Monday, August 02, 2010

How do courts determine which parent has the right of custody of the children in legal separation, annulment or declaration of nullity?

Please read my previous posts on the issue of custody:

Can a mother be deprived of custody of her child?

Custody battles over children: what determines fitness of a parent over another?

Custody battles over children between grandparents and a father or mother
The Supreme Court Rule on Provisional Orders A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC enumerates the procedures that our Family Court judges must follow in deciding the issue of custody in relation to petitions for legal separation, annulment of voidable marriage or declaration of nullity of marriage. Please take note that:

1. This Rule became effective in 2003 or before RA 9262 “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004” became effective in 2004; and

2. This Rule applies specifically to petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation.

RA 9262 has its own Implementing Rules and Regulations and Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. The speakers (active and retired Family Court judges) in the MCLE seminars that I am attending say that they also use the Rule on Provisional Orders as guidelines in granting orders in RA 9262 cases whenever appropriate.

Main guideline for award of custody: Best interests of the child

Section 4 of the Supreme Court Rule on Provisional Orders states:

In determining the right party or person to whom the custody of the child of the parties may be awarded pending the petition, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and shall give paramount consideration to the material and moral welfare of the child.

The court may likewise consider the following factors:

(a) the agreement of the parties;

(b) the desire and ability of each parent to foster an open and loving relationship between the child and the other parent;

(c) the child’s health, safety, and welfare;

(d) any history of child or spousal abuse by the person seeking custody or who has had any filial relationship with the child, including anyone courting the parent;

(e) the nature and frequency of contact with both parents;

(f) habitual use of alcohol or regulated substances;

(g) marital misconduct;

(h) the most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological and educational environment; and

(i) the preference of the child, if over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
Order of preference in the award of custody

In keeping with Articles 214 and 216 of the Family Code, Section 6 of the Supreme Court Rule states:

The court may award provisional custody in the following order of preference:

(1) to both parents jointly;

(2) to either parent taking into account all relevant considerations under the foregoing paragraph, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit;

(3) to the surviving grandparent, or if there are several of them, to the grandparent chosen by the child over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent is unfit or disqualified;

(4) to the eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;

(5) to the child’s actual custodian over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; or

(6) to any other person deemed by the court suitable to provide proper care and guidance for the child.

The custodian temporarily designated by the court shall give the court and the parents five days notice of any plan to change the residence of the child or take him out of his residence for more than three days provided it does not prejudice the visitation rights of the parents.
Section 5 of the Rule states that “appropriate visitation rights shall be provided to the parent who is not awarded provisional custody unless found unfit or disqualified by the court.”

Friday, July 30, 2010

Hold Departure Order for children while the petition for legal separation, annulment or declaration of nullity is ongoing

The Supreme Court Rule on Provisional Orders A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC enumerates the procedures that our Family Court judges must follow on these issues of custody, amount of financial support and Hold Departure Orders for children. Please take note that:

(1) This Rule became effective in 2003 or before RA 9262 “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004” became effective in 2004; and

(2) This Rule applies specifically to petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation.

RA 9262 has its own Implementing Rules and Regulations and Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. The speakers (active and retired Family Court judges) in the MCLE seminars I am attending say that they also use the Rule on Provisional Orders as guidelines in granting orders in RA 9262 cases whenever appropriate.

With regards Hold Departure Orders for children, Section 6 of the Supreme Court Rule on Provisional Orders states:

Pending resolution of the petition, no child of the parties shall be brought out of the country without prior order from the court.

The court, motu proprio or upon application under oath, may issue ex-parte a hold departure order, addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, directing it not to allow the departure of the child from the Philippines without the permission of the court.

The Family Court issuing the hold departure order shall furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation of the Department of Justice a copy of the hold departure order issued within twenty-four hours from the time of its issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal.

The hold-departure order shall contain the following information:
(a) the complete name (including the middle name), the date and place of birth, and the place of last residence of the person against whom a hold-departure order has been issued or whose departure from the country has been enjoined;

(b) the complete title and docket number of the case in which the hold departure was issued;

(c) the specific nature of the case; and

(d) the date of the hold-departure order.

If available, a recent photograph of the person against whom a hold-departure order has been issued or whose departure from the country has been enjoined should also be included,

The court may recall the order, motu proprio or upon verified motion of any of the parties after summary hearing, subject to such terms and conditions as may be necessary for the best interests of the child.

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

Legal Procedures 20: Extinction and prescription of the crime; civil liability

Free PDF legal procedures extinction and prescription of the crime civil liability Notes: (1) Please surf to the complete list of available PDFs on legal procedures in criminal and civil cases.

(2) Criminal liability may be extinguished either totally (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code) or partially (Art. 94).

Total extinction takes place under the following:

(a) death of the convict
(b) service of sentence
(c) amnesty
(d) absolute pardon
(e) prescription of the crime
(f) prescription of the penalty
(g) marriage of the offended woman, in private offenses, as provided by Art. 344 RPC
Prescription of the crime - it is the forfeiture or the loss of the right of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain period of time fixed by law (Art. 90, RPC)

Prescription of the penalty - it is the loss or forfeiture of the right of the State to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain period of time fixed by law (Art. 92, RPC).

Period of prescription of crimes punished by:
(a) death, reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal - 20 years;

(b) other afflictive penalties - 15 years;

(c) correctional penalties - 10 years except arresto mayor which prescribes in 5 years;

(d) oral defamation and slander by deed - 6 months;

(e) light offenses - 2 months.
The prescriptive period for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (bouncing checks) is 4 years.

Computation of the period of prescription of penalties

The period commences to run from the date the culprit evades the service of the sentence. It is interrupted:
(a) if the defendant surrenders;

(b) if he is captured;

(c) if he should go to a foreign country with which the Philippines has no extradition treaty; and

(d) if he should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription (Art. 93, RPC).
Partial extinction of criminal liability, Art. 94, RPC : (1) conditional pardon; (2) commutation of sentence; (3) good conduct allowances during confinement; (4) parole; (5) probation.

Civil liability includes:
(1) restitution - the return or restoration of the thing;

(2) reparation of the damage caused - the court determines the amount of damages by considering the price of the thing itself, and its special sentimental value to the offended party;

(3) indemnification for consequential damages - includes those caused to the injured party and those suffered by a third person by reason of the crime. (Art. 100 up to 113, RPC)

Tuesday, July 13, 2010

Legal lessons from the Kris Aquino - James Yap breakup: legal separation, annulment, declaration of nullity, requisites of marriage

Related post:

Kris Aquino and James Yap cannot adopt Bimby jointly or sequentially; only one of them can adopt Bimby
Note as of August 18, 2010:

From the remarks made by the lawyer of James Yap, it seems that Kris and James got married twice before the same officiating minister. They had to get married again since in the first marriage, there was no parental advice from James’ mother.

(The news reports said that since James was only 23 years old at the time of the marriage, he needed parental consent for the marriage. This is wrong. Under the Family Code, persons from age 21 to 25 need parental advice, not parental consent. News reporters and their editors should really take the time to learn the basics of the Family Code.)

The questions are (1) Which marriage is considered as the official marriage, the first or the second? and (2) Did Kris and James obtain a marriage license for either the first or second marriage, or did they avail of Article 34?

Article 40 of the Family Code states that for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a declaration of nullity of the first marriage. But this provision contemplates a situation where the man or woman gets married the second time around to a different person (not the spouse in the first marriage). In Kris and James’ case, they got married to each other twice. As the saying goes, “things are getting curiouser and curiouser ...”

Note as of August 13, 2010:


According to various news reports on television, newspapers and the Internet, the grounds for Kris’s petition for declaring her marriage with James Yap void are:
1. The lack of authority of the solemnizing officer Rayda P. Tumaliuan, a minister of Holy Sacrament International Church, based on Article 35, paragraph (2) of the Family Code. (Several weeks ago, ABS-CBN reported that it was former Quezon City Mayor Sonny Belmonte who solemnized the marriage, and that Kris and James got married without a license)

2. Neither Kris nor James belonged to the minister’s religious sect contrary to what Article 7, paragraph (2) of the Family Code provides.
Since this case is already in court, I will not discuss its merits. But Article 35, paragraph (2) clearly provides for an exception which news reports failed to point out. The exception states: “If one or both parties believe in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the authority, then the marriage is valid.”

As to the issue that neither Kris nor James belonged to the denomination of the solemnizing officer, the news reports also failed to mention that there are two kinds of requisites of marriage under the Family Code: essential (Article 2) and formal (Article 3). I discussed below what these requisites are.

Article 4 of the Family Code states the effect of the absence or defect in the requisites:
The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35, paragraph (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Justice Paras in his “Pre-Week Handbook in Civil Law” summarizes Article 4 in this way:
  • Absence of any of the essential requisites – the marriage is void ab initio.
  • A defect in any of the essential requisites – the marriage is voidable.
  • Absence of any of the formal requisites – the marriage is void ab initio.
  • An irregularity in any of the formal requisites – the marriage is valid but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
It seems to me that the novel (and interesting) issue that the court will decide is whether the non-membership of Kris and James in the denomination of the solemnizing officer is an absence or merely an irregularity (defect) in a formal requisite of marriage. If it is an absence, then the marriage is void. If it is merely an irregularity or a defect, then the marriage is valid.
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Last night, ABS-CBN’s TV Patrol showed an exclusive interview by Marie Lozano with the lawyers retained by Kris Aquino to end her marriage to James Yap. Kris’s lawyers said that she is seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage and not simply a legal separation. Lozano then stated the background for the petition. It seems that Kris and James got married in Boy Abunda’s house with Quezon City Mayor Sonny Belmonte officiating the marriage. As the news report revealed however, Kris and James did not have a marriage license. It was only the day after the “wedding” that Kris got a marriage license from Makati.

(You can read the TV Patrol report by Marie Lozano in the ABS-CBN website; the problem is, Lozano isn’t a lawyer, and, so, she didn’t know what the right questions should have been. Or maybe, as a condition for the exclusive interview, she might have been told beforehand what questions to ask and what not to ask. Incidentally, Lozano’s report as you can still view in YouTube or in the embedded video above, uses a page from my Family Matters website as the background graphic in the 1:51 mark. Thanks a million!)

What legal lessons can we learn from this situation? The breakup of any marriage is a tragic event. What makes this situation between Kris and James (and Baby James) even more tragic is that, since they are both celebrities, their breakup is a very public event. One good thing that can possibly come out of this situation is that Filipinos, as they follow the developments o radio, TV and the Internet, will learn about Philippine laws on marriage and the family.

Differences among legal separation, annulment of voidable marriage and declaration of nullity of void marriage

Legal separation is different from annulment, and for that matter, annulment is different from declaration of nullity. Legal separation is governed by Articles 55 to 67 of the Family Code; if the court grants the petition, the spouses are separated but their marriage bond remains. This means that the couple cannot marry other parties, and the woman is still bound to use her husband’s surname. These are the reasons why Filipino couples in trouble do not want to file for legal separation.

“Annulment” refers to voidable marriages under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code. On the other hand, “declaration of nullity,” which Kris is seeking, refers to void marriages under Articles 35 to 41. Filipinos, who do not know the difference, generically use the term “annulment” to refer to both processes. The difference between legal separation on one side, and annulment and declaration of nullity, on the other, is that in the latter two cases, the spouses can later on get married to other parties. Annulment and declaration of nullity are not divorces; we do not have a divorce law in the Philippines. In divorce, the grounds arose after the marriage, while in declaration of nullity, the grounds were already there even before the marriage. In practical effect however, annulment and declaration of nullity are the same as a divorce; the couple (once their marriage has been dissolved) can marry other parties.

Essential and formal requisites of marriage

Unlike what some people think, Kris and James's marriage is valid even if it took place in Boy Abunda’s house and not in a church or in the mayor’s office. The ground for Kris’s petition for declaration of nullity is that she and James did not have a marriage license. They got the marriage license AFTER the wedding. The Family Code provides two requisites for marriage – essential and formal. Article 2 of the Family Code states what the essential requisites are:

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.

As the term denotes, the essential requisites are well, essential. Without the essential requisites, the marriage is void. (Please take note, however, of my discussion on Article 40 of the Family Code below.)

Difference between parental consent and parental advice; minimum marrying age under the Family Code different from the New Civil Code

The Family Code states that the minimum marrying age is 18; the marriage is void for anyone who gets married below 18 even if such marriage had the consent of the parents. For persons between 18 to 21, parental consent is necessary for marriage. For persons above 21 (and one day) to 25, only parental advice is needed. If there is no parental advice or if the advice is adverse, there is a mandatory waiting period of three months before the marriage license is issued. For persons above 25 (and one day), no parental consent or advice is necessary.

The Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August 3, 1988. Before the Family Code became efective, the prevailing law on marriage was the New Civil Code of the Philippines. Under the NCC, the minimum marrying age was 14 for women and 16 for men.

Lack of a valid marriage license makes the marriage void

The marriage license is a formal requisite as Article 3 of the Family Code states:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Kris’s petition for declaration of nullity is based on Article 4 which states: “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).” The Family Code states exceptions when a marriage license is not required but these exceptions apparently dd not apply to Kris and James. (The exception in Article 35, paragraph 2 refers to a marriage solemnized by a person not legally authorized to do so; if any or both parties believed on good faith, however, that the solemnizing officer had the proper authority, the marriage is considered valid.)

Problems and questions with Kris’s petition

But if Kris and James got their marriage license only after the wedding, what did they state in their marriage certificate as to the date of their wedding? Did they make it appear in the marriage certificate that they got married after they obtained the license? If the marriage certificate shows that the date of the wedding is BEFORE the date of the issuance of the marriage license, then Kris may possibly use this as the basis for her petition.

If Kris and James made it appear in the marriage certificate, however, that they got married AFTER the issuance of the license, then Kris’s petition will run against the principle of equity. This principle states that “A person who comes to court must come with clean hands. This simply means that the court may dismiss Kris’s petition on the basis of equity since Kris and James brought this problem upon themselves. A public document on the files of the National Statistics Office like a marriage certificate is presumed regular. Will Kris be admitting in her petition that she misstated the date in her marriage certificate? On the basis of the presumption of regularity of public documents, the court may not believe Kris’s claim. The court can possibly say that Kris’s claim cannot be given any credence since it is self-serving. (The term “self-serving” has a technical legal meaning.)

If Kris will be claiming in her petition that she got her license after the wedding or that she misstated the date in her marriage certificate, she will put solemnizing officer Mayor (now Congressman) Sonny Belmonte in a very difficult situation. Mayor Belmonte, in compliance with the Family Code, should have required Kris and James to present to him their marriage license before he solemnized the marriage. I’m sure his political rivals will use this issue against him.

(The Family Code, which became effective in August 1988, removed from mayors the authority to solemnize marriages. But the Local Government Code of 1991 brought back to mayors this authority. I have been told that, in many towns and cities, the mayors simply sign the marriage certificate, with someone else conducting the actual marriage ceremonies.)

Difference between absence and defect in the requisites of marriage

Please take note of the difference between the absence of a marriage requisite and a defect in the requisite.

  • The lack or absence of an essential or formal requisite makes the marriage void.
  • A defect in the essential requisite does not affect the validity of the marriage, but there can be civil, criminal and administrative liabilities for the party or parties involved in the irregularity (second paragraph of Article 4).

Marriage contract or certificate is not an essential or formal requisite of marriage

The marriage contract or certificate is not an essential or formal requisite of marriage under the Family Code. Even if there is no copy of the marriage certificate in the files of the National Statistics Office, it cannot be said that the marriage is void. The existence or validity of the marriage can still be established through the marriage license, testimonies of the solemnizing officer and witnesses, etc.

Even if the marriage is void, there must be a court judgment declaring the marriage void

Article 40 of the Family Code provides that even if the marriage is void, the parties involved cannot take the law into their own hands and declare by themselves that the marriage is void. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the party or parties should file a petition to have their marriage declared as void. If any party to a void marriage gets married again without complying with Article 40, he or she can be charged with bigamy.

What will be the status of Baby James? Parental authority and custody

If and when the marriage is declared void for lack of a valid marriage license, what will be the status of Baby James? This is an unclear legal issue at this point in time. Article 54 of the Family Code states: “Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.” Please take note that Kris’s petition, according to the news report, will not be for annulment of a voidable marriage or a declaration of nullity based on Article 36 (psychological incapacity). Her petition will be based on Article 4 or the absence of a formal requisite - the marriage license. Thus, Article 54 may possibly not apply to Baby James, that is, he may not be considered legitimate. We will have to wait for the court judgment on this issue.

If and when the marriage is declared void and Baby James is considered illegitimate, there is, however, a way he can become legitimate. Kris can file for adoption under RA 8552 “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, and Baby James will become her legitimate child. If Baby James is adopted by Kris, can he later on be adopted by his father James? No; Article 187 of the Family Code states that “a person who has been adopted can no longer be adopted unless such adoption has been revoked or rescinded.”

But the Family Code provisions on adoption (Articles 183 to 193) have been superseded by RA 8552; for one thing, rescission of adoption is no longer allowed. Based merely on Article 187, however, it would seem that James can no longer adopt Baby James if and when he has already been adopted by Kris.

A question of surnames

If and when Kris’s petition for declaration of nullity is granted by the court, she will be able to use her maiden surname again. What about Baby James’s surname? Will it be changed to “Aquino” and no longer be “Yap”? The court can possibly rule that based on the legal principle of “best interests of the child,” Baby James can continue using his father’s surname.

But if the court rules in favor of Kris and orders the change of Baby James’s surname to “Aquino,” what can James do? Well, he can insist that Baby James continue using “Yap” in his birth certificate under RA 9255 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Please read my post “What surname should illegitimate children use? Problems and issues with RA 9255 and its implementing guidelines.”

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9255 make it mandatory for the illegitimate child to use the father’s surname if (1) the father acknowledges the child in the birth certificate or (2) issues a public or private instrument acknowledging the child, even if the mother does not give her consent to the use of the father’s surname. My stand is that the mother must give her consent before RA 9255 can be given effect. I have encouraged women who do not wish their children to use the father’s surname to file a petition to nullify the IRR of RA 9255. One good thing that can come out of this breakup between Kris and James is that Kris, with her financial capability to pay for lawyers, can file the necessary petition to nullify the IRR of RA 9255. If the guidelines are nullified, it will benefit not only Kris but a lot of women all over the Philippines.

Family Code provisions on custody

Lozano’s report cited Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that “no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” Her report stated that, according to the lawyers, Kris is willing to share custody with James. Not being a lawyer, Lozano may have misunderstood the lawyers’ statements; Article 213 of the Family Code will not apply to Kris, James and Baby James.

Pre-nuptial agreement; separation of properties between Kris and James

Lozano’s report also states that there is a question as to the separation of properties between Kris and Yap. She said that the lawyers did not reveal whether Kris and James had a pre-nuptial agreement. (Actually, the term used by the Family Code is “marriage settlement”.)

This is an interesting legal issue. If the marriage was void from the beginning, did the pre-nuptial agreement (if they had any) have any legal effect at all? If it had no legal effect, should Article 147 of the Family Code be the governing provision in this matter? This article provides that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their property relation is governed by the rules of co-ownership. In simpler terms, the wages and salaries, and properties acquired by Kris and James during their relationship belong to their co-ownership. The first two paragraphs of Article 147 state:

When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Note: Please read my post Family Code of the Philippines: Primer on marriage,” the comments, and my replies to the comments.

Tuesday, June 29, 2010

Legal Procedures 19: Duration of penalties

Free PDF legal procedures duration of penaltiesNotes: (1) Please surf to the complete list of available PDFs on legal procedures in criminal and civil cases.

(2) What is the difference between reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment?

The Supreme Court in Administrative Circular No. 6-A-92 explained the substantial difference between reclusion perpetua under the Revised Penal Code and life imprisonment when imposed as a penalty by special law.

The Court explained that reclusion perpetua under the Revised Penal Code is imprisonment for at least thirty [30] years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, and carries with it accessory penalties like perpetual special disqualification, etc. On the other hand, life imprisonment as imposed by a special law does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, and does not carry with it any accessory penalty. The complete text Administrative Circular No. 6-A-92 is posted below:

The Court has observed that several trial judges, in their judgments of conviction for such serious offenses as Murder, Robbery with Homicide and Rape with Homicide under the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 4, Art. II, RA 6425, as amended by P. D. 1675 [Dangerous Drugs Act], fail to appreciate and observe the substantial difference between reclusion perpetua under the Revised Penal Code and life imprisonment when imposed as a penalty by special law.

For the guidance of all concerned, the admonition by the Court on the subject in People vs. Penillos, January 30, 1992 [205 SCRA 546] is reproduced hereunder:

“As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Evidently, it considered the latter as the English translation of the former, which is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent case of People vs. Baguio, [April 30, 1991, 196 SCRA 459], this Court held:

‘The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of life imprisonment for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special law. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty [30] years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as life imprisonment which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration.’

“As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, reiterated in People vs. Pilones and in the concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People vs. Sumadic, this Court already made it clear that reclusion perpetua is not the same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment. Every Judge should take note of the distinction and this Court expects that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other.”
(3) The Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A. 4103, as amended) is meant to “uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness” through the shortening of the term of imprisonment of the convict, depending upon his behavior, physical, mental or moral record.

It does not apply, however, to offenses punished by death or reclusion perpetua; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage, piracy; habitual delinquents; those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence; those granted conditional pardon and who violated terms of the pardon; those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one year.

The basis of the application of the law is the penalty actually imposed and not that imposable by law. The Indeterminate Sentence Law covers crimes under the Revised Penal Code or by special law.

(4) Subsidiary penalty Art. 39 RPC: If the convict cannot pay the fine, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos. Subsidiary imprisonment is proper only if the principal penalty is prision correccional or lower. It does not violate the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of debts. If his finances improve, he must still pay.

Saturday, June 26, 2010

Legal Procedures 18: Remedies after conviction

Free PDF legal procedures remedies after convictionNotes: (1) Please surf to the complete list of available PDFs on legal procedures in criminal and civil cases.

(2) A judgment of acquittal generally cannot be appealed except to pursue the civil liability of the accused. Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code).

(3) The judgment whether of acquittal or conviction should establish the civil liability of the accused (Rule 120, Sec. 2) unless the complainant has reserved his right to file a separate civil action (Rule 111, Sec. 2).

(4) If the offended party is not satisfied with the award or is not indemnified as he may be entitled under the facts proved, he may appeal (Rule 122, Sec. 11, b). Actual, moral and exemplary damages may be awarded (Rule 111, Section 1).

(5) Motion to reopen - available only after either or both parties have presented their evidence; if the judgment has already been promulgated, the proper remedy is a motion for reconsideration or new trial.

Remedies after conviction

[1] Motion for modification of judgment of conviction - for example, by reducing the penalty imposed in view of a mitigating circumstance (Rule 120, Sec.7).

[2] Motion for reconsideration - pointing out errors of law or fact in the judgment, thus giving the court the opportunity to re-examine and correct its decision. (Rule 121, Sec. 1, 3 and 6)

[3] Motion for new trial - based on two grounds:

(a) Errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial which were prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused; and

(b) New and material evidence which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if introduced and admitted, would probably change the judgment (Rule 121, Section 2).
[4] Appeal to a higher court - the accused may seek to appeal a judgment of conviction. If the conviction carries with it either reclusion perpetua (“life imprisonment”) or the death penalty, then the case is automatically elevated to the Supreme Court. An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the execution of the decision appealed from shall be stayed as to the party who appealed. (Rule 122)

[5] Probation - this is available only if the penalty imposed is less than six years, the accused does not appeal the judgment and he has no prior conviction.

Thursday, June 24, 2010

Legal Procedures 17: Promulgation of judgment in criminal cases

Free PDF legal procedures promulgation of judgment criminal casesNotes: (1) Please surf to the complete list of available PDFs on legal procedures in criminal and civil cases.

If the accused escapes or could not be located during trial

(2) If the accused escapes or could not be located during the trial, the court orders the confiscation of the bond, and the case is then archived so that the prescriptive period won’t run.

In case the accused is bonded, the court orders the bail bondsmen to produce the body of the accused (that is, to bring the accused to court). The trial proceeds in absentia if the accused was validly arraigned.

(3) Notice is given to the accused, requiring his presence at the promulgation of the judgment. The decision of the court is then read to the accused.

What is proof beyond reasonable doubt?

(4) “Proof beyond reasonable doubt” is the level of proof required for conviction in a criminal case. It does not mean such degree of proof as excluding the possibility of error or mistake. It is sufficient if it produces moral or absolute certainty as required by law. Moral certainty springs from such proof as will satisfy the judgment and conscience of the trial judge, as a reasonable man, that the accused is guilty of the crime charged.

Benefits for those unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but subsequently acquitted and released

(5) Under R.A. 7309, the following may ask for compensation with the DOJ Board of Claims: victims of violent crimes; a person unjustly detained and released without being charged; any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention; any person who was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but subsequently acquitted and released.

Procedural rules in criminal cases involving juveniles

(6) Relevant provisions of Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law

Sec. 30. Guiding Principles in Judging the Juvenile.– Subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and other special laws, the judgment against a juvenile in conflict with the law shall be guided by the following principles:

1. It shall be in proportion to the gravity of the offense, and shall consider the circumstances and the best interests of the juvenile, the rights of the victim, the needs of society in line with the demands of restorative justice.

2. Restrictions on the personal liberty of the juvenile shall be limited to the minimum. Where discretion is given by law to the judge to determine whether the penalty to be imposed is fine or imprisonment, the imposition of the former should be preferred as the more appropriate penalty.

3. No corporal punishment shall be imposed.

Sec. 31. Promulgation of Sentence.– If after trial the Family Court should find the juvenile in conflict with the law guilty, it shall impose the proper penalty, including any civil liability which the juvenile may have incurred, and promulgate the sentence in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders.– The sentence shall be suspended without need of application by the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile:

1. Care, guidance, and supervision orders;
2. Community service orders;
3. Drug and alcohol treatment;
4. Participation in group counseling and similar activities;
5. Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for juveniles in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of the DSWD.

The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law with the disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status and progress report on the matter. The Family Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons whose presence may be deemed necessary.

The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.
(7) Relevant provisions of RA 9344 “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006”
SEC. 37. Diversion Measures. - Where the maximum penalty imposed by law for the offense with which the child in conflict with the law is charged is imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) years, regardless of the fine or fine alone regardless of the amount, and before arraignment of the child in conflict with the law, the court shall determine whether or not diversion is appropriate.

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Upon the recommendation of the social worker who has custody of the child, the court shall dismiss the case against the child whose sentence has been suspended and against whom disposition measures have been issued, and shall order the final discharge of the child if it finds that the objective of the disposition measures have been fulfilled.

The discharge of the child in conflict with the law shall not affect the civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense, which shall be enforced in accordance with law.

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict with the law shall be credited in the services of his/her sentence with the full time spent in actual commitment and detention under this Act.

SEC. 42. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a child in conflict with the law, and upon application at any time, place the child on probation in lieu of service of his/her sentence taking into account the best interest of the child. For this purpose, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the “Probation Law of 1976”, is hereby amended accordingly.
Judgment (Rules 120, Revised Rules of Court)

SECTION 1. Judgment; definition and form
.—Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. (1a)

SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment.—If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (2a)

SEC. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses.—When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense. (3a)

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is variance between the offense charge in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. (4a)

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. (5a)

SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.—The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (6a)

SEC. 7. Modification of judgment.—A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a)

SEC. 8. Entry of judgment.—After a judgment has become final, it shall be entered in accordance with Rule 36. (8)

SEC. 9. Existing provisions governing suspension of sentence, probation and parole not affected by this Rule.—Nothing in this Rule shall affect any existing provisions in the laws governing suspension of sentence, probation or parole. (9a)

Monday, June 21, 2010

Legal Procedures 15: Summary Procedure in criminal cases

Free PDF legal procedures Summary Procedure in criminal casesNotes: (1) Please surf to the complete list of available PDFs on legal procedures in criminal and civil cases.

(2) If there are two or more related cases, one under Summary Procedure and the others under ordinary procedure, then the rules on ordinary procedure will be followed.

(3) The rules of Summary Procedure are designed to expedite the hearings. After the witness has been sworn in and the private prosecutor, for example, has “offered the testimony of the witness,” the procedure generally goes like this:

Private prosecutor: “Mr. Witness, in relation to this case, do you remember executing any affidavit?”

Witness: “Yes, sir.”

Private prosecutor: “I am showing to you an affidavit previously marked as Exhibit ‘A’. What relation, if any, does this exhibit have with the affidavit you referred to?”

Witness: “This is the affidavit I executed”.

Private prosecutor: “On page 2 of Exhibit ‘A’, there is a signature above the printed name __________ marked as Exhibit ‘A-2-A’. Whose signature is this?”

Witness: “That is my signature.”

Private prosecutor: “Mr. Witness, do you affirm the truthfulness and veracity of the statements in your affidavit?”

Witness: “Yes, sir.”

Private prosecutor: (To the judge) “Your Honor, please, we are adopting the affidavit marked as Exhibit ‘B’ as constituting the direct testimony of this witness.”

Court: “Cross.”
The defense counsel, in this example, now conducts his cross examination. Of course, he must have read the affidavit beforehand.

(4) Some lawyers, after adopting the affidavit as the direct testimony of the witness, then make the mistake of asking the witness questions about the statements in the affidavit. The court will remind the lawyer that the rules of Summary Procedure are being followed in the case.

(5) Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings, motions or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for opening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third party complaints;
(l) Interventions.
Please read “Gloria Lucas, complainant vs. Judge Amelia A. Fabros, MeTC, Branch 9, Manila, respondent” for the Supreme Court clarification on “motion for reconsideration” as a prohibited pleading.

Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (criminal cases)


Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities. such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.

The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the compliant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the court's files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of filing, the care may be dismissed.

Sec. 12. Duty of court.

(a) If commenced by complaint. — On the basis of the compliant and the affidavits and other evidence accompanying the same, the court may dismiss the case outright for being patently without basis or merit and order the release of the amused if in custody.

(b) If commenced by information. — When the case is commenced by information, or is not dismissed pursuant to the next preceding paragraph, the court shall issue an order which, together with copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the prosecution, shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as any evidence in his behalf, serving copies thereof on the complainant or prosecutor not later than ten (10) days from receipt of said order. The prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the counter-affidavits of the defense.

Sec. 13. Arraignment and trial. — Should the court, upon a consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise, the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial.

If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be immediately arraigned and if he enters a plea of guilty, he shall forthwith be sentenced.

Sec. 14. Preliminary conference. — Before conducting the trial, the court shall call the parties to a preliminary conference during which a stipulation of facts may be entered into, or the propriety of allowing the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense may be considered, or such other matters may be taken up to clarify the issues and to ensure a speedy disposition of the case. However, no admission by the accused shall be used against him unless reduced to writing and signed by the accused and his counsel. A refusal or failure to stipulate shall not prejudice the accused.

Sec. 15. Procedure of trial. — At the trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same. Witnesses who testified may be subjected to cross-examination, redirect or re-cross examination. Should the affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as competent evidence for the party presenting the affidavit, but the adverse party may utilize the same for any admissible purpose.

Except in rebuttal or surrebuttal, no witness shall be allowed to testify unless his affidavit was previously submitted to the court in accordance with Section 12 hereof.

However, should a party desire to present additional affidavits or counter-affidavits as part of his direct evidence, he shall so manifest during the preliminary conference, stating the purpose thereof. If allowed by the court, the additional affidavits of the prosecution or the counter-affidavits of the defense shall be submitted to the court and served on the adverse party not later than three (3) days after the termination of the preliminary conference. If the additional affidavits are presented by the prosecution, the accused may file his counter-affidavits and serve the same on the prosecution within three (3) days from such service.

Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. — The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be on bail or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court.

Sec. 17. Judgment. — Where a trial has been conducted, the court shall promulgate the judgment not later than thirty (30) days after the termination of trial.

Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.

Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings, motions or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;

(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for opening of trial;

(d) Petition for relief from judgment;

(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;

(f) Memoranda;

(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;

(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;

(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;

(j) Reply;

(k) Third party complaints;

(l) Interventions.

Sec. 20. Affidavits. — The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.

A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the same to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion thereof from the record.

Sec. 21. Appeal. — The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate regional trial court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed.

Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. — The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent herewith.

Friday, June 18, 2010

Legal Procedures 14: Criminal cases subject to Summary Procedure

Free PDF legal procedures criminal cases subject to Summary procedureNotes: (1) Please surf to the complete list of available PDFs on legal procedures in criminal and civil cases.

(2) BP 22 cases are now subject to the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure and to mediation.

(3) It is the judge, not the fiscal, who determines whether the case falls under the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure.

(4) If a case falls under Summary Procedure, the judge will not issue a warrant of arrest for the accused, even if the information contains the amount of bail recommended by the fiscal. The accused need not therefore post bail. Please review our discussion on bail.

(5) If the accused is absent during a hearing and he was notified of such hearing in open court or by registered mail, the judge will issue a “bench warrant” for his arrest. If the accused has a valid reason for being absent, his lawyer can file a motion to lift the warrant of arrest.

(6) Upon determining that the case falls under Summary Procedure, the court issues a summons for the private complainant and the accused to appear in court for the arraignment and to submit their affidavits.

During the arraignment and preliminary conference, the judge will ask if the parties (the private complainant and the accused) have submitted their affidavits. The parties may respectively adopt the complaint-affidavit and the counter-affidavit filed during the preliminary investigation. The defense counsel, for example, may manifest, “Your Honor, please, we are adopting the counter-affidavit filed by the accused during the preliminary investigation.”

Tuesday, June 15, 2010

Legal Procedures 13: Motions during trial of a criminal case

Free PDF legal procedures motions during trial of criminal casesNotes: (1) Please surf to the complete list of available PDFs on legal procedures in criminal and civil cases.

(2) How to file a demurrer to evidence
There are two ways of asking for the leave of court to file a demurer to evidence: oral or written.

A. After the public or private prosecutor has formally offered the evidence in court, the defense lawyer can immediately ask the court for its express leave to file the demurrer. In granting the leave, the court also states a time period within which the demurrer must be filed, copy furnished to the prosecutor.

The prosecutor asks for the same period of time within which to file an opposition. The next hearing is scheduled giving allowance for the filing of the demurrer, the opposition, and the court’s action on the matter (whether to grant or deny the demurrer).

B. The defense counsel can also file a motion asking for the express leave of court to file the demurrer. The demurrer itself is attached to the motion.

(3) When the fiscal is absent or has to leave the hearing

The fiscal or public prosecutor has the control and supervision of the prosecution. In the fiscal’s absence, hearings must be reset even if the private complainant has his own lawyer. If the fiscal has to leave the hearing for some reason, he must endorse or authorize the private prosecutor.

(4) Remedy when the doctor who signed the medico-legal certificate is no longer available to testify

Doctors who work in government hospitals may be transferred to other institutions or may have already left the country. If the government doctor who signed the medico-legal certificate is no longer available to testify, the prosecutor can ask the court to issue a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum for the hospital’s records custodian. The records custodian will be directed to bring to court a certified true copy of the medico-legal certificate and to testify on the authenticity of such record.

A related issue: Can doctors in private hospitals issue a medical certificate? Yes they can. But if a patient tells a private doctor that the certificate is needed for the filing of a criminal case, the doctor will usually refuse to issue a certificate. The doctor will tell the patient to have himself or herself re-examined by a government doctor. The reason is that usually the private doctor does not want to be bothered in going to court and testifying.

Motions during trial of a criminal case

1. Consolidation of cases (Rule 119, Sec.22); separate trials (Sec. 16)

2. Motion for postponement - due to the absence of a party or counsel because of illness, or a conflict in schedules of the counsel de parte or the private prosecutor; absence of a material witness, etc.

3. Motion to secure documents and attendance of witnesses - subpoena ad testificandum, warrant of arrest, contempt, perpetuation of testimony, subpoena duces tecum, modes of discovery, bail for witnesses.

4. Exclusion of other witnesses - to prevent other witnesses from hearing the testimony of the witness currently being examined.

5. Exclusion of the public - the court may by itself exclude the public if the evidence to be presented is offensive to decency or public morals.

6. Provisional remedies - may be availed of in the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action insofar as they are applicable, e.g. attachment of the property of the accused (Rule 127, Section 1 and 2).

7. Demurrer to evidence - may be filed by the defense after the prosecution rests its case, based on the insufficiency of evidence. If the motion is granted, the accused is in effect acquitted. If the court denies the motion, the accused may present his evidence. When it is filed without express leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the prosecution’s evidence. (Rule 119, Sec. 23)

8. Dismissal of the case

(a) If the private complainant executes an affidavit of desistance, the fiscal files a motion to dismiss the case. The judge grants it if the case cannot be prosecuted successfully without the participation of the complainant.

(b) If the complainant has been absent several times despite due notice, the accused may move for provisional dismissal based on failure to prosecute, or dismissal on the merits by invoking his Constitutional right to a speedy trial.

(c) The accused can file a petition for mandamus to compel dismissal of the information, or a petition for habeas corpus, in case postponements lead to his detention beyond a reasonable period of time.

9. Motion to discharge the accused to become a State witness - the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent, provided that

(a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense, except such testimony;

(c) the testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(d) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

(e) said accused has not been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
The discharge shall amount to an acquittal and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense. (Rule 119, Section 17 and 18)

10. Two ways of becoming a State witness: (A) under Section 17 of Rule 11 9 or (B) under Republic Act No. 6981 “Witness Protection and Security Benefit Program” (Yu vs. Velasco, GR 142848, June 30, 2006)
The discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981 as availed of by the prosecution in favor of the private respondents, is distinct and separate from the discharge of an accused under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 is only one of the modes for a participant in the commission of a crime to be a state witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is another mode of discharge. The immunity provided under Republic Act No. 6981 is granted by the DOJ while the other is granted by the court.

Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, contemplates a situation where the information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned and the case is undergoing trial. The discharge of an accused under this rule may be ordered upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, that is, at any stage of the proceedings, from the filing of the information to the time the defense starts to offer any evidence.

On the other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981, only compliance with the requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure11 is required but not the requirement of Rule 119, Section 17.

More to the point is the recent case of Soberano v. People where this Court held:

An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.

At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one.
11. Supreme Court ruling on state witnesses: Rimberto T. Salvanera vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 143093, May 21, 2007
According to petitioner, the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged to become a state witness must be substantially corroborated, not by a co-accused likewise sought to be discharged, but by other prosecution witnesses who are not the accused in the same criminal case. Petitioner justifies this theory on the general principles of justice and sound logic. He contends that it is a notorious fact in human nature that a culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame on others, if by doing so, he will be freed from any criminal responsibility. Thus, in the instant case, petitioner supposes that both Abutin and Tampelix will naturally seize the opportunity to be absolved of any liability by putting the blame on one of their co-accused. Petitioner argues that prosecution witnesses Parane and Salazar, who are not accused, do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged conspiracy. Thus, they could not testify to corroborate the statement of Abutin and Tampelix that petitioner is the mastermind or the principal by induction.

We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that “there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness.” The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that “a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects.” It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each other’s testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and “to such extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest.”

As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime. The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission of the crime.

Thursday, June 10, 2010

Legal Procedures 12: Trial procedure in criminal cases

Free PDF legal procedures trial procedure in criminal casesUpdate as of April 29, 2018: (A) Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC; (B) “Judicial Affidavit Rule A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC”; and (C) “Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and Speedy Trial” A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC (March 18, 2014)

1. Please surf to the complete list of available PDFs on legal procedures in criminal and civil cases.

2. Tip for new bar passers

If you are a new bar passer who does not know courtroom procedures, you should inform the judge, “Your Honor please, I am a new bar passer, and I will appreciate any help that this Court can extend to me.” The judge will not scold you but will extend all the help you need. Even your opposing counsel (and other lawyers in the courtroom) will help you. It’s a little bit embarrassing saying this in front of your client, but it will help prevent you from making any mistake.

As a law student, you should not only rely on your subjects like Practice Court, Trial Techniques, or Evidence. You should watch as many courtroom hearings as you can. If your law school has a legal clinic, you can volunteer there and gain valuable experience in handling cases.

3. Interpretation into English of the testimonies of witnesses

English is the language of the law and the courtroom. When a witness testifies in Filipino or any dialect, a court staff interprets what was said into English. The lawyer presenting the witness or the opposing counsel can propose what the correct interpretation is. If what is said in Filipino or any dialect cannot be interpreted appropriately, or if it is important to retain the testimony as it is, the lawyer can manifest, “Your Honor, please, may we request that the vernacular be reflected in the record.”

4.Transcript of stenographic notes

Lawyers need the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) to prepare for their examination of witnesses and for their pleadings (memorandum, demurrer, appeal, etc). With most courts, the stenographer prepares the TSN before the next scheduled hearing. Before the hearing starts or any day beforehand, the lawyer usually asks his client to pay for and get the TSN. It usually costs ten to fifteen pesos per page.

Some stenographers in order to maximize their earnings type the transcripts with two inch margins all sides and in double or even triple space! In one major city here in Metro Manila, stenographers will not prepare the TSN until and unless they are paid beforehand. They estimate from their notes how many pages the TSN will be and they charge accordingly. One paralegal I know was charged 500 pesos by the stenographer; when he got the TSN, it was only two pages long. These unscrupulous practices of stenographers should be reported to the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court.

5. Trial lawyers and “lagare”

Some trial lawyers practice what is called “lagare”. For example, they schedule the hearings of two or more cases held in the same town or city in the same morning or afternoon session. They instruct their clients to inform the judge, when the case is called, that their lawyer is in another courtroom. The case is then set for a second or third call. After the lawyer finishes with the hearing in one case, he or she then goes to the other hearing. Judges allow this since they recognize that lawyers have to earn a living.

6. Court procedure when a child is the victim, the accused or a witness

The “Supreme Court Rule on Examination of a Child Witness” governs the examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It applies in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving child witnesses.

The objectives of this Rule are to create and maintain an environment that will allow children to give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma to children, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth. Section 25 of the Rule provides for the giving of the testimony via live-link television. Some courts (called “e-courts”) are equipped with video conferencing facilities. Please read the “Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law”.

7. Alternative Dispute Resolution of criminal cases

Rather than going through a full-blown trial, the contending parties can choose to go through “Alternative Dispute Resolution” (ADR) which is part of “Court-Annexed Mediation” (CAM). In criminal cases, the civil aspect or claim for damages for violation of BP 22 (bounced checks), simple theft, libel, and estafa can now be mediated. ADR is cost-effective as it takes merely ten percent of total duration of litigation saving time and resources of litigants and courts and preserves good will between the parties. When the civil aspect of the case is successfully mediated, the criminal aspect can then be dismissed.

8. If the accused escapes or could not be located during the trial, the court orders the confiscation of the bond, and the case is then archived so that the prescriptive period won’t run. In case the accused is bonded, the court orders the bail bondsmen to produce the body of the accused (that is, to bring the accused to court). The trial proceeds in absentia if the accused was validly arraigned.

9. Benefits under the Witness Protection Program

Under the Witness Protection program (RA 6981), a witness to a grave felony may be entitled to:

  • relocation
  • change of personal identity
  • a means of livelihood
  • financial assistance
  • protection from being removed or demoted in his work, etc.
In case of death or permanent incapacity due to his being a witness, his heirs get burial benefits, and his dependent children get free education up to college.

10. Benefits for victims of violent crimes, unjustly accused or detained, etc.

Under R.A. 7309, the following may ask for compensation with the Department of Justice Board of Claims: victims of violent crimes; a person unjustly detained and released without being charged; any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention; any person who was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but subsequently acquitted and released.

11. When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if there is good cause to detain him. The court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information. (Rule 119, Section 11)

Trial (Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)


Section 1. Time to prepare for trial. – After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order.

Sec. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. – Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trail on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.

The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.

Sec. 3. Exclusions.
- The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the accused;
(2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the accused;
(3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;
(4) Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; provided, that the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;
(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;
(6) Delay resulting from a finding of existence of a prejudicial question; and
(7) Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. He shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical inability of the accused to stand trial.

(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or, as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for separate trial has been granted.

(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.

Sec. 4. Factors for granting continuance. – The following factors, among others, shall be considered by a court in determining whether to grant a continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule.

(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would likely make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice; and

(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established therein.

In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because of congestion of the court’s calendar or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the prosecutor.

Sec. 5. Time limit following an order for new trial. – If the accused is to be tried again pursuant to an order for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from notice of the order, provided that if the period becomes impractical due to unavailability of witnesses and other factors, the court may extend but not to exceed one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred eighty (180) days from notice of said order for new trial.

Sec. 6. Extended time limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116 and the preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.

Sec. 7. Public attorney’s duties where accused is imprisoned.
– If the public attorney assigned to defend a person charged with a crime knows that he latter is preventively detained, either because he is charged with a bailable crime but has no means to post bail, or, is charged with a non-bailable crime, or, is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, it shall be his duty to do the following:

(a) Shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial or cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner requiring such person to so advise the prisoner of his right and demand trial.

(b) Upon receipt of that notice, the custodian of the prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his right to demand trial. If at anytime thereafter the prisoner informs his custodian that he demands such trial, the latter shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.

(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.

(d) When the custodian of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly supported request for the availability of the prisoner for purpose of trial, the prisoner shall be made available accordingly.

Sec. 8. Sanctions.
– In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public attorney, or the prosecutor:

(a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;

(b) Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;

(c) Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions hereof, the court may punish such counsel, attorney, or prosecutor, as follows:
(1) By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense o fan accused, a fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);
(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de officio, public attorney, or prosecutor a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and
(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before the court trying the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The punishment provided for by this section shall be without prejudice to any appropriate criminal action or other sanction authorized under these rules.
Sec. 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit. – If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this Rule, the information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under section 3 of this rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.

Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismiss under this section.

Sec. 10. Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy trial in the Constitution.
– No provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of the right to speedy trial guaranteed by Section 14(2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 11. Order of trial
. – The trial shall proceed in the following order:

(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.

(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any, arising, from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.

(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.

(d) Upon admission of evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.

(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.

Sec. 12. Application for examination of witness for accused before trial.
– When the accused has been held to answer for an offense, he may, upon motion with notice to the other parties, have witnesses conditionally examined in his behalf. The motion shall state: (a) the name and residence of the witness; (b) the substance of his testimony; and (c) that the witness is sick or infirm as to afford reasonable ground for believing that he will not be able to attend the trial, or resides more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial and has no means to attend the same, or that other similar circumstances exist that would make him unavailable or prevent him from attending the trial. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit of the accused and such other evidence as the court may require.

Sec. 13. Examination of defense witness; how made.
– If the court is satisfied that the examination of a witness for the accused is necessary, an order shall be made directing that the witness be examined at a specific date, time and place and that a copy of the order be served on the prosecutor at least three (3) days before the scheduled examination. The examination shall be taken before a judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein. The examination shall proceed notwithstanding the absence of the prosecutor provided he was duly notified of the hearing. A written record of the testimony shall be taken.

Sec. 14. Bail to secure appearance of material witness.
– When the court is satisfied, upon proof of oath, that a material witness will not testify when required, it may, upon motion of either party, order the witness to post bail in such sum as may be deemed proper. Upon refusal to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken.

Sec. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution.– When it is satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, of has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

Sec. 16. Trial of several accused. – When two or more accused are jointly charged with an offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the court, in its discretion and upon motion of the prosecutor or any accused, orders separate trial for one or more accused.

Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness.
– When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Sec. 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal
. – The order indicated in the preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge.

Sec. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense.
– When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.

Sec. 20. Appointment of acting prosecutor.
– When a prosecutor, his assistant or deputy is disqualified to act due to any of the grounds stated in section 1 of Rule 137 or for any other reason, the judge or the prosecutor shall communicate with the Secretary of Justice in order that the latter may appoint an acting prosecutor.

Sec. 21. Exclusion of the public. – The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during the trial is offensive to decency or public morals. He may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public from the trial except court personnel and the counsel of the parties.

Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. – Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court.

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

Sec. 24. Reopening. – At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.