Family Code of the Philippines: Primer on illegitimate children

Summary: 1. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in the Family Code. (Please read the related post If a wife gets pregnant by a man not her husband, will the child be legitimate or illegitimate?) 2. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. 3. A petition for compulsory recognition of an illegitimate child must be filed during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 4. Illegitimate children must use the surname of their mother. They are under the exclusive parental authority of their mother. RA 9255, however, gives illegitimate children the right to use their biological father’s surname under certain conditions. But the children remain illegitimate even if they use their biological father’s surname in their birth certificates; their father cannot exercise parental authority over them. 5. If the biological father does not acknowledge the child, the entry for middle name in the birth certificate must be left blank. 6. The legitime (share in the inheritance) of each illegitimate child is one-half of a legitimate child’s legitime. 7. Illegitimate children are entitled to financial support. 8. If the mother of an illegitimate child dies, who will exercise parental authority? 9. Related posts: Visitation rights over illegitimate children What surname should illegitimate children use? Computing the legitimes of legitimate and illegitimate children; an illegitimate child gets one-half DNA testing to prove legitimacy or illegitimacy of children; Supreme Court’s New Rule on DNA Evidence If a wife gets pregnant by a man not her husband, will the child be legitimate or illegitimate?

(Note: Click the graphic to download a free PDF newsletter on the topic “Visitation rights over illegitimate children.” This PDF is for your personal, non-commercial use only; you must not upload it to any website, blog, file-sharing platform, or the cloud.)

Articles 175 and 176 of the Family Code provide for the ways by which illegitimate children can establish their filiation, and their rights as to their surname and inheritance. (Republic Act 9255, approved on February 24, 2004, amended Art. 176.)

Who are illegitimate children?

Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in the Family Code.

How can illegitimate children establish their filiation?

Illegitimate children may establish their filiation (or relationship with their biological parent) in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

How can the filiation of legitimate children (and of illegitimate children) be proved?

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of these evidence, the legitimate filiation is proved by:

1.] The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

What is the difference between voluntary recognition and compulsory recognition of an illegitimate child?

Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth appearing in the civil register, a final judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no further court action and is, therefore, not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition be brought during the lifetime of the putative parent.

Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other hand, may be demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents and must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents.

(Divinagracia v. Bellosillo, No. L-47407, 12 August 1986, 143 SCRA 356; Victoria C. Tayag, Petitioner, vs. Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, Respondent, G.R. No. 174680, March 24, 2008)

Who should file the action to claim the status of an illegitimate child? When should it be filed?

Based on Article 175, the action (or court case, in simpler terms) to claim the status of an illegitimate child must be filed:

• by the guardian of a child who is a minor, or is incapacitated or insane, during the child’s lifetime;
• by the child, upon reaching the age of majority;
• by the child’s heirs if the child dies during minority or insanity, within five years from the death.

If the child dies after reaching the age of majority without filing the action, the heirs cannot file it.

If the ground for filing the action is open and continuous possession of the status of a illegitimate child, it must be filed during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (Article 175, 2nd paragraph)

What surname should illegitimate children use?

(Note: Please read my post “What surname should illegitimate children use?”)

Illegitimate children should use the surname and be under the parental authority of their mother. They are entitled to support in conformity with the Family Code. (Article 176, Family Code)

Republic Act 9255, approved on February 24, 2004, amended Article 176. Under RA 9255, illegitimate children may use surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. The father, however, has the right to file an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation.

If the father does not recognize the child, the entry for middle name in the birth certificate must be left blank

In the case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, the Supreme Court ruled:

Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father’s surname.

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother’ surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged child.(Emphasis by boldfacing supplied)

How much is the legitime (share in the inheritance) of an illegitimate child?

The legitime of each illegitimate child is one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Please read “Computing the legitimes of legitimate and illegitimate children; an illegitimate child gets one-half”.

Illegitimate children are entitled to financial support

1. If the illegitimate children have not been recognized by their biological father, they can file a petition for compulsory recognition and financial support. They can ask the court to compel the father to undergo DNA testing. (Please read DNA testing to prove legitimacy or illegitimacy of children; Supreme Court’s New Rule on DNA Evidence)

2. If the father has recognized the illegitimate children by signing the birth certificate or through a written document, they can file a petition for Protection Order for support under Section 8, paragraph (g) of RA 9262. (If the father claims that his signature or the document was forged, they can ask the court to compel him to undergo DNA testing.)

Through a Protection Order, the court will order the father and his employer to set aside a certain percentage of his salary to be remitted directly to the children on a monthly basis. If the father or his employer, or both fail to do so, they can be charged with contempt of court.

The Family Code does not provide a specific percentage of the monthly salary for the support. It only provides that amount of support is balanced between the necessities of the person asking for support and the financial capability of the person from whom support is being asked. Support can be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.

If the mother of an illegitimate child dies, who will exercise parental authority?

An OFW from the Middle East e-mailed me asking about his right to his illegitimate children since the mother has died. He said that he wants custody of his children, but the maternal grandparents refuse to let the children be with him.

Article 212 of the Family Code states: “In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority.”

I stand to be corrected, but I do not think that Article 212 applies in this situation. Notice that it says “the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority.” But under Article 176 of the Family Code, sole parental authority belongs to the mother. The biological father does not have any parental authority, and so, in case of the mother’s death, what parental authority can he “continue” to exercise?

I think Article 214 of the Family Code provides a possible answer. It says:

In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority.

The question is which grandparents – the maternal grandparents or the paternal grandparents? Again based on Article 176, I will say that it is the grandparents on the illegitimate child’s mother side who should exercise parental authority.

In the situation of that OFW I told you about above, he can of course file a petition in court for parental authority to be granted to him. He can file a petition to this effect or file for adoption of his illegitimate children under RA 8552. Either way, if the court grants his petition, he will have parental authority over his children.

Family Code of the Philippines: Primer on paternity, filiation, and legitimate children

Related post: “If a wife gets pregnant by a man not her husband, will the child be legitimate or illegitimate?”

Articles 163 up to 174 of the Family Code deal with the issues of paternity, filiation, and legitimate children. (We will discuss in the next primer the Family Code provisions on illegitimate children.) At the latter portion of this primer are the highlights of the Supreme Court rulings in “Locsin vs. Locsin” (on the importance of a birth certificate in proving filiation, and the lack of value of an alleged child’s picture taken at the funeral of the alleged father) and “De Jesus vs. Dizon” (on the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate).

What are the kinds of filiation of children?

The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate.

What is the status of a child born during the marriage of its parents?

Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

What about children conceived by artificial insemination?

Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.

Who are illegitimate children?

Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in the Family Code.

How can the legitimacy of a child be impugned or questioned?

Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:

1. That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:

(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;

(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or

(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;

2. That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or

3. That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.

What if the mother states that her child is in fact illegitimate? What if the mother was sentenced by a court as being an adulteress?

The child is considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

What rules govern when the marriage is terminated and the mother marries within 3oo days after the former marriage is terminated?

If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:

1. A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage;

2. A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.

Who has the burden of proof in proving or disproving the filiation of a child born after 300 days following the termination of the former marriage?

The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage must be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.

When should the action to impugn or question the legitimacy of a child be filed in court?

1. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child must be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.

2. If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the paragraph above or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period must be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.

In what instances can the heirs of a husband impugn or question the filiation of an alleged child?

The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:

1. If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;

2. If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or

3. If the child was born after the death of the husband.

How can the filiation of legitimate children be proved?

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation must be proved by:

1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Within what periods should the claim for legitimacy be pursued?

The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and will be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

What are the rights of legitimate children?

Legitimate children have the right:

1. To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;

2. To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and

3. To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code.

Locsin vs. Locsin, G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001

A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry [from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied] has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.

Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.

De Jesus vs. Dizon, G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001

The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latter’s estate under the rules on succession.

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.

A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.

Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

Family Code of the Philippines: Primer on legal separation

Men and women in troubled marriages have a variety of options under the Family Code in ending their relationship. At the very least, spouses can ask the courts for the judicial separation of their property as provided for in Articles 134 up to 142. Under this option, the conjugal property is liquidated and each spouse gets his or her own respective share. But the marital ties still remain. At the opposite end of the spectrum of legal options is “declaration of nullity of the marriage” with Article 36 of the Family Code as the most commonly used justification. The conjugal property is also liquidated, and more importantly, the spouses are free to marry other persons.

The Family Code, under Articles 55 to 67, also provides for “legal separation” where the conjugal property is liquidated, and the spouses are free to live independently of each other but without the right to marry other persons since the marriage ties are still binding.

What are the grounds for legal separation?

1. Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

2. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

3. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

4. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;

5. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

6. Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

7. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;

8. Sexual infidelity or perversion;

9. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or

[10] Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

The term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption.

Under what circumstances may the petition for legal separation be denied?

The petition may be denied on any of the following grounds:

1. Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;

2. Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;

3. Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation;

4. Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;

5. Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or

6. Where the action is barred by prescription.

When should the petition for legal separation be filed?

An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause.

What is the so-called “cooling-off period”?

An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.

What are the duties of the Family Court in petitions for legal separation?

1. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable.

2. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

What happens when the petition is filed?

1. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.

2. The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.

3. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children.

What does Article 49 provide for?

Article 49 of the Family Code states, “During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided for in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.”

What are the effects if the court grants the petition for legal separation?

1. The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;

2. The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43[2];

3. The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of the Family Code; and

4. The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.

What about the donations made by the spouses to each other?

The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured.

The action to revoke the donation must be brought within five years from the time the decree of legal separation has become final.

What if there is reconciliation between the spouses while the petition is being heard by the court?

1. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation.

2. The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and

3. The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries.

What protection, if any, is provided for the creditors of the spouses?

Article 67 provides that the agreement to revive the former property regime shall be executed under oath and shall specify:

1. The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;

2. Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and

3. The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.

The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties.

The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim.

Family Code of the Philippines: Primer on the family and family home

Title V of the Family Code, specifically Articles 149 up to 162, defines what the family is, what family relations include and the procedures regarding the family home. (For the Biblical views on marriage and the family, please surf over to my “Legal issues and family matters” website.)

How does the Family Code define “family”?

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (Art. 149, Family Code)

Art. 149 speaks of “family relations.” What are included under the term “family relations”?

Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (Art. 150)

Art. 149 states that “no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.” What’s an example of these destructive custom, practice or agreement?

Please read below (after this primer) excerpts of the Supreme Court decision in Concerned Employee vs. Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564. November 23, 2004. The Court said, among others, “Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, the sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized and likewise affirmed by our statutes as a special contract of permanent union. Accordingly, the Court has had little qualms with penalizing judicial employees for their dalliances with married persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.”

Please also read my discussion of the Estrada vs. Escritor ruling of the Supreme Court regarding live-in relationships and the Constitutional freedom of religion.

If there are lawsuits between members of the same family (like quarrels among brothers and sisters regarding their inheritance), what is the requirement, if any, of the Family Code?

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (Art. 151)

If brothers and sisters, for example, cannot agree on the sharing or partition of their inheritance, but they do not want to resort to the filing of cases in court, what legal remedy do they have?

They can avail of Republic Act 9285 or the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.” Under the said law, the Office of Alternative Dispute Resolution has been created under the Department of Justice, and it helps provide parties to settle their dispute through mediation, conciliation, arbitration and other means

What is a family home?

The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (Art. 152)

When is the family home deemed constituted?

The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Art. 153)

Who are the beneficiaries of the family home?

The beneficiaries of a family home are:

1. The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and

2. Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. (Art. 154)

Art. 153 states that the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. Are there any exceptions?

The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

1. For nonpayment of taxes;

2. For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

3. For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

5. For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. (Art. 155)

What may be constituted as a family home? Who may constitute a family home?

The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent.

The family home may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own property.

Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home. (Art. 156)

What is the value of the family home?

The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.

In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.

Urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. (Art. 157)

Can the family home be sold or otherwise alienated? Under what conditions?

The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide. (Art. 158)

What happens to the family home if the unmarried head of the family, or one or both spouses die?

The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (Art. 159)

Under what circumstances, other than Article 155, can the family home be subject to execution?

When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.

At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. (Art. 160)

How many family homes can a person constitute?

For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home. (Art. 161)

Art. 149 states that “no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.” The following are excerpts from the Supreme Court decision in the case of Concerned Employee vs. Mayor (A.M. No. P-02-1564. November 23, 2004) and illustrate what these destructive custom, practice or agreement are.

As correctly found by DCA Perez, most of the allegations stated in the anonymous letter-complaint were unsubstantiated. Thus, they were correctly disregarded. What becomes clear though from the facts is that respondent, a single woman, engaged in sexual relations with a married man, resulting in a child born out of wedlock. Respondent admitted just as much in her complaint for parental recognition and support filed on 19 May 1998, her admissions therein verified under oath. Moreover, the illicit liaison occurred during her employment with the judiciary. For this reason, the DCA recommends that respondent be found guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and suspended for six months.

Our landmark ruling in Estrada v. Escritor emphasizes that in determining whether the acts complained of constitute “disgraceful and immoral behavior” under the Civil Service Laws, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other should be kept in mind. The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed - albeit not exclusively - in the law, on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Thus, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose.

Thus, any judicial pronouncement that an activity constitutes “disgraceful and immoral” behavior under the contemplation of the Civil Service law must satisfy the test that such conduct is regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. Such judicial declarations cannot be mere effectuations of personal bias, notably those colored by particular religious mores. Nor would the demand be satisfied by the haphazard invocation of “cultural” values, without a convincing demonstration that these cultural biases have since been recognized and given accord within the realm of public policy. The Constitution and the statutes of the land would serve as especially authoritative sources of recognition, since they are irrefutable as to what the public policy is. At the same time, the constitutional protections afforded under the Bill of Rights should be observed, to the extent that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.

Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, the sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized and likewise affirmed by our statutes as a special contract of permanent union. Accordingly, the Court has had little qualms with penalizing judicial employees for their dalliances with married persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.

Please also read my discussion of the Estrada vs. Escritor ruling of the Supreme Court regarding live-in relationships and the Constitutional freedom of religion.

Family Code of the Philippines: Primer on rights and obligations between husband and wife

The rights and obligations of husbands and wives are covered by Title III of the Family Code, specifically from Articles 68 up to 73. Please surf over to my Salt and Light blog for a primer on the rights and obligations of husbands and wives, plus a discussion on the Biblical views about the roles of men and women.

Article 68 provides that “the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.” The legal word for living together and enjoying the rights and privileges of marriage is “consortium” or “coverture.” The case of Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio-Bildner (G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001 and G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001) revolved around the following issue: “May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.”

The decision penned by Justice Pardo states among other things that “coverture” is prompted by the spontaneous, mutual love and affection between husband and wife and cannot be enforced by any legal mandate or court order. The Court said:

“No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.”

Family Code of the Philippines: Primer on void and voidable marriages

(Note: Click the graphic to download a free PDF newsletter on this topic. This PDF is for your personal, non-commercial use only; you must not upload it to any website, blog, file-sharing platform, or the cloud.)

The complete provisions of the Family Code on void and voidable marriages are Articles 35 up to 54.

What marriages are void from the beginning?

Article 35 of the Family Code provides that the following marriages are void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless the marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;

(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered under the preceding Chapter;

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Update as of April 25, 2018: “SC recognizes divorce in marriage with foreigners” (Rappler) The Supreme Court (SC) en banc issued a landmark ruling on Tuesday, April 24, recognizing divorce in marriages with foreigners. Voting 10-3-1, the SC en banc ruled “that a foreign divorce secured by a Filipino against a foreign spouse is also considered valid in the Philippines, even if it is the Filipino spouse who files for divorce abroad.” “Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo” G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018 Based on a clear and plain reading of paragraph 2 of Article 26 (Family Code), the provision only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceedings wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.”

What is the famous “Article 36” of the Family Code? What is psychological incapacity?

Article 36 states that “a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”

The Family Code does not define what “psychological incapacity” is. But the Supreme Court in several decisions has clarified what “psychological incapacity” is. In the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court stated:

"Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

What marriages are considered incestuous and thus void?

Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

What marriages are void by reasons of public policy?

The following marriages are void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;

(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other party, killed his own wife or her own husband, or the other person's spouse.

The Family Code prohibits marriage “between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree.” What does “fourth civil degree” mean?

For example, Boy and Girl are first cousins:

Boy’s father is A. Girl’s mother is B. A and B are brother and sister. From Boy to his father A, one civil degree. From A to his parents (Boy’s grandparents), two civil degrees. From the parents down to B, three. From B to Girl, four civil degrees.

Boy and Girl therefore cannot get married since they are related within four civil degrees.

Who are people related by four civil degrees (and are therefore prohibited from getting married)?

First cousins (as in the example I gave above) are related by four civil degrees. An uncle and a niece (or an aunt and a nephew) are also within four civil degrees.

Can persons who find out that their marriage is bigamous simply declare by themselves that the marriage is void?

No, they cannot. They must file a petition asking the court to declare the marriage as void. (Article 40)

If the husband or wife has been missing for several years and could not be located despite earnest and diligent efforts, can the present spouse get married again?

Article 41 provides that a marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage is void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years is sufficient.

What step must the present spouse take to get married again?

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under Article 41, the spouse present must file a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

What happens if the spouse declared presumptively dead reappears later on?

The subsequent marriage is automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance must be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person; due notice must be given to the spouses of the subsequent marriage. The fact of reappearance can be disputed in court.

What are the effects if the subsequent marriage is terminated?

(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived before its termination are legitimate;

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, will be dissolved and liquidated, but if either or both spouses contracted marriage in bad faith, their share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property will be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage will remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, the donations will be revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if the designation is stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Liberty Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013 Issue: Is a marriage, entered into for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in exchange for $2,000, void on the ground of lack of consent? Background facts: Liberty Albios asked Daniel Lee Fringer to marry her so that she can acquire American citizenship. In return, Albios promised to give Fringer $2,000. After the wedding, they went their separate ways. Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with Albios. In turn, Albios did not pay Fringer the $2,000 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. Regional Trial Court rules that Albios and Fringer’s marriage is void for lack of consent Albios filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She described their marriage as made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio (from the start). The RTC ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking and that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, the marriage was a farce. Court of Appeals affirms RTC ruling The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that Albios and Fringer clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that Albios and Fringer never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000. Supreme Court rules that the marriage is valid Albios and Fringer's marriage is not void ab initio (from the start) and continues to be valid and subsisting. Consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. Their consent was conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage. Their consent was freely given as best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

What are the reasons for annulling a marriage?

Article 45 provides that a marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes existing at the time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless after coming to reason, the party freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless the party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, the party afterwards freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and the incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.

Article 45, paragraph (3) speaks of fraud that may annul a marriage. What constitutes fraud?

Any of the following circumstances constitutes fraud referred to in Number 3 of Article 44:

(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(2) Concealment by the wife that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;

(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or

(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality, or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity constitutes fraud that will give grounds for the annulment of marriage.

Who can file for the annulment of a marriage and within what periods?

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before the party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other spouse's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;

(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.

During the course of the trial for the annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages, how can the rights of the spouses and their children as to support, visitation rights, etc. be ensured?

Article 49 provides that during the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court must provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court must give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of the children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain under Title IX. It must also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.

What are the things to be decided upon by the Court in cases of annulment or declaration of nullity?

Article 50 provides that the final judgment of the Court must provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been decided upon in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership must be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

How can the rights of the children be guaranteed?

Article 51 provides that in the partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, must be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.

Does this mean that the children will no longer inherit from their parents later on?

No, the delivery of the presumptive legitimes will not prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents. But the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity will be considered as advances on their legitime. (In simpler terms, the children will still inherit from their parents later on, minus what they have already received as their presumptive legitime.)

What are required to be done with the judgment, partition, etc.?

The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes must be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, it will not affect third persons.

When can the former spouses get married again to other persons?

Article 53 provides that either of the former spouses may marry again after complying with the requirements of Article 52; otherwise, the subsequent marriage will be void.

What is the status of the children in these cases?

Article 54 provides that children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory are legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 are also legitimate.

Related posts: 1. If husband and wife have not seen each other for more than seven years, does it mean their marriage is already void? 2. If a person gets married while his petition for declaration of nullity of his first marriage is ongoing, can he be charged with bigamy? 3. Quickie marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code: Is the marriage void if the affidavit of marital cohabitation is false? 4. Legal lessons from the Kris Aquino - James Yap breakup: legal separation, annulment, declaration of nullity, essential and formal requisites of marriage 5. Irreconcilable differences not a ground for declaring a marriage null and void 6. When a man is married to or living in with several women successively or simultaneously, who has the right to inherit from him? 7. Family Code of the Philippines: Primer on marriage

The Battered Woman Syndrome

I promised you in my Salt and Light blog post entitled “Coming Attractions” that I will write a lengthy article on the “Battered Woman Syndrome.” Well, here’s the article as I promised, taken from excerpts of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Marivic Genosa, a Leyteña convicted of murdering her husband for which the trial court imposed on her the death penalty. The Supreme Court’s decision is heavy reading, even for law students, but if you’re a counselor, pastor, or someone who personally knows a battered woman, you should take the time and effort in understanding it.

Republic Act 9262 or the “Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004” defines BWS as “a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.” Section 26 of RA 9262 discusses the “Battered Woman Syndrome” as a defense:

Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.

In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.

In layman’s terms, if an abused woman kills or inflict physical injuries on her abusive husband or live-in partner, once the trial court determines that she is suffering from the “Battered Woman Syndrome,” the court will declare her not guilty.

Even before the passage of RA 9262 into law last March 2004, the Supreme Court had already considered the “Battered Woman Syndrome” as a defense specifically in the case of Marivic Genosa. On automatic appeal of Genosa’s case to the High Court, nationally-known lawyer Katrina Legarda introduced BWS as Genosa’s defense.

The facts of the Genosa case, according to the prosecution

As the Supreme Court decision stated, the prosecution’s version of the facts are as follows:

“Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben’s younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.

“On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Ben’s house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas’ rented house, he heard her say ‘I won’t hesitate to kill you’ to which Ben replied ‘Why kill me when I am innocent?’ That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas’ rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.

“On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.

“That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas’ rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.

“On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son’s misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.

“Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas’ rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.

“About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben’s death was ‘cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].’

“Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas’ house. Ecel went home despite appellant’s request for her to sleep in their house.

“Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her ‘You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.’ Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, ‘smashed’ the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then ‘smashed’ Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.

“Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly ‘distorted’ the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.”

Genosa’s version of events

The Supreme Court decision also narrated Genosa’s version of the facts in this manner:

1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her husband’s death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.

2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.

3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben’s parents, together with Ben’s brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben ‘lived happily’. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.

6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.

These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.

7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.

7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses ‘grappling with each other’. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify.

7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw ‘the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa’. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning.

7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified ‘if somebody would come.’ He testified that while Ben was alive ‘he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say, ‘Teody’ because that was what he used to call me, ‘mokimas ta,’ which means ‘let’s go and look for a whore.’ Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben ‘would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her.’ Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.

7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house ‘because she might be battered by her husband.’ When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that ‘her husband was already there and was drunk.’ Miss Arano knew he was drunk ‘because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face.’ Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple ‘were very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase.’ She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn’t get in he got a chair and a knife and ‘showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us.’ She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she left Marivic’s house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.

7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient ‘many times’ and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital.

The Battered Woman Syndrome

During the hearing on remand at the trial court level, expert witnesses Dra. Natividad Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo testified on what the Battered Woman Syndrome was. The Supreme Court decision states what BWS is as follows,

In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their “understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time.”

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”

Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her “placatory” and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.

However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence “spirals out of control” and leads to an acute battering incident.

The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.

At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.

The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this “good, gentle and caring man” is the real person whom she loves.

A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.

The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman’s psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of “tension, violence and forgiveness,” each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning without the other.

Effect of battery on a woman victim

The Supreme Court, based on the testimonies of the expert witnesses, summarized the effects when a woman is abused over a period of time, to wit,

Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. “How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called ‘battered wife syndrome.’”

To understand the syndrome properly, however, one’s viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions about battered women.

The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latter’s “ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape.” In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that “the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then.”

Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that “the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.”

The Supreme Court ruling

After the Leyte trial court heard and elevated the records of the testimonies of the expert witnesses, the Supreme Court ruled, among others,

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.

How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Ben’s relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?

Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother’s or father’s house; that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.

Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?

In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.

The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each other’s testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.

We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.

Mitigating circumstances in Genosa’s favor

However, the Supreme Court considered certain factors (“psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation”) as mitigating circumstances in Genosa’s favor:

Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor.

In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus. His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.

The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo’s testimony that with “neurotic anxiety” -- a psychological effect on a victim of “overwhelming brutality [or] trauma” -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control “re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered.” She thinks “of nothing but the suffering.” Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.

The Supreme Court’s epilogue in the Genosa case

In its Epilogue, the Court eloquently stated its concern for the safety of battered women but admitted its hands were tied by the existing provisions of the Revised Penal Code on self-defense and justifying circumstances. The Court said, to wit,

Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant’s counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.

While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The bottom line in Genosa’s case

Considering everything, the Supreme Court thus ruled that the Battered Woman Syndrome as defense could not be applied to Genosa. However, as pointed out above, the Court considered two mitigating circumstances (and no aggravating circumstance), and thus reduced her penalty from death to to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. For time already served, the Court ordered Genosa’s release from the Correctional Institution for Women.


Note: Besides the post above, I have also writtten several other articles about spousal abuse, domestic violence, etc. Please take time to read the following:

Hope and help for the battered woman (2): RA 9262 essential provisions
Hope and help for the battered woman (3): RA 9262 Protection Orders
Hope and help for the battered woman (4): Emotional abuse / psychological violence
Hope and help for the battered woman (5): Biblical response to abuse; evangelical Christians are best husbands – University of Virginia study
Mediation not applicable to domestic violence cases