The Battered Woman Syndrome

I promised you in my Salt and Light blog post entitled “Coming Attractions” that I will write a lengthy article on the “Battered Woman Syndrome.” Well, here’s the article as I promised, taken from excerpts of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Marivic Genosa, a Leyteña convicted of murdering her husband for which the trial court imposed on her the death penalty. The Supreme Court’s decision is heavy reading, even for law students, but if you’re a counselor, pastor, or someone who personally knows a battered woman, you should take the time and effort in understanding it.

Republic Act 9262 or the “Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004” defines BWS as “a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.” Section 26 of RA 9262 discusses the “Battered Woman Syndrome” as a defense:

Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.

In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.

In layman’s terms, if an abused woman kills or inflict physical injuries on her abusive husband or live-in partner, once the trial court determines that she is suffering from the “Battered Woman Syndrome,” the court will declare her not guilty.

Even before the passage of RA 9262 into law last March 2004, the Supreme Court had already considered the “Battered Woman Syndrome” as a defense specifically in the case of Marivic Genosa. On automatic appeal of Genosa’s case to the High Court, nationally-known lawyer Katrina Legarda introduced BWS as Genosa’s defense.

The facts of the Genosa case, according to the prosecution

As the Supreme Court decision stated, the prosecution’s version of the facts are as follows:

“Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben’s younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.

“On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Ben’s house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas’ rented house, he heard her say ‘I won’t hesitate to kill you’ to which Ben replied ‘Why kill me when I am innocent?’ That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas’ rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.

“On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.

“That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas’ rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.

“On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son’s misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.

“Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas’ rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.

“About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben’s death was ‘cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].’

“Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas’ house. Ecel went home despite appellant’s request for her to sleep in their house.

“Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her ‘You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.’ Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, ‘smashed’ the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then ‘smashed’ Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.

“Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly ‘distorted’ the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.”

Genosa’s version of events

The Supreme Court decision also narrated Genosa’s version of the facts in this manner:

1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her husband’s death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.

2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.

3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben’s parents, together with Ben’s brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben ‘lived happily’. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.

6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.

These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.

7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.

7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses ‘grappling with each other’. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify.

7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw ‘the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa’. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning.

7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified ‘if somebody would come.’ He testified that while Ben was alive ‘he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say, ‘Teody’ because that was what he used to call me, ‘mokimas ta,’ which means ‘let’s go and look for a whore.’ Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben ‘would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her.’ Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.

7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house ‘because she might be battered by her husband.’ When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that ‘her husband was already there and was drunk.’ Miss Arano knew he was drunk ‘because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face.’ Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple ‘were very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase.’ She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn’t get in he got a chair and a knife and ‘showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us.’ She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she left Marivic’s house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.

7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient ‘many times’ and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital.

The Battered Woman Syndrome

During the hearing on remand at the trial court level, expert witnesses Dra. Natividad Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo testified on what the Battered Woman Syndrome was. The Supreme Court decision states what BWS is as follows,

In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their “understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time.”

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”

Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her “placatory” and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.

However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence “spirals out of control” and leads to an acute battering incident.

The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.

At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.

The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this “good, gentle and caring man” is the real person whom she loves.

A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.

The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman’s psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of “tension, violence and forgiveness,” each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning without the other.

Effect of battery on a woman victim

The Supreme Court, based on the testimonies of the expert witnesses, summarized the effects when a woman is abused over a period of time, to wit,

Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. “How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called ‘battered wife syndrome.’”

To understand the syndrome properly, however, one’s viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions about battered women.

The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latter’s “ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape.” In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that “the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then.”

Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that “the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.”

The Supreme Court ruling

After the Leyte trial court heard and elevated the records of the testimonies of the expert witnesses, the Supreme Court ruled, among others,

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.

How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Ben’s relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?

Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother’s or father’s house; that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.

Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?

In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.

The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each other’s testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.

We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.

Mitigating circumstances in Genosa’s favor

However, the Supreme Court considered certain factors (“psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation”) as mitigating circumstances in Genosa’s favor:

Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor.

In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus. His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.

The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo’s testimony that with “neurotic anxiety” -- a psychological effect on a victim of “overwhelming brutality [or] trauma” -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control “re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered.” She thinks “of nothing but the suffering.” Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.

The Supreme Court’s epilogue in the Genosa case

In its Epilogue, the Court eloquently stated its concern for the safety of battered women but admitted its hands were tied by the existing provisions of the Revised Penal Code on self-defense and justifying circumstances. The Court said, to wit,

Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant’s counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.

While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The bottom line in Genosa’s case

Considering everything, the Supreme Court thus ruled that the Battered Woman Syndrome as defense could not be applied to Genosa. However, as pointed out above, the Court considered two mitigating circumstances (and no aggravating circumstance), and thus reduced her penalty from death to to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. For time already served, the Court ordered Genosa’s release from the Correctional Institution for Women.


Note: Besides the post above, I have also writtten several other articles about spousal abuse, domestic violence, etc. Please take time to read the following:

Hope and help for the battered woman (2): RA 9262 essential provisions
Hope and help for the battered woman (3): RA 9262 Protection Orders
Hope and help for the battered woman (4): Emotional abuse / psychological violence
Hope and help for the battered woman (5): Biblical response to abuse; evangelical Christians are best husbands – University of Virginia study
Mediation not applicable to domestic violence cases

Family Code of the Philippines: Primer on marriage

Update as of April 25, 2018: “SC recognizes divorce in marriage with foreigners” (Rappler) The Supreme Court (SC) en banc issued a landmark ruling on Tuesday, April 24, recognizing divorce in marriages with foreigners. Voting 10-3-1, the SC en banc ruled “that a foreign divorce secured by a Filipino against a foreign spouse is also considered valid in the Philippines, even if it is the Filipino spouse who files for divorce abroad.” “Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo” G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018 Based on a clear and plain reading of paragraph 2 of Article 26 (Family Code), the provision only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceedings wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.” Related posts: 1. If husband and wife have not seen each other for more than seven years, does it mean their marriage is already void? 2. If a person gets married while his petition for declaration of nullity of his first marriage is ongoing, can he be charged with bigamy? 3. Quickie marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code: Is the marriage void if the affidavit of marital cohabitation is false? 4. Legal lessons from the Kris Aquino - James Yap breakup: legal separation, annulment, declaration of nullity, essential and formal requisites of marriage 5. Irreconcilable differences not a ground for declaring a marriage null and void 6. When a man is married to or living in with several women successively or simultaneously, who has the right to inherit from him?

(Note: Click the graphic to download a free PDF newsletter on this topic. This PDF is for your personal, non-commercial use only; you must not upload it to any website, blog, file-sharing platform, or the cloud.)

Starting this week, I will be posting primers on the various provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines. For this week, the primer is on the basic provisions on marriage, specifically Articles 1 to 34. Please surf over to Title I, Articles 1 to 54 which comprise the complete provisions of the Family Code on marriage.

You may also want to review my previous articles on “covenant marriage” and “divorce and remarriage” from the Philippine legal standpoint. I discussed these articles with pastors and workers who attended the Baptist Mission Partners symposium last week.

How does the Family Code define “marriage”?

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Article 1)

What are the essential requisites that make a marriage valid?

Republic of the Philippines vs. Liberty Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013 Issue: Is a marriage, entered into for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in exchange for $2,000, void on the ground of lack of consent? Background facts: Liberty Albios asked Daniel Lee Fringer to marry her so that she can acquire American citizenship. In return, Albios promised to give Fringer $2,000. After the wedding, they went their separate ways. Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with Albios. In turn, Albios did not pay Fringer the $2,000 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. Regional Trial Court rules that Albios and Fringer’s marriage is void for lack of consent Albios filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She described their marriage as made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio (from the start). The RTC ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking and that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, the marriage was a farce. Court of Appeals affirms RTC ruling The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that Albios and Fringer clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that Albios and Fringer never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000. Supreme Court rules that the marriage is valid Albios and Fringer’s marriage is not void ab initio (from the start) and continues to be valid and subsisting. Consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. Their consent was conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage. Their consent was freely given as best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

Article 2 provides that a marriage is valid if these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.

What are the formal requisites of marriage?

The formal requisites of marriage according to Article 3 are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

What is the effect if an essential or formal requisite is absent?

The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites renders the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

What is the effect if any of the essential requisites is defective?

A defect in any of the essential requisites does not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity will be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

What is the age at which a man or woman can get married?

Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.

(Note: Before the Family Code became effective in August 3, 1988, the minimum age for marriage under the New Civil Code of the Philippines was 16 for men and 14 for women.)

Is there any prescribed form for the marriage ceremony?

No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It is necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration must be contained in the marriage certificate which must be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

If a party cannot sign the marriage certificate, what can be done?

In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it is sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact must be attested by the solemnizing officer.

Who are authorized to solemnize marriages?

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;

(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;

(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;

(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.

Note: The Local Government Code of 1991 restored to the mayors their authority to solemnize marriages

For Filipinos residing or traveling abroad and who want to get married, who can solemnize the marriage?

The consul-general, the consul, or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines can solemnize the marriage.

What can be done if upon applying for a marriage license, the parties cannot produce their birth certificates?

The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate is not required if the parents of the contracting parties appear personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of the parties, as stated in the application, or when the local civil registrar is, by merely looking at the applicants upon their personally appearing before him, convinced that either or both of them have the required age. (Last paragraph, Article 12)

What are the requirements of the Local Civil Registrar if either of the contracting parties was previously married?

The previously married applicant must furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate, the death certificate of the deceased spouse, or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of the previous marriage.

In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party must make an affidavit stating this circumstance, actual civil status, and the name and date of death of the deceased spouse. (Article 13)

What is the effectivity of the marriage license once issued?

The license is valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of issue, and it is automatically canceled at the expiration of the period if the contracting parties have not used it. The expiry date must be stamped in bold characters on the face of every license issued. (Article 20)

What are the requirements if a foreigner wants to get married here in the Philippines?

When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, they must submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials, before a marriage license can be obtained.

Stateless persons or refugees from other countries must, instead of the certificate of legal capacity, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing their capacity to contract marriage. (Article 21)

What are the rules for marriages entered into by Filipinos in foreign countries?

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines under the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, are also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is afterwards validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Article 26, as amended by Executive Order 227)

Under what circumstances will a marriage license no longer be required?

In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and will remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives. (Article 27)

If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable the party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (Article 28)

Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (Article 33)

No license is necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties must state these facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer must also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. (Article 34; please read “Quickie marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code: Is the marriage void if the affidavit of marital cohabitation is false?”)

What are the rules for marriages performed by a ship captain or a pilot?

A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. (Article 31)

What are the rules for marriages performed by a military commander?

A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, has the authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (Article 32)

Can I get married to my first cousin?

No, you cannot. You are related to your cousin by four civil degrees. Because of public policy, the Family Code prohibits marriage between persons related within the 4th degree of consanguinity (Article 38 of the Family Code).

Here’s how to count the number of degrees: From you to your father or mother, that is one degree. From your father or mother, to your grandparents, that is another civil degree. From your grandparents to your uncle or aunt, that is another degree. And from your uncle or aunt to your first cousin, is another degree, making a total of four degrees.

Primer on RA 7877 or the “Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995”

What is the policy of the State with regards sexual harassment?

The State values the dignity of every individual, enhances the development of its human resources, guarantees full respect for human rights, and upholds the dignity of workers, employees, applicants for employment, students or those undergoing training, instruction or education. Towards this end, all forms of sexual harassment in the employment, education or training environment are declared unlawful. (Section 2)

How is sexual harassment defined in RA 7877?

Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said act. (Section 3)

How is sexual harassment committed in a work-related or employment environment?

Sexual harassment is committed in this situation when:

1. The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms of conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;

2. The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or

3. The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

How is sexual harassment committed in an education or training environment?

Sexual harassment, in this kind of environment is committed:

1. Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender;

2. Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the offender;

3. When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the granting of honors and scholarships, or the payment of a stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges, or consideration; or

4. When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice.

Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual harassment as herein defined, or who cooperates in the commission thereof by another without which it would not have been committed, shall also be held liable under this RA 7877.

What is the duty of the employer or head of office in a work-related, education or training environment?

It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:

(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.

Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual harassment.

The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this subsection (a) shall include, among others, guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or training institutions.

(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment. The committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with officers and employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors, and students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.

The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a copy of RA 7877 for the information of all concerned.

Who shall comprise the committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment?

In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative each from the management, the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory rank, and from the rank and file employees.

In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative from the administration, the trainors, instructors, professors or coaches and students or trainees, as the case may be.

What is the liability of the employer, head of office, educational or training institution?

The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall be solidarily liable for damages arising from the acts of sexual harassment committed in the employment, education or training environment if the employer or head of office, educational or training institution is informed of such acts by the offended party and no immediate action is taken.

Besides filing a case under RA 7877, can the victim also file other charges?

The victim of work, education or training-related sexual harassment can institute a separate and independent action for damages and other affirmative relief.

What are the penalties provided for under RA 7877?

Any person who violates the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

What is the prescriptive period for filing of cases of sexual harassment?

Any action arising from the violation of the provisions of RA 7877 shall prescribe in three years. (In layman’s terms, this means that an incident of sexual harassment must be filed with the fiscal’s office within three years after it occurred. Otherwise, it can no longer be prosecuted.)

Postscript: To know more about what sexual harassment is, please read the complete text of the Supreme Court decision in Mollaneda vs. Umacob [G.R. No. 140128. June 6, 2001] where the Department of Education Division Superintendent of Davao City was found guilty of the charge of sexual harassment.In the case of Biboso vs. Villanueva (A.M. No. MTJ-01-1356. April 16, 2001), the respondent, a judge from Sultan Kudarat, was found innocent of the charge of sexual harassment.

A primer on the Newborn Screening Act of 2004

A very positive, recent development in our laws is the promulgation into law of Republic Act 9288 or the Newborn Screening Act of 2004. You can find the complete text of RA 9288 in my “Family Matters” website. Below is a primer on this law.

What is Republic Act No. 9288?

It is the Philippine law promulgating a comprehensive policy and a national system for ensuring newborn screening. RA 9288 is known as the "Newborn Screening Act of 2004." It was approved on April 07, 2004.

What is the policy of the State with regards the health of the people, especially children?

It is the policy of the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people, including the rights of children to survival and full and healthy development as normal individuals.
In pursuit of such policy, the State through RA 9288 has institutionalized a national newborn screening system that is comprehensive, integrative and sustainable, and will facilitate collaboration among government and non-government agencies at the national and local levels, the private sector, families and communities, professional health organizations, academic institutions, and non-governmental organizations.

The National Newborn Screening System shall ensure that every baby born in the Philippines is offered the opportunity to undergo newborn screening and thus be spared from heritable conditions that can lead to mental retardation and death if undetected and untreated.

What are the objectives of the National Newborn Screening System?

1. To ensure that every newborn has access to newborn screening for certain heritable conditions that can result in mental retardation, serious health complications or death if left undetected and untreated;

2. To establish and integrate a sustainable newborn screening system within the public health delivery system;

3. To ensure that all health practitioners are aware of the advantages of newborn screening and of their respective responsibilities in offering newborns the opportunity to undergo newborn screening; and

4. To ensure that parents recognize their responsibility in promoting their child’s right to health and full development, within the context of responsible parenthood, by protecting their child from preventable causes of disability and death through newborn screening.

What is meant by Comprehensive Newborn Screening System?

It means a newborn screening system that includes, but is not limited to,

1. Education of relevant stakeholders; collection and biochemical screening of blood samples taken from newborns;

2. Tracking and confirmatory testing to ensure the accuracy of screening results; clinical evaluation and biochemical/medical confirmation of test results;

3. Drugs and medical/surgical management and dietary supplementation to address the heritable conditions; and

4. Evaluation activities to assess long term outcome, patient compliance and quality assurance.

What is meant by “follow-up” in the context of RA 9288?

Follow-up means the monitoring of a newborn with a heritable condition for the purpose of ensuring that the newborn patient complies fully with the medicine of dietary prescriptions.

What are included under the term “health institutions”?

The term includes hospitals, health infirmaries, health centers, lying-in centers or puericulture centers with obstetrical and pediatric services, whether public or private.

Who is considered as a “healthcare practitioner” under RA 9288?

The term means physicians, nurses, midwives, nursing aides and traditional birth attendants.

What is meant by “heritable condition”?

It means any condition that can result in mental retardation, physical deformity or death if left undetected and untreated and which is usually inherited from the genes of either or both biological parents of the newborn.

What is meant by “newborn?”

“Newborn” means a child from the time of complete delivery to 30 days old.

What is “newborn screening”?

It means the process of collecting a few drops of blood from the newborn onto an appropriate collection card and performing biochemical testing for determining if the newborn has a heritable condition.

What is a Newborn Screening Center?

It is a facility equipped with a newborn screening laboratory that complies with the standards established by the NIH and provides all required laboratory tests and recall/follow-up programs for newborns with heritable conditions.

What is the Newborn Screening Reference Center?

It is the central facility at the NIH that defines testing and follow-up protocols, maintains an external laboratory proficiency testing program, oversees the national testing database and case registries, assists in training activities in all aspects of the program, oversees content of educational materials and acts as the Secretariat of the Advisory Committee on Newborn Screening.

What is meant by “parent education?”

It refers to the various means of providing parents or legal guardians information about newborn screening.

What is meant by “recall”?

“Recall” means a procedure for locating a newborn with a possible heritable condition for purposes of providing the newborn with appropriate laboratory to confirm the diagnosis and, as appropriate, provide treatment.

What will treatment consist of a newborn is found to have a heritable condition?

Treatment means prompt, appropriate and adequate medicine, medical, and surgical management or dietary prescription to a newborn for purposes of treating or mitigating the adverse health consequences of the heritable condition.

What are the obligations of health practitioners under RA 9288?

Any health practitioner who delivers, or assists in the delivery, of a newborn in the Philippines shall, prior to delivery, inform the parents or legal guardian of the newborn of the availability, nature and benefits of newborn screening. Appropriate notification and education regarding this obligation shall be the responsibility of the Department of Health (DOH).

How is newborn screening performed?

Newborn screening shall be performed after twenty-four (24) hours of life but not later than three (3) days from complete delivery of the newborn. A newborn that must be placed in intensive care in order to ensure survival may be exempted from the 3-day requirement but must be tested by seven (7) days of age.

It shall be the joint responsibility of the parent(s) and the practitioner or other person delivering the newborn to ensure that newborn screening is performed. An appropriate informational brochure for parents to assist in fulfilling this responsibility shall be made available by the Department of Health and shall be distributed to all health institutions and made available to any health practitioner requesting it for appropriate distribution.

Can parents refuse to have their babies tested?

A parent or legal guardian may refuse testing on the grounds of religious beliefs, but shall acknowledge in writing their understanding that refusal for testing places their newborn at risk for undiagnosed heritable conditions. A copy of this refusal documentation shall be made part of the newborn’s medical record and refusal shall be indicated in the national newborn screening database.

What are the requirements of RA 9288 for health institutions?

The DOH and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC) shall require health institutions to provide newborn screening services as a condition for licensure or accreditation.

What are the procedures or requirements in the establishment and accreditation of Newborn Screening Centers?

The DOH shall ensure that Newborn Screening Centers are strategically located in order to be accessible to the relevant public and provide services that comply with the standards approved by the Committee upon the recommendation of the NIH. No Newborn Screening Center shall be allowed to operate unless it has been duly accredited by the DOH based on the standards set forth by the Committee.

At a minimum, every Newborn Screening Center shall: (i) have a certified laboratory performing all tests included in the newborn screening program, (ii) have a recall/follow up programs for infants found positive for any and all of the heritable conditions; (iii) be supervised and staffed by trained personnel who have been duly qualified by the NIH; and (iv) submit to periodic announced or unannounced inspections by the Reference Center in order to evaluate and ensure quality Newborn Screening Center performance.

What is the Newborn Screening Reference Center and what is its function?

The NIH shall establish a Newborn Screening Reference Center, which shall be responsible for the national testing database and case registries, training, technical assistance and continuing education for laboratory staff in all Newborn Screening Centers.

The NIH Newborn Screening Reference Center shall be responsible for drafting and ensuring good laboratory practice standards for newborn screening centers, including establishing an external laboratory proficiency testing and certification program. It shall also act as the principal repository of technical information relating to newborn screening standards and practices, and shall provide technical assistance to newborn screening centers needing such assistance.

What is required of all Newborn Screening Centers?

They must coordinate with the NIH Newborn Screening Reference Center for consolidation of patient databases. The NIH Newborn Screening Reference Center shall maintain a national database of patients tested and a registry for each condition. It shall submit reports annually to the Committee and to the DOH on the status of and relevant health information derived from the database.

Who will shoulder the newborn screening fees?

The PHIC shall include cost of newborn screening in its benefits package. The newborn screening fee shall be applied to, among others, testing costs, education, sample transport, follow-up and reasonable overhead expenses.

A primer on RA 8972 or the Solo Parents’ Welfare Act of 2000

Update as of August 13, 2010:Senator Loren Legarda filed SB No. 1439 entitled “Solo Parents Welfare Act of 2010.” The bill seeks to amend RA 8972 and to provide the following support and benefits for solo parents: 1. Ten percent discount from all purchases of clothing and clothing materials for the child from birth up to two years; 2. Fifteen discount from all purchases of baby’s milk, food and food supplements; 3. Fifteen percent discount from all purchases of medicines and other medical supplements/supplies for the child; and 4. Basic personal exemption from individual income tax.

Last March 19, I gave a 3-hour legal seminar for the single parents group of a PCEC-affiliated church in Quezon City. Known as the Single Parents For Christ (SPARC), the group is composed of some 20 to 30 women who are single parents for various reasons - widowhood, separation from their husbands, grandparents left to take care of grandkids as the parents are working abroad, etc.

We had a fruitful afternoon discussing the essential provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, RA 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, and RA 8972 or the Solo Parents’ Welfare Act of 2000. If you’d like to know more about this group of dear ladies, please surf to their website.

While browsing at the new OMF Lit bookstore in Boni Avenue in Mandaluyong, I saw a book entitled, if I remember correctly, “On Single Parenting” published by Zondervan, priced at around two hundred eighty pesos. Once I get a copy of the book, I will do a review on it in my Salt and Light blog. (You might also be interested in the video “Si Nanay Ay Si Tatay” available at House of Praise outlets.) Anyway, for now, I have below a primer on our country’s solo parents’ law.

What is our country’s law for single parents?

Republic Act No. 8972 or the “Solo Parents' Welfare Act of 2000” is the Philippine law on single parents. It was promulgated on November 7, 2000.

What is the policy of the State regarding solo parents?

It is the policy of the State to promote the family as the foundation of the nation, strengthen its solidarity and ensure its total development. Towards this end, it will develop a comprehensive program of services for solo parents and their children to be carried out by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), the National Housing Authority (NHA), the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and other related government and non-government agencies. (Sec.2, RA 8972)

Who is considered under the law as a “solo parent”?

Any individual who falls under any of the following categories is considered as a single parent:

1. A woman who gives birth as a result of rape and other crimes against chastity even without a final conviction of the offender: Provided, That the mother keeps and raises the child;

2. Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to death of spouse;

3. Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood while the spouse is detained or is serving sentence for a criminal conviction for at least one year;

4. Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to physical and/or mental incapacity of spouse as certified by a public medical practitioner;

5. Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to legal separation or de facto separation from spouse for at least one year, as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children;

6. Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage as decreed by a court or by a church as long as he or she is entrusted with the custody of the children;

7.Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to abandonment of spouse for at least one year;

8. Unmarried mother or father who has preferred to keep and rear the child or children instead of having others care for them or give them up to a welfare institution;

9. Any other person who solely provides parental care and support to a child or children;

10. Any family member who assumes the responsibility of head of family as a result of the death, abandonment, disappearance or prolonged absence of the parents or solo parent.

A change in the status or circumstance of the parent claiming benefits under this Act, such that he/she is no longer left alone with the responsibility of parenthood, shall terminate his/her eligibility for these benefits.

Who are considered as “children” under RA 8972?

The term “children” refers to those living with and dependent upon the solo parent for support who are unmarried, unemployed and not more than eighteen years of age, or even over eighteen years but are incapable of self-support because of mental or physical disability.

What is “parental responsibility”?

The term “parental responsibility” with respect to their minor children refers to the rights and duties of the parents as defined in Article 220 of the Family Code of the Philippines.”

What are the criteria for support under RA 8972?

1. Any solo parent whose income in the place of domicile falls below the poverty threshold as set by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and subject to the assessment of the DSWD worker in the area is eligible for assistance;

2. That any solo parent whose income is above the poverty threshold can enjoy the benefits mentioned in Sections 6, 7 and 8 of RA 8972.

What are government agencies required to provide under RA 8972?

A comprehensive package of social development and welfare services for solo parents and their families will be developed by the DSWD, DOH, DECS, CHED, TESDA, DOLE, NHA and DILG, in coordination with local government units and a nongovernmental organization with proven track record in providing services for solo parents.

The DSWD must coordinate with concerned agencies the implementation of the comprehensive package of social development and welfare services for solo parents and their families.

What are included in this package of services for single parents?

The package of services will initially include:

(a) Livelihood development services which include trainings on livelihood skills, basic business management, value orientation and the provision of seed capital or job placement.

(b) Counseling services which include individual, peer group or family counseling. This will focus on the resolution of personal relationship and role conflicts.

(c) Parent effectiveness services which include the provision and expansion of knowledge and skills of the solo parent on early childhood development, behavior management, health care, rights and duties of parents and children.

(d) Critical incidence stress debriefing which includes preventive stress management strategy designed to assist solo parents in coping with crisis situations and cases of abuse.

(e) Special projects for individuals in need of protection which include temporary shelter, counseling, legal assistance, medical care, self-concept or ego-building, crisis management and spiritual enrichment.

What is “flexible work schedule”?

It is the right granted to a solo parent employee to vary arrival and departure time without affecting the core work hours as defined by the employer. Under Section 6 of RA 8972, the employer must provide for a flexible working schedule for solo parents: But the flexible work schedule should not affect individual and company productivity: Provided, further, That any employer may request exemption from the above requirements from the DOLE on meritorious grounds.

What about the issue of work discrimination, in terms of job assignments or promotion?

Section 7 of RA 8972 provides that employers must not discriminate against solo parents with respect to terms and conditions of their employment.

What is the so-called single parent leave?

Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8972 states that “in addition to leave privileges under existing laws, parental leave of not more than seven (7) working days every year shall be granted to any solo parent employee who has rendered service of at least one (1) year.” Please take note of the phrase “in addition to leave privileges under existing laws.”

What if there are already benefits under company policies or provisions of the CBA? Can the parental leave still be availed of?

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8972 (take note specially of Section 21) state:

Section 18. Parental Leave – In addition to leave privileges under existing laws, parental leave of not more than seven (7) working days every year shall be granted to any solo parent employee who has rendered service of at least one (1) year. The seven-day parental leave shall be non-cumulative.

Section 19. Conditions for Entitlement of Parental Leave – A solo parent shall be entitled to parental leave provided that:

(a) He/She has rendered at least one (1) year of service whether continuous or broken at the time of the effectivity of the Act;

(b) He/She has notified his/her employer of the availment thereof within a reasonable time period; and

(c) He/She has presented a Solo Parent Identification Card to his/her employer.

Section 20. Non-conversion of Parental Leave – In the event that the parental leave is not availed of, said leave shall not be convertible to cash unless specifically agreed upon previously. However, if said leave were denied an employee as a result of non-compliance with the provisions of these Rules by an employer, the aforementioned leave may be used a basis for the computation of damages.

Section 21. Crediting of Existing Leave – If there is an existing or similar benefit under a company policy, or a collective bargaining agreement or collective negotiation agreement the same shall be credited as such. If the same is greater than the seven (7) days provided for in the Act, the greater benefit shall prevail.

If the company already gives leave benefits or there are applicable provisions in the CBA, the question that should be resolved is: Are the benefits similar to or greater than the parental leave under RA 8972? If not, then these benefits under company policies or CBA provisions cannot be credited under Section 21.

Companies, in seeking ways to save on costs and expenses, sometimes refuse to grant the solo parent leave. They claim that that there are existing or benefits similar to the solo parent leave under company policies. If you are a solo parent working for a company that refuses to grant the solo parent leave by claiming that Section 21 of the IRR applies, then you should seek the help of the Public Assistance and Complaints Unit of the DOLE. The PACU will help you file a complaint and then call you and your employer to a mediation/conciliation conference. If nothing comes out of the conciliation, the PACU will endorse your complaint to the National Labor Relations Commission.

A common problem of single parents is providing educational opportunities for their children. Does RA 8972 have provision on this issue?

The DECS, CHED and TESDA are mandated to provide the following benefits and privileges:

(1) Scholarship programs for qualified solo parents and their children in institutions of basic, tertiary and technical/skills education; and

(2) Nonformal education programs appropriate for solo parents and their children.

Another problem of single parents is housing. What benefits if any are provided under RA 8972?

Solo parents shall be given allocation in housing projects and shall be provided with liberal terms of payment on said government low-cost housing projects in accordance with housing law provisions prioritizing applicants below the poverty line as declared by the NEDA.

What about medical assistance?

The DOH shall develop a comprehensive health care program for solo parents and their children. The program shall be implemented by the DOH through their retained hospitals and medical centers and the local government units (LGUs) through their provincial/district/city/municipal hospitals and rural health units (RHUs).

How do I avail of the benefits under RA 8972?

You can communicate with the DSWD office of your town or city as to the requirements.

Postscript: As you can see from the above, the package of benefits for single parents is quite slim. Perhaps, our enlightened legislators will see the need to increase the assistance to single parents. One idea the SPARC ladies came up with is the “Single Parents ID” just like that of the senior citizens, with all of the corresponding benefits.

Mediation not applicable to domestic violence cases, with apologies to Pia Guanio

Update: Supreme Court rules that RA 9262 cases cannot be mediated The non-referral of a VAWC (violence against women and children) case to a mediator is justified. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. Garcia vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

Several days ago, I was watching Channel 7’s “24 Oras” early evening news program when Pia Guanio, the entertainment segment host, reported an item about Hollywood actor Lou Diamond Phillips. As reported, Phillips was arrested by Los Angeles police for verbally and physically abusing his live-in girlfriend. Phillips, who’s got Filipino ancestry, was released by the police several hours later on his own recognizance.

What got my attention was Pia’s last statement in her news report. I stand to be corrected but I heard Pia say, “Pansamantalang pinakawalan si Phillips upang masubukan niya at ng kanyang ka-live in ang meditation.” In English, that translates into, “Phillips was released by the police so that he and his live-in partner can try meditation.”

Either Pia Guanio (a beautiful and smart woman desperately in need of a fashion make-over) misread the teleprompter, or the news editors of Channel 7 were really at fault. You see, the word Pia should have used instead of MEDITATION was MEDIATION. For a brief moment, I had visions of Lou Diamond Phillips and his live-in partner doing some Transcendental Meditation in order to solve their relationship problems. Om! Om! Sorry, Pia!

Levity aside, I have written several articles on RA 9262, our country’s landmark law on violence against women. If you’d like to review these articles, here are the links:

Hope and help for the battered woman (2): RA 9262 essential provisions
Hope and help for the battered woman (3): RA 9262 Protection Orders
Hope and help for the battered woman (4): Emotional abuse / psychological violence
Hope and help for the battered woman (5): Biblical response to abuse; evangelical Christians are best husbands – University of Virginia study
The “Battered Woman Syndrome” as defense

What is mediation?

Mediation is a method of “Alternative Dispute Resolution” and under the Supreme Court guidelines, it is mandatory for all civil cases and some criminal offenses (like BP 22 or bouncing checks). The court orders the litigants to undergo mediation proceedings before a Supreme Court-trained mediator, for a period of 30 days. Mediation is informal and the mediator tries to get the parties to settle the case amicably, on a win-win scenario for all the parties involved. If the mediation fails, then the case is referred back to court for continuation of trial. But experience has shown that mediation works well with a high percentage of cases amicably settled.

Labor dispute cases in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) now also undergo mandatory conciliation/mediation proceedings. Of course, most of you are familiar with the mediation proceedings at the barangay level, as provided for by the Local Government Code of 1991.

RA 9262 cases expressly exempted from mediation (by barangay officials, police officers, social workers, and judges)

It appears from Pia’s report and the Internet resources I checked that California and some other places in the USA allow mediation proceedings even in domestic violence cases. But, here in the Philippines, RA 9262, its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the Supreme Court Rule for RA 9262, all prohibit mediation of cases involving violence against women. You might ask, if mediation has been proven to work well, then why is it prohibited in RA 9262 cases?

The Supreme Court, quoting the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence, gives us the reason why:

Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection order has been sought.

Alison E. Gerencser, in an article entitled “Family Mediation: Screening for Domestic Abuse” (Florida State University Law Review), argues forcefully that domestic violence cases should be exempted from mediation proceedings. While written in the context of American society and a bit dated since it was written in 1995, it is a very informative article. Among other things, Gerencser cites studies that show women have only suffered more abuse after mediation sessions than after trials.

Anyway, here are the specific provisions that prohibit mediation or conciliation of domestic violence cases:

RA 9262

Sec. 33. Prohibited Acts. – A Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad or the court hearing an application for a protection order shall not order, direct, force or in any way unduly influence he applicant for a protection order to compromise or abandon any of the reliefs sought in the application for protection under this Act. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and Sections 410, 411, 412 and 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall not apply in proceedings where relief is sought under this Act.

Failure to comply with this Section shall render the official or judge administratively liable.

Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9262

Section 27. Prohibited Acts – A Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad, or the court hearing an application for a protection order shall not order, direct, force or in any way unduly influence the applicant to compromise or abandon any of the reliefs sought in the application for protection order under the Act. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and Sections 410, 411, 412 and 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall not apply in proceedings where relief is sought under the Act.

Failure to comply with this Section shall render the official or judge administratively liable.

Law enforcers and other government personnel shall not mediate or conciliate or influence the victim-survivor or applicant for a protection order to compromise or abandon the relief sought.

Section 47, paragraph (o): Shall not attempt to influence the victim-survivor to abandon her claims. All forms of amicable settlement under the Katarungang Pambarangay such as mediation, settlement, conciliation, arbitration shall not apply to cases of VAWC in the Act xxx

Supreme Court Rule

Sec. 23. Preliminary conference.—
(a) When conducted.—A preliminary conference, which is mandatory, shall be held on the date indicated in the notice.
(b) Notice.—The notice shall be served the parties, including the offended party, who shall be required to notify their respective counsels, if any. The parties shall appear in person at the preliminary conference and submit their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
(c) Nature and purpose.—The court shall consider:
(1) The propriety of issuing a protection order. The court shall not deny the issuance of a protection order due to the lapse of time between the act of violence and the filing of the petition, subject to Section 24, R.A. No. 9262. The issuance of a barangay protection order or the pendency of an application for a barangay protection order shall not preclude a petitioner from applying for, or the court from granting, a protection order;
(2) The simplification of the issues; and
(3) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.

The court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator.

Perhaps, as judges, lawyers, social workers, police officers and religious ministers gain more knowledge and experience in handling domestic violence cases, at some stage of the proceedings, some form of mediation or conciliation could possibly be availed of to end the violence, mend the marriage and bring unity back to the family. Let’s all MEDITATE on that.