kimble in his article “Down with Provided That” (Michigan Bar Journal, July 2004) enumerates the criticisms made by legal drafting experts against provisos. Among others, Kimble cites:

    [1] Thomas R. Haggard, Legal Drafting in a Nutshell 279 (2d ed. 2003): ‘‘[P]rovided that . . . defies grammatical analysis. Provisos produce single sentences that are often hundreds of words long. Knowledgeable drafters have railed against them for years. Apart from being a grammatical abomination, provided that is ambiguous . . . .’’

    [2] David Mellinkoff, Mellinkoff ’s Dictionary of American Legal Usage 520 (1992): ‘‘[The proviso] is one of the horrors of legal writing, in a class with notwithstanding.’’
    BeforeAfter
    XVI. If a Senator is called as a witness, he/she shall be sworn, and give his/her testimony standing in his/her place.
    ?




    What exactly does “give his/her testimony standing in his/her place” mean? In our trial courts, the witness usually sits beside the judge’s table (so that the judge can clearly hear the testimony and observe the demeanor of the witness). If you remember from the impeachment trial of former President Joseph Estrada, the senator-judges were sitting in one section of the Senate hall and in front of them was a chair reserved for the witness called to testify. The lawyers for President Estrada and the House panel of prosecutors were on opposite sides of the hall, at right angles to where the senator-judges were. Does Rule XVI mean that the senator-witness will not sit down in the place reserved for the testifying witness but instead will testify while standing up in the section of the hall reserved for the senator-judges? This seems to be what Rule XVI is saying because Rule XXI states: “Thereafter, each Senator, as his/her name is called, shall rise in his/her place and answer: guilty or not guilty.”

    But what’s the point in requiring the senator called as a witness to stand up while testifying? What if the senator is arthritic and cannot stand up for a long period of time? Will it be a violation of Rule XVI if the senator requests that he or she be allowed to sit down while testifying?

    BeforeAfter
    XXI. The trial of all the articles of impeachment shall be completed before the Senators vote on the final question on whether or not the impeachment is sustained. On the final question whether the impeachment is sustained, the vote shall be taken on each article of impeachment separately; and if the impeachment shall not, upon any of the articles presented, be sustained by the votes of two-thirds of all the Members, a judgment of acquittal shall be entered; but if the person impeached in such articles of impeachment shall be convicted upon any of said articles by the votes of two-thirds of all the Members, the Senate shall proceed to pronounce judgment of conviction, and a certified copy of such judgment shall be deposited in the Office of the Secretary of the Senate. A motion to reconsider the vote by which any article of impeachment is sustained or rejected shall not be in order.

    XXI. The Senate must complete the trial of all the articles of impeachment before it votes on whether the person impeached is guilty or not.

    The Senate must vote on each article of impeachment. An affirmative vote of two-thirds of all the senators is necessary to convict the person impeached of any of the articles of impeachment.

    If the impeachment is not sustained on any of the articles of impeachment, the Senate must render a judgment of acquittal.

    If the person impeached is convicted on any of the articles of impeachment, the Senate must render a judgment of conviction for that article.

    A certified copy of the judgment, whether for acquittal or conviction, must be deposited in the Office of the Secretary of the Senate.

    A motion for reconsideration of the vote on any of the articles of impeachment is not allowed

    Redundant expressions: The phrase “on the final question on whether or not the impeachment is sustained” is used twice (first and second sentences). The phrase “by the votes of two-thirds of all the Members” is used twice in the second sentence.

    In the clause “the vote shall be taken on each article of impeachment separately,” the adverb “separately” is unnecessary or redundant because of the word “each.“

    The second sentence is ultra long with 105 words, and is complex, dealing with several issues (voting on each article; judgment of acquittal; judgment of conviction; two-thirds vote; and deposit of the judgment). I broke up this sentence into five sentences (in four paragraphs).

    Rule XXI uses the words “enter” and “pronounce” in connection with “judgment.” I used the word “render” instead.


    I will be adding more revisions and refining them as the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona unfold. If you have your own plain language revisions that can make the Senate rules on impeachment more understandable for the public, please send them to me at gtgalacio@yahoo.com. I am sure that some of you have noticed that the impeachment rules use a lot of nominalizations (verbs turned into nouns). Can you spot the nominalizations or “nouners” as Prof. Kimble calls them?


    SameSaidSuch
    Rule III

    whose duty it shall be to take the
    same.

    Rule IX

    the
    same shall be recorded

    Rule XII. The Secretary of the Senate shall record the proceedings in cases of impeachment as in the case of legislative proceedings, and the same shall be reported in the
    same manner as the legislative proceedings of the Senate.


    Rule XVIII

    The
    same shall likewise apply to the prosecutors, to the person impeached, and to their respective counsel and witnesses.

    Rule XXIII

    it being necessary to use the
    same as testimony.

















    Rule II

    during the consideration of
    said articles

    Rule VII

    reciting or incorporating
    said articles

    file his/her Answer to said articles of impeachment

    Rule XI

    adjournment of the Senate sitting in
    said trial

    XXI

    be convicted upon any of
    said articles

    Rule XXIII

    Presiding Officer of the said Senate

    the service of
    said subpoena

    the
    said ______

    the
    said ______

    the accusations as set forth in
    said articles

    the said ________

    to answer to the
    said articles of impeachment

    Presiding Officer of the
    said Senate

    Form of Order to be indorsed on said writ of summons.

    mentioned in the
    said writ of summons.

    mentioned in the
    said writ of summons.

    Presiding Officer of the
    said Senate










    Rule I

    to receive the prosecutors on
    such time and date

    Rule III

    for the consideration of
    such articles

    enforce
    such other regulations and orders

    employ
    such aid and assistance

    Rule VI

    submit any such question to a vote

    Rule VII

    named in
    such writSuch writ shall be served

    day fixed for
    such appearance of the person impeached

    if the service of
    such writ shall fail

    made in
    such manner as the Senate shall direct

    answer to such articles of impeachment

    Rule VIII

    I have performed
    such service

    Rule X

    at such other hour as the Senate may order

    Rule XI

    the Presiding Officer upon
    such trial

    Rule XXI

    the person impeached in
    such articles of impeachment

    certified copy of
    such judgment

    Rule XXIII
    such proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments

    perform
    such orders, directions, and judgments

    Rule XXIV

    fix a day and hour for resuming
    such consideration




    Notes: (1) Please read my post “Plain English, Plain Language or Plain Writing for government offices and private companies in the Philippines.” (2) I conduct seminars for government offices or private companies that want to train their staff in Plain English. Please email me at gtgalacio@yahoo.com or text 0927-798-3138 for details. (3) For interactive grammar exercises, please visit my “Better English for everyone” website; I also have interactive quizzes on Plain English / Plain Language. (4) If the tables do not look right, try using Mozilla Firefox or Google Chrome.

    Saturday, December 10, 2011

    Ad cautelam: filing of pleadings and appearing in court to question its jurisdiction or as a precautionary measure

    1. Plain English / Plain Language version of “ad cautelam”

    Instead of “ad cautelam” or “ex abundanti ad cautelam,” lawyers should simply use the phrase “with express reservation on jurisdiction.” (By the speaker on Civil Procedure, from Romulo Mabanta, in an MCLE seminar sponsored by the Quezon City IBP)

    2. “Taguig vs. Makati” June 15, 2016, G.R. No. 20839 (Supreme Court ruling on forum shopping, splitting a single cause of action, and ad cautelam pleadings):

    This case centers on the issue of whether respondent City of Makati engaged in forum shopping in simultaneously pursuing:

    (1) Petition for Annulment under Rule 47 with the Court of Appeals of the July 8, 2011 Regional Trial Court Decision; and

    (2) Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam (later Appeal) of the same July 8, 2011 RTC Decision.

    Makati emphasized that its Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal were mere precautionary measures. Appending the phrase “ad cautelam” to an application for relief does not alter the nature of the remedy being pursued. Had it been granted by the trial court, the Motion for Reconsideration — ad cautelam or otherwise - would have ultimately resulted in the setting aside of the assailed decision.
    The Latin term “ad cautelam” can be translated into English as “for security,” “as a precaution,” or “to be on the safe side.” The phrase“ex abundanti ad cautela” means “with extreme caution.”

    The Revised Rules of Court do not have a specific provision on ad cautelam. But lawyers have used it in at least two ways:

    1. To question a court’s jurisdiction and at the same time be able to file pleadings, lawyers can caption their pleadings as “ad cautelam.”In court hearings, lawyers must inform the judge that they are questioning the court’s jurisdiction;

    2. To preserve a party’s remedies, lawyers can file an “ad cautelam” pleading as a precautionary measure .

    Using ad cautelam to file pleadings or ask for reliefs while questioning a court’s jurisdiction

    1. GMA’s electoral sabotage case before the Pasay City RTC

    Lawyers for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) have been filing pleadings captioned “ad cautelam” with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court. They are questioning before the Supreme Court the RTC’s jurisdiction over the electoral sabotage case filed by the COMELEC against the former president. But at the same time, they have been asking the RTC for certain reliefs for GMA like hospital arrest, the use of a cellphone and laptop, etc. By captioning their pleadings with ad cautelam, these lawyers are reminding the RTC that they are not accepting its jurisdiction over the case.

    2. Does a rehabilitation court have jurisdiction over a partially executed NLRC decision?

    Many years ago, I represented a former hotel chef. He had won his NLRC case for back wages against the hotel, and the decision had been partially executed. But the hotel filed for corporate rehabilitation with the Regional Trial Court in Manila, and the judge ordered all parties with money claims against the hotel to file their Answer. Parties who failed to file their Answer could no longer pursue their claims.

    If I had filed an Answer for my client, it would have meant that I was accepting the court’s jurisdiction. My theory was that the NLRC had jurisdiction because it was a labor case and its decision had been partially executed. But as a precaution, I filed with the Manila RTC a pleading captioned “Manifestation/Motion ex abundanti ad cautelam”. In the pleading, I stated that while my client was complying with the court’s order, he was questioning its jurisdiction. In layman’s terms, it was better safe than sorry.

    Using ad cautelam as a precautionary measure

    1. Aguedo F. Agbayani, petitioner, vs. The Commission On Elections And Rafael M. Colet, respondents. G.R. No. 87440-42 June 13, 1990

    Agbayani, a Pangasinan gubernatorial candidate, filed pre-proclamation protest cases against his political rival Colet. When Colet was proclaimed as governor, Agbayani filed an election protest. Because of his pending pre-proclamation cases, he captioned his election protest ex abundante ad cautelam. The Comelec, acting on the election protest, required Colet to file a responsive answer. Agbayani then filed a reply, which he also captioned ad cautelam.

    The Comelec dismissed Agbayani’s pre-proclamation cases and his motion for reconsideration. It said that the pre-proclamation controversy became moot and academic when Agbayani filed the election protest and his reply, even if they were both captioned ad cautelam.

    Agbayani appealed to the Supreme Court. Ruling in his favor, the Court noted that Agbayani filed the election protest ad cautelam (or “for safety’s sake) just in case the Comelec dismissed his pre-proclamation cases. For the upcoming barangay elections, a Comelec resolution provided that all ballot boxes would be used for the barangay elections, unless they were not involved in any pre-proclamation-controversy, election protest, or official investigation. Agbayani thus wanted to preserve all the ballot boxes and their contents so that he could file an election protest later on. The Court said:
    As the above-mentioned cases involved only nine precincts, it was only prudent for the petitioner to file his protest ad cautelam in case the pre-proclamation controversy was ultimately dismissed and it became necessary for him to activate his protest. The protest would involve all the precincts in the province. If he had not taken this precaution, an the other ballot boxes would have been emptied and their contents would have been burned and forever lost.
    As to Agbayani’s filing of a reply, the Court said:
    It was not the fault of the petitioner if the COMELEC decided to give due course to the protest right away even if it was ad cautelam. The protest was at that time only tentative, awaiting the disposition of the pre-proclamation controversy. The petitioner did file a reply to the private respondent’s answer with counter-protest, but it was only to prevent any declaration that he had by his inaction waived, the right to file responsive pleadings. Such a reply did not make the pre-proclamation controversy moot and academic.

    Most indicative of the petitioner’s intention is the express reservation he made in the protest ad cautelam itself, where he clearly stated:
    As additional precautionary measure, the protestant herein is filing this protest and cautela(m), without withdrawing his petitions in said pre-proclamation controversy, in order to exempt from the provisions of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2035 the precincts hereinafter specified. (Emphasis supplied)
    2. Francisco I. Chavez, Petitioner, versus Commission On Elections, Respondent. G. R. No. 105323, July 3, 1992. G. R. No. 105323, July 3, 1992

    Former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, a senatorial candidate in the 1992 elections, alleged that he lost at least 1.7 million votes because of a nuisance candidate with the same surname as his. On May 23, 1992, he filed an urgent petition before the Comelec asking it to [1] implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de oficio; [2] to re-open the ballot boxes in 13 provinces including the National Capital Region involving some 80,348 precincts and to scan for the “Chavez” votes for purposes of crediting the same in his favor; [3] make the appropriate entries in the election returns/certificates of canvass; and [4] to suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.

    Dissatisfied with the failure of the Comelec to act on his petition, Chavez filed with the Supreme Court an urgent Petition Ad Cautelam for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate, without first implementing respondent Comelec’s resolution of May 12, 1992 and acting upon petitioner’s letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992.

    On June 4, 1992, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the 24th winning senatorial candidate and setting the case for hearing on June 9, 1992. On the same day, Chavez filed a manifestation stating that on May 30, 1992, his urgent petition dated May 22, 1992 was dismissed by the Comelec. He also prayed that the Petition Ad Cautelam be considered a regular petition.

    On June 8, 1992, Senator Agapito Aquino (the 24th ranked senator) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene with Comment in Intervention praying for the dismissal of Chavez’s petition. Sen. Aquino argued that the petition was in the nature of a pre-proclamation controversy, which was not allowed in elections involving senators.

    The Supreme Court ruled in Sen. Aquino’s favor, stating that Chavez’s proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

    3. Hongkong And Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, petitioner, vs. Cecilia Diez Catalan, respondent. G.R. No. 159590, October 18, 2004, and HSBC International Trustee Limited, petitioner, vs. Cecilia Diez Catalan, respondent. G.R. No. 15959, October 18, 2004

    Sometime in March 1997, Frederick Arthur Thomson (Thomson) issued five HSBANK checks amounting to HK$3,200,000.00, payable to Cecilia Diez Catalan (Catalan). When the checks were deposited, HSBANK returned them purportedly for reason of “payment stopped” pending confirmation, despite the fact that the checks were duly funded.

    In January 2001, Catalan filed before the RTC a complaint for a sum of money with damages against HSBANK due to its alleged refusal to pay her the value of the checks issued by Thomson.

    In September 2001, Catalan filed an Amended Complaint impleading petitioner HSBC TRUSTEE as co-defendant and invoking Article 19 of the Civil Code as basis for her cause of action. Catalan prayed that HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE be ordered to pay Php 20,864,000.00 representing the value of the five checks at the rate of Php 6.52 per HK$1 as of January 29, 2001 for the acts of HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in refusing to pay the amount justly due her, in addition to moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

    HSBANK filed a motion for extension of time to file an Answer or a motion to dismiss. On October 2, 2001, HSBANK filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint alleging, among other grounds, that it did not submit to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it filed its motion for extension of time.

    On the other hand, HSBC TRUSTEE, without submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, filed a Special Appearance for Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over it. HSBC TRUSTEE alleged that tender of summons through HSBANK Makati did not confer upon the RTC jurisdiction over it.

    On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss. HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate motions for reconsideration but both were denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 20, 2002.

    On February 21, 2003, Catalan moved to declare HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in default for failure to file their Answer to the amended complaint.

    On March 5, 2003, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate “petitions for certiorari and/or prohibition” with the Court of Appeals (CA).

    Subsequently, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed before the RTC separate Answers ad cautelam, both dated March 18, 2003, as a “precaution against being declared in default and without prejudice to the separate petitions for certiorari and/or prohibition then pending with the CA”.

    Among several grounds for their appeals, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE alleged that the Court of Appeals committed serious error by holding that they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by filing an Answer to the Amended Complaint.

    Issue: Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE when they filed their respective Answers ad cautelam?

    The Supreme Court ruled:

    Against HSBANKIn favor of HSBC TRUSTEE
    The Rules of Court provides that a court generally acquires jurisdiction over a person through either a valid service of summons in the manner required by law or the person’s voluntary appearance in court.
    HSBANK initially filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer or Motion to Dismiss.
    HSBANK already invoked the RTC’s jurisdiction over it by praying that its motion for extension of time to file answer or a motion to dismiss be granted. The Court has held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
    Consequently, HSBANK’s expressed reservation in its Answer ad cautelam that it filed the same “as a mere precaution against being declared in default, and without prejudice to the Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition xxx now pending before the Court of Appeals” to assail the jurisdiction of the RTC over it is of no moment. Having earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time to file answer or motion to dismiss, HSBANK, effectively submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Court.
    In contrast, the filing by HSBC TRUSTEE of a motion to dismiss cannot be considered a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a conditional appearance, entered precisely to question the regularity of the service of summons. It is settled that a party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court, e.g., invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be considered to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. HSBC TRUSTEE has been consistent in all its pleadings in assailing the service of summons and the jurisdiction of the RTC over it.
    Thus, HSBC TRUSTEE cannot be declared in estoppel when it filed an Answer ad cautelam before the RTC while its petition for certiorari was pending before the CA. Such answer did not render the petition for certiorari before the CA moot and academic. The Answer of HSBC TRUSTEE was only filed to prevent any declaration that it had by its inaction waived the right to file responsive pleadings.

    4. “Taguig vs. Makati” June 15, 2016, G.R. No. 20839 (Supreme Court ruling on forum shopping, splitting a single cause of action, and ad cautelam pleadings):

    This case centers on the issue of whether respondent City of Makati engaged in forum shopping in simultaneously pursuing:

    (1) Petition for Annulment under Rule 47 with the Court of Appeals of the July 8, 2011 Regional Trial Court Decision; and

    (2) Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam (later Appeal) of the same July 8, 2011 RTC Decision.

    Makati emphasized that its Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal were mere precautionary measures. Appending the phrase “ad cautelam” to an application for relief does not alter the nature of the remedy being pursued. Had it been granted by the trial court, the Motion for Reconsideration — ad cautelam or otherwise - would have ultimately resulted in the setting aside of the assailed decision.

    More to come. For now, let me leave you with this quote from Congressman Ronnie Zamora. During the 2005 impeachment deliberations against GMA, Congressman Zamora said that his father told him: “Keep away from lawyers who start their sentences with ex abundanti ad cautela.”

    Friday, October 21, 2011

    Heirs and inheritance (Part 9): Last will must be probated; Preterition - when a compulsory heir is omitted in a last will

    Legal procedures in the probate of a last will:

    Rule 75 Production of Will; Allowance of Will Necessary
    Rule 76
    Allowance or Disallowance of Will
    Rule 77
    Allowance of Will Proved Outside of Philippines
    Rule 78
    Letters Testamentary and of Administration of Estate Thereunder
    Rule 79
    Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary; Petition and Contest for Letters of Administration
    Rule 80
    Special Administrators
    Rule 81
    Bonds of Executors and Administrators
    Rule 82
    Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation and removal of Executors and Administrators
    Rule 83
    Inventory and Appraisal; Provision for Support of Family
    Rule 84
    General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators
    Rule 85
    Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators
    Rule 86
    Claims Against Estate
    Rule 87
    Actions by and against Executors and Administrators
    Rule 88
    Payments of the Debts of the Estate
    Rule 89
    Sales, Mortgages, and Other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent
    Rule 90
    Distribution and Partition of the Estate
    Philippine law requires that a will, whether notarial or holographic, must be probated or allowed by a court before it can be given effect. Rule 75 of the Rules of Court states:
    Sec. 1. Allowance necessary; Conclusive as to execution. - No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
    The Register of Deeds will not transfer the titles of lands to the persons named in the will unless they submit the court order approving the will.

    The Regional Trial Court of the place where the testator (the person who executed the last will) died has jurisdiction over the probate of the will.

    Within twenty days after knowing of the testator's death, the person who has custody of the will must deliver the will to the court or to the person named in the will as executor. In case of that person’s refusal to deliver the will, the court can impose a fine or order that person’s imprisonment until it is delivered.

    Who may petition for the probate of the will?

    Section 1 of Rule 76 states:
    Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
    What if a compulsory heir is omitted in a last will?

    This situation leads to what is called in law as “preterition.” It is covered by Articles 854 and 855 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
    Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

    If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.

    Art. 855. The share of a child or descendant omitted in a will must first be taken from the part of the estate not disposed of by the will, if any; if that is not sufficient, so much as may be necessary must be taken proportionally from the shares of the other compulsory heirs.
    Simply stated, the law protects the right of the omitted compulsory heirs. The heirs can ask the court to annul the institution of heirs in the will. As Article 855 states, their share will be taken first from the so-called free portion; if that is not sufficient to complete their legitimes, the deficiency will be taken proportionally from the shares of the other heirs.

    No preterition if compulsory heirs are mentioned in the will but get less than wh
    at they are entitled to under the law

    Preterition does not occur if the testator mentions the compulsory heirs in the last will but assigns to them an amount less than what they are entitled under the law. In this situation, the disadvantaged heirs can compel the other heirs to contribute until their legitimes are satisfied.

    Depriving compulsory heirs of their inheritance

    The only way for compulsory heirs to be deprived of their inheritance is through a valid disinheritance. Please read my posts: