Rights and obligations of husbands and wives

The Family Code mentions the word “love” only twice and the first mention of the word is found in Title III which covers Articles 68 up to 73. The second mention of the word “love” is in Article 220 which states the rights and duties of parents towards their unemancipated children. Paragraph (2) of the article states that among the duties of parents towards their children is “to give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding.”

Anyway, let’s proceed from this romantic, mushy (this is redundant, right?) stuff about “love” and get on with the nitty-gritty details of the rights and obligations between husbands and wives.

As “Insight for Living” Bible teacher Chuck Swindoll once said, “The basis of a good marriage is not love; it is commitment.” What he's saying is that love is not a matter of the emotions, but of the will, of volition (this is really redundant, right?) You might want to review my article "Love Potion No. 9" where I wrote about dopamine, oxytocin and vasopressin. These chemicals produced by the human body and which some people have termed as the “cuddle chemicals” are believed responsible for that mysterious thing called love.

After the Family Code primer immediately below, I will discuss what the Bible says about rights and duties of husbands and wives, okay?

What are the rights and obligations of spouses under the Family Code?

The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (Art. 68, Family Code of the Philippines)

What if one spouse refuses to comply with his or her marital obligations as provided under Art. 68, can the offended spouse legally compel him to come home and comply with such obligations?

The Supreme Court in the case of Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio-Bildner (G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001 and G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001) stated among other things that “consortium” or “coverture” (the obligation to, live together, observe mutual, respect and fidelity) is prompted by the spontaneous, mutual love and affection between husband and wife and cannot be enforced by any legal mandate or court order.

The Ilusorio decision written by Justice Pardo revolved around this issue: “May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.”

The Supreme Court as a final note in the Ilusorio decision stated, “No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.”

Who decides on the family domicile?

The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. (Art. 69)

Article 68 states that the spouses are obliged to live together. Are there exceptions?

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (2nd paragraph, Art.69)

Who is responsible for the support of the family?

The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (Art. 70)

Who manages the household?

The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.

What if the husband or the wife neglects his or her duties to the family?

When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (Art. 72)

Under RA 9262 or the “Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004”, the wife can petition the Family Court where she resides for a Protection Order.

Can the wife exercise her profession or engage in business even without the permission of her husband?

Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds. (Art.73)

What if there is disagreement between the spouses?

In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:

(1) The objection is proper; and

(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.

If the husband refuses unjustifiably to allow his wife to exercise her profession or engage in business, what are the rights of the wife?

RA 9262, under paragraph (4) of Section 5 lists this situation as a act of violence against a woman. The said paragraph penalizes the man (husband or live-in partner) if he “prevents the woman from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controls the victim's own money or properties, or solely controls the conjugal or common money, or properties.”

Rights and obligations of husbands and wives from the Biblical standpoint

Ephesians 5:21 up to 33 outline the rights and obligations of husbands and wives:

21. Submitting yourselves one to another in the fear of God.
22. Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord.
23. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church: and he is the saviour of the body.
24. Therefore as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in every thing.
25. Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it;
26. That he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word,
27. That he might present it to himself a glorious church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish.
28. So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself.
29. For no man ever yet hated his own flesh; but nourisheth and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the church:
30. For we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones.
31. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh.
32. This is a great mystery: but I speak concerning Christ and the church.
33. Nevertheless let every one of you in particular so love his wife even as himself; and the wife see that she reverence her husband.

I Peter 3: 1-12 also state the rights and duties of husbands and wives toward each other:

1. Likewise, ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands; that, if any obey not the word, they also may without the word be won by the conversation of the wives;
2. While they behold your chaste conversation coupled with fear.
3. Whose adorning let it not be that outward adorning of plaiting the hair, and of wearing of gold, or of putting on of apparel;
4. But let it be the hidden man of the heart, in that which is not corruptible, even the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, which is in the sight of God of great price.
5. For after this manner in the old time the holy women also, who trusted in God, adorned themselves, being in subjection unto their own husbands:
6. Even as Sara obeyed Abraham, calling him lord: whose daughters ye are, as long as ye do well, and are not afraid with any amazement.
7. Likewise, ye husbands, dwell with them according to knowledge, giving honour unto the wife, as unto the weaker vessel, and as being heirs together of the grace of life; that your prayers be not hindered.
8. Finally, be ye all of one mind, having compassion one of another, love as brethren, be pitiful, be courteous:
9. Not rendering evil for evil, or railing for railing: but contrariwise blessing; knowing that ye are thereunto called, that ye should inherit a blessing.
10. For he that will love life, and see good days, let him refrain his tongue from evil, and his lips that they speak no guile:
11. Let him eschew evil, and do good; let him seek peace, and ensue it.
12. For the eyes of the Lord are over the righteous, and his ears are open unto their prayers: but the face of the Lord is against them that do evil.

In the area of relationships and marriage, there cannot be a more explosive and divisive issue than that of the headship of men and the submission of women. Sometime in the late 1990’s, I think, the Southern Baptist Convention issued an official statement asking women to “graciously submit” to their husbands. Needless to say, that statement was greeted with controversy, scorn and ridicule from different sectors and even from within the Convention itself. Feminist groups have been saying all these time that the Biblical injunction for women to submit to their husbands is an open invitation for spousal abuse.

If you want a thorough discussion of the Biblical doctrines of the headship of men and the submission of women, I recommend the following books to you:

1. “Strike the Original Match” by Chuck Swindoll; Multnomah Press © 1980; specifically the chapters entitled “Let’s Repair the Foundation” and “Bricks that Build a Marriage.”

2. “The Grace Awakening” also by Chuck Swindoll; Word Publishing, ©1996; specifically the chapter entitled “A Marriage Oiled by Grace”

3. “Together Forever” by Anne Kristin Caroll; Zondervan, © 1982 by Barbara J. Denis); specifically the chapter entitled “Who Wears the Pants?”

4. “Rocking the Roles” by Robert Lewis and William Hendricks; NavPress, ©1991; specifically the chapters entitled “The ‘S’ Word” and “The Masculine Counterpart to the ‘S’ Word.”

I have previously written about the headship of men and the submission of women, and you might want to re-read it. Part of that article reads as follows:

Lewis and Hendricks, while maintaining the traditional view of the headship of men and the submission of women, clarify however that submission is not a wife’s role. Rather, they say, submission is the wife’s loving response to her husband’s loving and sacrificial headship.

“Roles” and ‘responses” may sound like only semantics to you, but I encourage you to read “Rocking the Roles.” The most striking statement in this book about submission is found in page 135: “A biblically submissive wife’s focus is not on enabling wrong behavior, but in empowering her husband to pursue right behavior – to become the man God wants him to be, and the leader God wants him to be.”

I remember something Dr. James Dobson wrote in his classic book (highly recommended!) “Love Must Be Tough” about submission. Dobson said, “Being a spiritually submissive wife doesn’t mean being a doormat.”

Caroll, who writes her book out of the crucible of the pain of her divorce (and remarriage to the same guy) says on page 126, “Submission is freedom.”

During the wedding reception of a Filipino missionary couple bound for a Creative Access Nation, the groom wished out loud that his wife would submit to him. That brought about a lot of laughter among the guests. Well, Sir, please do keep in mind Lewis and Hendricks’ definition of submission and I’m sure your marriage will turn out okay. What’s their definition again? “A biblically submissive wife’s focus is not on enabling wrong behavior, but in empowering her husband to pursue right behavior – to become the man God wants him to be, and the leader God wants him to be.”

Biblical grounds for divorce and remarriage

We don’t have a divorce law here in the Philippines. But we do have its equivalents (for example, declaration of nullity of a marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code) which allow the estranged couple to marry other persons after their marriage has been declared null and void. Please take note that on the basis of Article 15 of the New Civil Code, a divorce obtained by a Filipino abroad will not be recognized here in the Philippines. Please read the following articles I have written on the issue of divorce and remarriage for Filipinos:

Divorce obtained abroad by Filipino citizen against alien spouse now recognized in the Philippines

Filipino divorced by spouse (who's formerly a Philippine citizen) can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code

Ruffa, Ylmaz, TV Patrol, divorce and remarriage by Filipinos; John and Gretchen?

The issue I wish to discuss here however is the Biblical grounds for divorce and remarriage. I’m sure you have heard the expression “What is legal is not always moral, and what is moral is not always legal.” Well, let me rephrase it this way, “What is legal is not always Biblical, and what is Biblical is not always legal.”

Over the years, pastors and church members have asked me for advice on what to do in situations where a new believer in Christ is legally married but is now separated and living in with another partner. While I could outline the laws and legal procedures in annulling a marriage, I would always tell the church member to consult his pastor on whether he has Biblical grounds for annulling his marriage.

My discussion here is based primarily on three sources: (1) Chuck Swindoll’s book “Strike The Original Match”; (2) Kerby Anderson’s article on divorce from the Probe Ministries website; and (3) from the Radio Bible Class Ministries article “Divorce and Remarriage” by RBC research editor Herb Vander Lugt.

Swindoll’s views on divorce and remarriage

Chuck Swindoll describes it accurately when he said in his book (published by Multnomah Press, 1980) that a busload of evangelical theologians will never achieve unanimity in their views of divorce and remarriage even if the bus went on a tour for the whole summer. Some Filipino pastors will categorically state, “The Bible does not allow divorce under any circumstance, period. The Bible does not allow remarriage, either, period.”

My own views are similar to those propounded by Swindoll. He states that based on Matthew 19 and I Corinthians 7:12-15, there are three circumstances or grounds for a valid, Biblical divorce and remarriage. These are:

1. When the marriage and divorce occurred prior to salvation;

2. When one’s mate is guilty of sexual immorality and is unwilling to repent and live faithfully with the marriage partner;

3. When one of the mates is an unbeliever and willfully and permanently deserts the believing partner.

Swindoll closes his discussion by quoting John R.W. Stott (Church Counter-Culture, IVF Press 1978) who says, “Divorce was a divine concession to human weakness.” Swindoll adds, “No Christian should aggressively seek the dissolution of his or her marriage bond. Some of the very best things God has to teach His children are learned while working through marital difficulties. Endless stories could be told of how God honored the perseverance of abused and ignored parties as they refused to give up.”

Dr. Ed Wheat, M.D. in his book “Love Life for Every Married Couple” (reprinted in the Philippines by Christian Literature Crusade) echoes the same view in page 227: “Do not give your husband a divorce. Do all in your power to delay or prevent it. If you must consult a lawyer, make it clear to the lawyer that it is only for your financial protection and that of your children. Find a Christian lawyer who will help you preserve your marriage.”

Anderson’s views

Kerby Anderson agrees with Swindoll that divorce and remarriage are Biblical only “in cases of marital infidelity by the other spouse or in cases of desertion by an unbelieving spouse.” Anderson also warns that even in these cases, pastors and churches should encourage reconciliation, not divorce.

Anderson also briefly tackles the issue of domestic violence or spousal abuse. He says that “in very troubling cases which involve mental, sexual and/or physical abuse, legal separation is available as a remedy to protect the abused spouse.”

Vander Lugt’s views; spousal abuse as a ground for divorce and remarriage

The Radio Bible Class Ministries article by Vander Lugt discusses in greater detail the issue of domestic violence or spousal abuse as a ground for divorce. Vander Lugt basically agrees with Swindoll and Anderson that the Bible permits divorce and remarriage on two grounds: sexual infidelity and the desertion of a spouse by an unbeliever.

However, Vander Lugt argues that I Corinthians 7:10-11 is the Apostle Paul’s compassionate provision for an abused woman. He states, “ … a woman who is married to a physically abusive husband may not be sinning when, with the encouragement of her spiritual counselors, she seeks divorce action – even if her husband is not guilty of sexual immorality.” He adds however that in such a case, remarriage is not allowed.

It is clear from the previous citation of Swindoll, Anderson and Wheat’s views, that Vander Lugt departs completely from what is certainly the majority view on divorce and remarriage.

A lot of pastors will also find questionable Vander Lugt's views that:

1. “When two people whose divorces were not valid in God’s sight come together in the sexual union of marriage, they break their former marriage covenant. But this is not a continuing state. From this point on, they are husband and wife.
“God considers two people as married when they have met the civil requirements. This is true even when their divorces were not valid in God’s sight.”

2. “ … when two people marry after a divorce on grounds less than specified by Jesus and Paul, they sin against the covenant they made in the previous marriage. But this occurs only once. Their first sexual union breaks the former bind. The new marriage covenant is now in effect.”

Ptr. John MacArthur Jr. (I can’t remember the exact source) on the contrary, says that since the divorce is not Biblical, God doesn’t recognize the subsequent marriage. Most Filipino pastors I know would also take strong exceptions to these views by Vander Lugt. To be fair however, Vander Lugt doesn't simply pull these views out of thin air. He bases his views on the difference between the Greek word for fornication ("porneia") and for adultery ("moicheia"). You can read his complete article at the Radio Bible Class Ministries website.

I began this discussion with the statement, “What is legal is not always Biblical, and what is Biblical is not always legal.” Let me pose a situationer for you at this point.

The Family Code of the Philippines provides in Articles 41 up to 44 what is known as “declaration of presumptive death for purposes of remarriage.” If a spouse has been missing for two years (extraordinary absence) or four years (ordinary absence), and there is well founded belief that the absent spouse is dead, the present spouse can file a petition in court asking that the absent spouse be declared presumptively dead. After the court’s decision has become final and executory, the present spouse is now free to remarry.

That’s the law. My question to you is this: You’re a pastor, and your church member says that he or she wants to avail of Articles 41 to 44 of the Family Code in order to marry someone. Would you say that the member has a Biblical reason for remarriage?

Freedom of religion in public schools

With regards the teaching of religion to public school students, the 1987 Constitution in Article XIV, Section 3, paragraph (3), states,

“At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.”

The freedom of religion clause of the 1987 Constitution is found in Article III, Section 5. It states,

“]“No law shall be passed respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.”

The freedom of religion clause of our Constitution is of American origin. Thus decisions of the US Supreme Court are applicable to Philippine situations. In terms of discrimination against any religion, the US Supreme Court has ruled the following:

1. Lamb’s Chapel et al. v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993) - School districts cannot deny churches access to school premises after-hours, if the district allowed the use of its building to other groups.

2. Good News Club v. Milford Central School, (2001) - Milford Central School cannot keep Good News Club from using its facilities because the school had created a limited public forum and prohibiting the religious club was viewpoint discrimination.

3. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) - A state university cannot refuse to grant a student religious group “equal access” to facilities that are open to other student groups.

4. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) - Court overturned conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who gave a religious address in a public park without permission of Pawtuckett, Rhode Island city officials. Pawtuckett officials had allowed other reliigous groups to speak in the park

Extra-judicial settlement of estates

Q: My father died leaving some properties to my mother and three children, including me. How can we divide up his properties? What are the respective shares?

A: You and your fellow heirs can simply ask a lawyer to draw up a deed of extra-judicial settlement of your father's estate. You can then have it notarized, and then have the notice published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three weeks. After you pay the corresponding taxes, you can then present the deed, the notarized affidavit of publication and the official receipts, to the Register of Deeds so that new titles can be issued to your names (assuming of course that your father left real properties).

Your mother gets one-half of the estate as her conjugal share. The remaining half will then be divided among your mother, you and your two other siblings. However, nothing prevents any heir from giving up his share of the inheritance or from choosing and getting a lesser amount. Thus, for example, instead of getting the farm in the province, one of the heirs may choose to get as his inheritance the brand new car.

Correction of birth certificates

Q: How can I have my birth certificate corrected?

A: For change of first name, and for correction of minor clerical errors, you can simply file an administrative petition with the Local Civil Registrar of your place of birth or residence, under Republic Act 9048, also called the "Guinigundo Law."

For substantial errors, however, like errors in birthdates, gender, etc. you will still have to file the proper petition with the Regional Trial Court of the place which issued your birth certificate.

Marriage between first cousins

Q: Can I get married to my first cousin?

A: No, you cannot. You are related to your cousin by four civil degrees, and thus any such marriage is prohibited by reason of public policy (Article 38 of the Family Code).

From you to your father or mother, that is one degree. From your father or mother, to your grandparents, that is another civiil degree. From your grandparents to your uncle or aunt, that is another degree. And from your uncle or aunt to your first cousin, is another degree, making a total of four degrees.

Legal separation and declaration of nullity

Q: What is the difference between legal separation and declaration of nullity?

A: The grounds or reasons are different, and more importantly, in legal separation, the spouses are not allowed to get married again to other parties. The wife also still has to use her husband's surname. (Practically no one therefore wants to file for legal separation; almost everyone in marital troubles will choose to have his or her marriage decalred null and void.)

Divorce and declaration of nullity

Q: What is the difference between divorce and declaration of nullity?

A: In divorce (which is non-existent in the Philippines), the grounds or reasons for such arise during the marriage. In declaration of nullity of a marriage (as provided for by the Family Code), the grounds or reasons are already existing even before the marriage, but such grounds may have manifested themselves only during the marriage.

In practical effect, however, both divorce and declaration of nullity of a marriage allow the former spouses to get married again to other persons.

Annulment and declaration of nullity

Q: Is there any difference between annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage?

A: Under Articles 35 up to 54 of the Family Code, some marriages are considered either void or voidable. Technically speaking, annulment refers to the legal action declaring void those marriages considered as voidable (that is valid until annulled). On the other hand, declaration of nullity refers to those marriages considered as void from the very beginning.

In laymen's language, however, annulment is often used as a generic term for the legal action concerning both kinds of marriages.

Marriage license requirement

Q: My boyfriend and I are both above 21 years of age, and we want to get married, with our parents' consent. But the Local Civil Registrar won’t issue a marriage license because my boyfriend can't produce his birth certificate. What can we do?


A: Please point out to the LCR the last portion of Article 12 of the Family Code which states,

“The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate shall not be required if the parents of the contracting parties appear personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as stated in the application, or when the local civil registrar shall, by merely looking at the applicants upon their personally appearing before him, be convinced that either or both of them have the required age.”

Psychological incapacity

Q: What is psychological incapacity?


A: Article 36 of the Family Code provides, “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”


The Supreme Court in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals.stated, “pychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”


In Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals, a 2003 case, the Supreme Court stated,

“The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that “expert opinion need not be alleged” in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.

“Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and control the human body. Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity.”

Effects of Art. 36

Q: What are the effects when a marriage is declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code?

A: Articles 50 up to 54 of the Family Code provide for the effects when a marriage is annulled or declared null and void. Among others, the children are considered as legitimate, and their presumptive legitimes must be given to them before the judgment can become final.

Rights of illegitimate children

Q: What are the rights of illegitimate children?

A: Under Republic Act 9255, Article 176 of the Family Code has been amended, allowing illegitimate children to use the surname of their father “if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. The father, however, has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.”

Also, whatever a legitimate child gets in terms of inheritance, the illegitimate child is entitled to one-half. For example, if the legitimate child gets one hundred thousand pesos as his share in the inheritance, the illegitimate child gets fifty thousand pesos.

Marriage certificate not in NSO files

Q: My husband found out that our marriage certificate is not on file with the National Statistics Office. He said that our marriage is therefore not valid, and that he can get married to another woman. Is my husband correct?

A: Your husband is wrong. The lack or absence of a marriage certificate (or contract) in the files of the NSO does not make your marriage invalid. The marriage certificate (or contract) is not an essential or formal requisite for the validity of a marriage under the Family Code.

The marriage certificate is a powerful documentary evidence of the existence of your marriage. Even then, however, the existence or validity of your marriage can be proven by other evidence - the marriage license, the testimony of the officiating minister and the witnesses, wedding pictures, etc.

Should your husband therefore insist on getting married again, you can charge him with bigamy under the Revised Penal Code.

Adoption and simulation of birth

(Note: Click the picture to download a free PDF newsletter on this topic.)

What is the difference between adoption and simulation of birth?

Adoption is the legal process by which a child becomes the legitimate child of the adopting person/s. The law which governs domestic adoption is Republic Act 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.

Simulation of birth, on the other hand, occurs when a childless couple, for example, comes into possession of a baby or child, given to them by a midwife, an unwed mother or a relative, and this couple then applies for a birth certificate, making it appear that the baby or child is their biological offspring. Under RA 8552, simulation of birth is a criminal offense punishable by eight years imprisonment and a fine of fifty thousand pesos.

The Marian Guinn Case [2]: right of church discipline ends upon withdrawal of membership

As I mentioned previously, the Oklahoma State Supreme Court ruled that:

1. All actions of the church in disciplining Guinn before she withdrew her membership were protected by the First Amendment and thus outside of the purview of secular courts; and

2. After Guinn withdrew her membership, the church no longer had the right to discipline her and was thus liable to Guinn for damages.

The following are the pertinent portions of the decision of the Oklahoma State Supreme Court (sub-headings supplied):

Respect given by secular courts to decisions of church disciplining authorities

The religion clauses of the first amendment, which prohibit both state and federal governments from inhibiting or supporting citizens’ religious interests, were written in an effort to create an environment in which “many types of life, character, opinion and belief . . . [could] develop unmolested and unobstructed.”

Whenever the questions of discipline or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.

If members of religious organizations could freely pursue their doctrinal grievances in civil courts, or legislatures could pass laws to inhibit or enhance religious activities, ecclesiastical liberty would be subjected to governmental interference and the ‘unmolested and unobstructed’ development of opinion and belief which the First Amendment shield was designed to foster could be secularly undermined.

The disciplinary actions taken by the Elders against Guinn before she withdrew her membership from the Church of Christ did not constitute a threat to public safety, peace or order and hence did not justify state interference.

Right of people to freely choose and join religious organizations

When people voluntarily join together in pursuit of spiritual fulfillment, the First Amendment requires that the government respect their decision and not impose its own ideas on the religious organization. Under the First Amendment people may freely consent to being spiritually governed by an established set of ecclesiastical tenets defined and carried out by those chosen to interpret and impose them.

A person who joins a church voluntarily submits himself to the authority of that church and is therefor bound by its rules

The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.

Under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, Guinn had the right to consent as a participant in the practices and beliefs of the Church of Christ without fear of governmental interference. As the Church’s chosen spiritual leaders, the Elders were responsible for providing guidance to all those who, like Guinn, had chosen to follow. Under the Free Exercise Clause the Elders had the right to rely on Parishioner’s consensual participation in the congregation when they disciplined her as one who had voluntarily elected to adhere to their doctrinal precepts.

Guinn’s willing submission to the Church of Christ’s dogma, and the Elders’ reliance on that submission, collectively shielded the church’s prewithdrawal, religiously-motivated discipline from scrutiny through secular judicature.

A person has the unqualified right to withdraw his membership from a church

The right to withdraw one’s implied consent to submit to the disciplinary decisions of a church is constitutionally unqualified; its relinquishment requires a knowing and intelligent waiver.

Guinn asserts that her withdrawal of membership from the Collinsville Church of Christ was also effective as a withdrawal of her consent to submit to that church’s beliefs and ecclesiastical disciplinary procedures. Upon her withdrawal, Guinn urges, the church was precluded from sanctioning her as if she were a current member. By continuing to discipline her as though she were a practicing Church of Christ member, the Elders are alleged to have invaded her privacy and caused her emotional distress.

In defense of their actions the Elders claim that the Church of Christ has no doctrinal provision for withdrawal of membership. According to their beliefs, a member remains a part of the congregation for life. Like those who are born into a family, they may leave but they can never really sever the familial bond. A court’s determination that Guinn effectively withdrew her membership and thus her consent to submit to church doctrine would, according to the Elders, be a constitutionally impermissible state usurpation of religious discipline accomplished through judicial interference.

The Elders had never been confronted with a member who chose to withdraw from the church. Because disciplinary proceedings against Guinn had already commenced when she withdrew her membership, the Elders concluded their actions could not be hindered by her withdrawal and would be protected by the First Amendment. Guinn relies on her September 24, 1981 handwritten letter to the Elders in which she unequivocally stated that she withdrew her membership and terminated her consent to being treated as a member of the Church of Christ communion. By common-law standards we find her communication was an effective withdrawal of her membership and of her consent to religious discipline.

Just as freedom to worship is protected by the First Amendment, so also is the liberty to recede from one’s religious allegiance

In Torcaso v. Watkins, the Court reaffirmed that neither a state nor the federal government can force or influence a person to go or to remain away from church against one’s will or to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. The First Amendment clearly safeguards the freedom to worship as well as the freedom not to worship.

When Guinn withdrew her membership from the Church of Christ and thereby withdrew her consent to participate in a spiritual relationship in which she had implicitly agreed to submit to ecclesiastical supervision, those disciplinary actions thereafter taken by the Elders against Guinn, which actively involved her in the church's will and command, were outside the purview of the First Amendment protection and were the proper subject of state regulation.

The church’s right to discipline ends when the person withdraws his membership

Disciplinary practices involving members of an ecclesiastical association, which do not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order, are unquestionably among those hallowed First Amendment rights with which the government cannot interfere. If these sectarian matters were easily subject to civil adjudication and liability by secular judicature, the First Amendment shield under which “many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed” would be rendered impotent.

First Amendment protection does not extend to all religiously-motivated disciplinary practices in which ecclesiastical organizations might engage. By its very nature, ecclesiastical discipline involves both church and member. It is a means of religious expression as well as a means of ecclesiastically judging one who transgresses a church law which one has consented to obey. The right to express dissatisfaction with the disobedience of those who have promised to adhere to doctrinal precepts and to take ecclesiastically-mandated measures to bring wayward members back within the bounds of accepted behavior, are forms of religious expression and association which the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause was designed to protect and preserve. And yet the constitutionally protected freedom to impose even the most deeply felt, spiritually-inspired disciplinary measure is forfeited when the object of “benevolent” concern is one who has terminated voluntary submission to another’s supervision and command.

After Guinn withdrew her membership from the Collinsville Church of Christ, the Elders were neither absolutely nor conditionally privileged to publicize private facts about her life.

The Marian Guinn Case: Improper use of church discipline

I grew up in the Mandaluyong Bible Baptist Church in Nueve de Febrero St. under missionary Fred Null and his wife Lorene, and Pastor Wen Secillano. In my childhood, I witnessed two cases where the church imposed discipline on some erring members guilty of sexual misconduct. These experiences gave me awesome respect for the process of church discipline.

Several years ago, J. Carl Laney came here to the Philippines to give a seminar on church discipline based on his book. I think the seminar was held at the Greenhills Christian Fellowship and reportedly some 400 pastors attended the seminar.

The process of church discipline is clearly spelled out in Matthew chapter 18. In a previous post, I gave you the complete text of a Supreme Court decision on the issue of church discipline (expulsion of members) in a case involving "The Church in Quezon City." Our discussion on the improper use of church displine will now focus on the American case of "Marian Guinn versus the Church of Christ of Collinsville."

Briefly, after being disciplined by her church, Marian Guinn sued her church. She won around four hundred thousand dollars in damages from the trial court. (The church budget was only around sixty five thousand dollars a year.) The church appealed to the Oklahoma State Supreme Court, which remanded the case to the trial court. The State Supreme Court ruled that all actions of the church in disciplining Guinn while she was still a church member fell under the mantle of freedom of religion and therefore were beyond the jurisdiction of secular courts. But the Court also ruled that all actions of the church after Guinn had withdrawn her membership from the church was no longer protected by freedom of religion, and the church could therefore be held accountable for damages. Reportedly, the church settled out of court with Guinn rather than go through a new trial.

The question is, Why did the church continue with the imposition of discipline when Guinn had already withdrawn her membership from the church? Well, the church did not have a provision in its Constitution for a member withdrawing membership. The church also did not have a tradition of a member withdrawing her membership; in cases of discipline, it was the church which withdrew fellowship with the erring church member.

Below are the facts of the case as taken from the decision of the Oklahoma State Supreme Court. I will discuss later on the ramifications of the said decision.

MARIAN GUINN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,v. THE CHURCH OF CHRIST OF COLLINSVILLE, OKLAHOMA, A NON-PROFIT CORPORATION; ALLEN CASH, TED MOODY AND RON WITTEN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

On appeal from the District Court, ¶0 In an action for damages from invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, brought by a former parishioner against the congregation and its leadership, judgment was rendered on a jury verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendants, JUDGMENT IS REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.

[775 P.2d 767]

¶1 The dispositive first-impression question presented is whether a state forensic inquiry into an alleged tortious act by a religious body against its former member is an unconstitutional usurpation of the church's prerogatives by a secular court and hence prohibited by the First Amendment. We answer in the negative.

I
FACTS

¶2 The plaintiff-appellee, Marian Guinn [Parishioner], and her children moved to Collinsville, Oklahoma in 1974. While staying with her sister, Parishioner became acquainted with the defendants-appellants, Ron Whitten, Ted Moody and Allen Cash [collectively referred to as the "Elders"] in their capacities as Elders of the Collinsville Church of Christ. A few weeks later, Parishioner became a member of that congregation. Both Parishioner and the Elders agree that the first few years of Parishioner's membership reflected the mutual support inherent in a relationship between a religious organization and one of its members. Parishioner attended services and the congregation extended to her a financial and emotional helping hand.

¶3 In 1980 the Elders confronted Parishioner with a rumor that she was having sexual relations with a male Collinsville resident [companion], who was not a member of the Church of Christ. According to the Elders, they pursued this rumor in order to uphold their doctrinal commands which require that they, as church leaders, monitor the congregation members' actions, as well as confront and discuss [775 P.2d 768] problems with any one who is "having trouble." The Church of Christ follows a literal interpretation of the Bible which serves as the church's sole source of moral, religious and ethical guidance. When confronted with the allegation, Parishioner admitted violating the Church of Christ's prohibition against fornication. As a transgressor of the denomination's code of ethics, Parishioner became subject to the disciplinary procedure set forth in Matthew 18:13-17.1

¶4 The Elders carried out the biblically-mandated disciplinary procedure in three stages, with the entire process lasting more than a year. First, the Elders approached Parishioner and her children in a laundromat and requested that she appear before the church and repent of the fornication sin. They also suggested that Parishioner refrain from seeing her companion.

¶5 The second of the three "meetings" was held at the church. According to the Parishioner, her attendance dropped considerably after the Elders initially confronted her in the laundromat. The Elders had called Parishioner and told her that if she did not come to church to discuss her continuing relationship with her companion they would come to her house. Although the bad weather that night made the Parishioner anxious about leaving her children alone, she decided to meet with the Elders at the church. They instructed her to stop seeing her companion. Parishioner agreed this was the best solution because her relationship with him was deteriorating.

¶6 The third and final meeting took place on the driveway outside the Parishioner's home when she was under suspicion of having been with her companion. The Elders parked near Parishioner's house and awaited her arrival. When Parishioner's car pulled into the driveway, the Elders approached it and told Parishioner and her companion that if she did not appear before the congregation and repent of her fornication sin, the members would "withdraw fellowship"2 from her.

¶7 On September 21, 1981, a few days after the third meeting, the Elders sent Parishioner a letter warning her that if she did not repent, the withdrawal of fellowship process would be commenced. At this point Parishioner realized the Elders intended to inform the congregation of her sexual involvement with the companion. She sought legal advice in an effort to ascertain her rights. On September 24 her lawyer sent the Elders a letter and advised them not to expose Parishioner's private life to the Collinsville congregation which comprised approximately five percent of the town's population. The Elders did not heed her lawyer's advice.

¶8 On September 25, 1981 Parishioner wrote the Elders a letter imploring them not to mention her name in church except to tell the congregation that she had withdrawn from membership. The Elders ignored Parishioner's requests. On September 27 [775 P.2d 769] they read to the congregation the September 21 letter they had sent to Parishioner. During the same service the Elders advised the congregation to contact Parishioner and to encourage her to repent and return to the Church. The Elders also told the congregation that should their attempts fail, the scriptures Parishioner had violated would be read aloud at the next service and the withdrawal of fellowship proceeding would begin.

¶9 Parishioner met with one of the Elders personally and again attempted to dissuade him from divulging her private life to the congregation. The Elder told her that withdrawing membership from the Church of Christ was not only doctrinally impossible but it could not halt the disciplinary sanction being carried out against her. The Church of Christ believes that all its members are a family; one can be born into a family but can never truly withdraw from it. A Church of Christ member can voluntarily join the church's flock but cannot then disassociate oneself from it.

¶10 According to one of the Elders, Parishioner was publicly branded a fornicator when the scriptures she had violated were recited to the Collinsville Church of Christ congregation on October 4. As part of the disciplinary process the same information about Parishioner's transgressions was sent to four other area Church of Christ congregations to be read aloud during services.

¶11 For the torts of outrage and invasion of privacy Parishioner recovered actual and punitive damages from the three Elders and from the Collinsville Church of Christ.3 Parishioner alleged in her claim of outrage that when disciplining her the Elders employed methods which caused her emotional anguish. Her claim of invasion of privacy was cast in two theories. Firstly, Parishioner asserted the Elders intruded upon her seclusion by carrying out against her religious disciplinary measures which were highly offensive, unreasonable and intrusive. Secondly, Parishioner claimed the Elders unreasonably publicized private facts about her life by communicating her transgressions to the Collinsville and the four other area Church of Christ congregations. After overruling the Elders' demurrers and their motion for summary judgment, the trial court submitted the case to the jury; its verdict was in favor of Parishioner and against each of the three individual Elders. The parties stipulated the Elders were at all times acting as agents of the Church of Christ corporation and thus the trial court found the judgment against the Elders also was a judgment against the Collinsville Church of Christ. The jury awarded $205,000 in actual and $185,000 in punitive damages; the trial court then added $44,737 in prejudgment interest.

Supreme Court ruling on termination or expulsion of church members

The ruling of our Supreme Court cited below illustrates the need for the following: (1) for local Baptist churches to draft a Constitution and By-Laws applicable and relevant to their doctrines and practices, instead of relying on the SEC ready made forms; (2) to educate members as to the provisions of their church’s Constitution and By-Laws; (3) for a regularly updated list of members; and (4) to strictly follow the provisions of the said documents in the affairs of the church.

THIRD DIVISION[G.R. Nos. 134963-64. September 27, 2001]
ALFREDO LONG and FELIX ALMERIA, petitioners, vs. LYDIA BASA, ANTHONY SAYHEELIAM and YAO CHEK, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 135152-53. September 27, 2001]
LIM CHE BOON, TAN HON KOC, JOSEPH LIM and LIU YEK SEE, petitioners, vs. LYDIA BASA, ANTHONY SAYHEELIAM and YAO CHEK, respondents. [G.R. No. 137135. September 27, 2001]
LIM CHE BOON, TAN HON KOC, JOSEPH LIM and LIU YEK SEE, petitioners, vs. LYDIA BASA, ANTHONY SAYHEELIAM and YAO CHEK, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

These are consolidated cases involving a religious corporation whose Board of Directors had expelled certain members thereof on purely spiritual or religious grounds since they refused to follow its teachings and doctrines. The controversy here centers on the legality of the expulsion.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals and as culled from the voluminous records of these cases, may be stated as follows:

In 1973, a religious group known as "The Church In Quezon City (Church Assembly Hall), Incorporated" ("CHURCH" for brevity), located at 140 Talayan St., Talayan Village, Quezon City, was organized as "an entity of the brotherhood in Christ."

It was registered in the same year with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-stock, non-profit religious corporation for the administration of its temporalities or the management of its properties.

The Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of the CHURCH decree that its affairs and operation shall be managed by a Board of Directors consisting of six (6) members, who shall be members of the CHURCH.

As a "brotherhood in Christ," the CHURCH embraced the “Principles of Faith” that "every member or officer" thereof “shall, without mental reservation, adhere strictly to the doctrine, teaching and faith being observed by the (CHURCH) in proclaiming the Gospel of Christ, to save lost souls, to lead men in worshipping the true God, in accordance with the Holy Bible and to believe:

(a) The Old and the New Testaments comprising the Holy Bible as inspired by God;
(b) The Trinity of the God-Head, which is God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit.
(c) That Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of the Living God, conceived by the Virgin Mary through the Holy Spirit, and possessing the nature of both God and man, and who died on the cross to save mankind, was buried, rose again on the third day, has ascended up to heaven, and will come back to reign as King someday.
(d) That the only way to salvation is solely by trusting on the shed blood of Jesus and the conviction of the Holy Spirit."

Zealous in upholding and guarding their Christian faith, and to ensure unity and uninterrupted exercise of their religious belief, the members of the CHURCH vested upon the Board of Directors the absolute power "(to preserve and protect the(ir) faith" and to admit and expel a member of the CHURCH.

Admission for membership in the CHURCH is so exacting. Only "persons zealous of the Gospel, faithful in Church work and of sound knowledge of the Truth, as the Board of Directors shall admit to membership, shall be members of the (CHURCH)."

The procedure for the expulsion of an erring or dissident member is prescribed in Article VII (paragraph 4) of the CHURCH By-laws, which provides that "If it is brought to the notice of the Board of Directors that any member has failed to observe any regulations and By-laws of the Institution (CHURCH) or the conduct of any member has been dishonorable or improper or otherwise injurious to the character and interest of the Institution, the Board of Directors may b(y) resolution without assigning any reason therefor expel such member from such Institution and he shall then forfeit his interest, rights and privileges in the Institution."

As early as 1988, the Board of Directors observed that certain members of the CHURCH, including petitioners herein, exhibited "conduct which was dishonorable, improper and injurious to the character and interest of the (CHURCH)" by "introducing (to the members) doctrines and teachings which were not based on the Holy Bible" and the Principles of Faith embraced by the CHURCH.

Confronted with this situation, the respondents, as members of the Board of Directors, and some responsible members of the CHURCH, advised the petitioners "to correct their ways" and reminded them "that under the By-laws, this organization is only for worshipping the true God, not to worship Buddha or men." The respondents also warned them that if they persist in their highly improper conduct, they will be dropped from the membership of the CHURCH.

These exhortations and warnings to the erring members were made during Sunday worship gatherings, "in small group meetings and even one-on-one personal talk with them." Since 1988, these warnings were announced by the members of the Board "(s)ometimes once a week (when they) meet together."

But petitioners ignored these repeated admonitions.

Alarmed that petitioners' conduct will continue to undermine the integrity of the Principles of Faith of the CHURCH, the Board of Directors, during its August 30, 1993 regular meeting held for the purpose of reviewing and updating the membership list of the CHURCH, removed from the said list certain names of members, including the names of herein petitioners Joseph Lim, Liu Yek See, Alfredo Long and Felix Almeria. They were removed for espousing doctrines inimical or injurious to the Principles of Faith of the CHURCH. The Board also updated the list by removing the names of those who have migrated to other countries, those deceased and those whom the CHURCH had lost contact with. The resolution adopted by the Board in that August 30, 1993 meeting reads in part:

"Director Anthony Sayheeliam announced that the regular meeting is to review, update and approve the list of corporate membership. After due deliberation and upon motion duly made and seconded, the following resolutions were approved and adopted:

"RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the list of corporate membership of this Institution as shown on Annex "A" is hereby reviewed, updated and approved by the Board.

"RESOLVED, FURTHER, AS IT IS HEREBY FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Board approved that those who are not included in the said list of corporate membership of this Institution are no longer considered as a corporate member of this Institution.

"RESOLVED, FINALLY, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that any or all previous lists of membership are hereby superseded, revoked and/or rendered null, void and of no effect.

"There being no further business and no other matter to transact, the meeting was thereupon adjourned."

All the then six (6) members of the Board, namely, Directors Lim Che Boon, Tan Hon Koc (herein petitioners), Anthony Sayheeliam, Leandro Basa, Yao Chec and Lydia L. Basa (herein respondents) "were duly informed" of that meeting.However, Directors Lim Che Boon and Tan Hon Koc did not appear. Thus, the above-quoted resolution was signed only by Directors Anthony Sayheeliam, Leandro Basa, Yao Chec and Lydia L. Basa who composed the majority of the Board.

The updated membership list approved by the Board on August 30, 1993, together with the minutes of the meeting, were duly filed with the SEC on September 13, 1993.

On September 29, 1993, petitioners Lim Che Boon, Tan Hon Koc, Joseph Lim, Liu Yek See and others questioned their expulsion by filing with the SEC Securities Investigation and Clearing Department a petition. docketed as SEC Case No. 09-93-4581 (and later a supplemental petition) against Directors Yao Chek, Leandro Basa, Lydia Basa and Anthony Sayheeliam. It sought mainly the annulment of the August 30, 1993 membership list and the reinstatement of the original list on the ground that the expulsion was made without prior notice and hearing. The case was assigned to SEC Hearing Officer Manuel Perea (the "Perea case").

The petition also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction principally to enjoin the Board of Directors from holding any election of a new set of directors among the members named in the August 30, 1993 list of corporate membership.

After conducting a hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, SEC Hearing Officer Manuel Perea denied the same in an order dated February 22, 1994.Perea ruled inter alia that the expulsion was in accordance with the aforequoted provisions of paragraph 4, Article VII of the CHURCH By-laws, reasoning that "the notice referred to (in par. 4) is notice to the Board of Directors of the grounds for expulsion enumerated therein and not notice to the (erring) members…."

Perea's order further stated: "It is also clear (from par. 4) that the resolution of expulsion need not state the reason for expelling a member."

Petitioners elevated Perea's order of February 22, 1994 to the SEC en banc via a petition for certiorari, docketed as SEC EB Case No. 389. The SEC, in an en banc decision dated July 11, 1994, affirmed the Perea ruling and "dismissed for lack of merit" the petition.

Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the SEC en banc.

Since the said SEC en banc decision pertains only to the preliminary injunction incident, the SEC, through a hearing panel, conducted further proceedings to hear and decide the permissive counterclaim and third-party complaint incorporated in respondents' supplemental answer, including their prayer for injunctive relief to prevent petitioners from interfering and usurping the functions of the Board of Directors.

Petitioners subsequently filed motions to dismiss/strike out the counterclaim and third-party complaint. But the motions were denied by the hearing panel in its omnibus order dated October 2, 1995. The said order also declined to act on respondents’ third-party complaint’s prayer for injunctive relief since “there is a case pending before another Hearing Officer in SEC Case No. 4994 for the declaration of nullity of the general membership meeting held on February 12, 1995.”

Upon denial of the separate motions for reconsideration of both parties, the respondents filed with the SEC en banc a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as SEC EB Case No. 484. A review of the records show that the issue posed in this case is also the validity of the questioned expulsion already resolved by the SEC en banc in its decision dated July 11, 1994 in SEC EB Case No. 389 which had attained finality.

On July 31, 1996, the SEC en banc, by a vote of two to one, with one Commissioner abstaining, issued an order in SEC EB Case No. 484, setting aside the expulsion of certain members of the CHURCH approved by its Board of Directors on August 30, 1993 for being void and ordering the reinstatement of petitioners as members of the CHURCH.

Promptly, herein respondents Anthony Sayheeliam and Lydia Basa filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41551, assailing the July 31, 1996 order.

Respondent Yao Check, for his part, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of July 31, 1996. Upon denial of his motion, he also filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43389. This case was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 41551.

On May 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its now assailed decision granting respondents’ consolidated petitions and reversing the July 31, 1996 order of the SEC en banc in SEC EB Case No. 484.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the appellate court in a resolution dated August 18, 1998.

Hence, the present consolidated petitions for review by Certiorari (G.R. Nos. 134963-64 and G.R. Nos. 135152-53) under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

The pith issue in the instant cases, as correctly defined by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision and resolution, is whether the expulsion of petitioners Joseph Lim, Liu Yek See, Alfredo Long and Felix Almeria from the membership of the CHURCH by its Board of Directors through a resolution issued on August 30, 1993 is in accordance with law.

Petitioners insist that the expulsion is void since it was rendered without prior notice to them or, in a constitutional context, without due process.

On the other hand, respondents assert that the expulsion is in accordance with the By-laws of the CHURCH.

We rule against the petitioners.

It must be emphasized that the issue of the validity of the expulsion had long been resolved and declared valid by the SEC en banc in its decision dated July 11, 1994 in SEC EB Case No. 389. The decision affirmed the order dated February 22, 1994 of SEC Hearing Officer Manuel Perea in SEC Case No. 09-93-4581. The petitioners themselves admitted in their present petition that they did not appeal anymore from the July 11, 1994 decision of the SEC en banc, thereby rendering the same final and conclusive. As such, the expulsion order is now inextricably binding on the parties concerned and can no longer be modified, much less reversed.

What was definitely resolved in the Perea decision and in SEC EB Case No. 389 was the validity of the expulsion proceedings conducted by the Board of Directors in its meeting on August 30, 1993 wherein a Resolution updating the membership list of the CHURCH was approved. On the other hand, the SEC hearing panel conducted further proceedings only to decide the permissive counterclaim and third-party complaint incorporated in respondents’ supplemental answer, including their prayer for injunctive relief to prevent petitioners from interfering and usurping the functions of the Board of Directors.

Thus, we find accurate the following findings and conclusion of the Court of Appeals on this matter:

“….It ought to be recalled that when Hearing Officer Perea denied the herein respondents’ (now petitioners’) prayer for injunctive relief in SEC Case No. 09-93-4581 to stop the herein petitioners (now respondents) from calling a membership meeting on the basis of the expurgated list of membership dated August 30, 1993, they interposed in SEC EB Case No. 389 a petition to review the order of denial. Then and there, the SEC en banc rendered its decision dated July 11, 1994 sustaining Hearing Officer Perea on the ratiocination that the expulsion of members effected on August 30, 1993 by the board of directors was valid having been done in accordance with the by-laws of the CHURCH, and although the herein respondents (now petitioners) subsequently sought the dismissal of SEC Case No. 09-93-4581, the order of dismissal explicitly stated that it did not encompass the herein petitioners’ (now respondents’) permissive counterclaim and third-party complaint. Thus, further proceedings were conducted which culminated in the issuance of the Hearing Panel’s Omnibus Orders dated October 2, 1995 and January 19, 1996, which were elevated, this time by the herein petitioners (now respondents), to the SEC en banc in a petition for review on certiorari docketed as SEC EB Case No. 484. It was in this latter case that the SEC en banc handed down its assailed order of July 31, 1996 in violation of the law of the case that was earlier laid down with finality in SEC EB Case No. 389.

x x x x x x x x x

“Thusly, the question on the validity of the expulsion of some of the members of the CHURCH was squarely raised and frontally resolved in the decision rendered in SEC EB Case No. 389.” (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, the issuance by the SEC en banc of its July 31, 1996 order in SEC EB Case No. 484, which reopened the very same issue of the validity of the expulsion proceedings, completely reversing its final and executory en banc decision of July 11, 1994 (SEC EB Case No. 389), is certainly in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative, quasi-judicial and judicial determinations.

The Court of Appeals is, therefore, correct in voiding the SEC en banc orders dated July 31, 1996 and January 29, 1997 in SEC EB Case No. 484, thereby upholding the expulsion of petitioners and others by the Board of Directors on August 30, 1993.

In this regard, what we said in Fortich vs. Corona, et al. bears repeating: “The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.”

Let it not be said that the denial of the present petitions, even on this ground alone, is a mere technicality. In the aforecited case of Fortich vs. Corona, we held that once a case had been resolved with finality, vested rights were acquired by the winning party. Consequently, the rule on finality of decisions, orders or resolutions of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body is “not a question of technicality but of substance and merit,” the underlying consideration therefor being the protection of the substantive rights of the winning party. In the succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in the case of Videogram Regulatory Board vs. Court of Appeals, et al., “Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.’’

Be that as it may, we find baseless petitioners’ claim that their expulsion was executed without prior notice or due process.

In the first place, the By-laws of the CHURCH, which the members have expressly adhered to, does not require the Board of Directors to give prior notice to the erring or dissident members in cases of expulsion. This is evident from the procedure for expulsion prescribed in Article VII (paragraph 4) of the By-laws, which reads:

"4. If it is brought to the notice of the Board of Directors that any member has failed to observe any regulations and By-laws of the Institution (CHURCH) or the conduct of any member has been dishonorable or improper or otherwise injurious to the character and interest of the Institution, the Board of Directors may b(y) resolution without assigning any reason therefor expel such member from such Institution and he shall then forfeit his interest, rights and privileges in the Institution." (Emphasis ours)

From the above-quoted By-law provision, the only requirements before a member can be expelled or removed from the membership of the CHURCH are: (a) the Board of Directors has been notified that a member has failed to observe any regulations and By-laws of the CHURCH, or the conduct of any member has been dishonorable or improper or otherwise injurious to the character and interest of the CHURCH, and (b) a resolution is passed by the Board expelling the member concerned, without assigning any reason therefor.

It is thus clear that a member who commits any of the causes for expulsion enumerated in paragraph 4 of Article VII may be expelled by the Board of Directors, through a resolution, without giving that erring member any notice prior to his expulsion. The resolution need not even state the reason for such action.

The CHURCH By-law provision on expulsion, as phrased, may sound unusual and objectionable to petitioners as there is no requirement of prior notice to be given to an erring member before he can be expelled. But that is how peculiar the nature of a religious corporation is vis-à-vis an ordinary corporation organized for profit. It must be stressed that the basis of the relationship between a religious corporation and its members is the latter’s absolute adherence to a common religious or spiritual belief. Once this basis ceases, membership in the religious corporation must also cease. Thus, generally, there is no room for dissension in a religious corporation. And where, as here, any member of a religious corporation is expelled from the membership for espousing doctrines and teachings contrary to that of his church, the established doctrine in this jurisdiction is that such action from the church authorities is conclusive upon the civil courts. As far back in 1918, we held in United States vs. Canete that:

"…in matters purely ecclesiastical the decisions of the proper church tribunals are conclusive upon the civil tribunals. A church member who is expelled from the membership by the church authorities, or a priest or minister who is by them deprived of his sacred office, is without remedy in the civil courts, which will not inquire into the correctness of the decisions of the ecclesiastical tribunals." (Emphasis ours)

Obviously recognizing the peculiarity of a religious corporation, the Corporation Code leaves the matter of ecclesiastical discipline to the religious group concerned.

Section 91 of the Corporation Code, which has been made explicitly applicable to religious corporations by the second paragraph of Section 109 of the same Code, states:

"SEC. 91. Termination of membership.- Membership shall be terminated in the manner and for the causes provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. Termination of membership shall have the effect of extinguishing all rights of a member in the corporation or in its property, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws." (Emphasis ours)

Moreover, the petitioners really have no reason to bewail the lack of prior notice in the By-laws. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, they have waived such notice by adhering to those By-laws. They became members of the CHURCH voluntarily. They entered into its covenant and subscribed to its rules. By doing so, they are bound by their consent.


Even assuming that petitioners' expulsion falls within the Constitutional provisions on "prior notice" or "due process," still we can not conclude that respondents committed a constitutional infraction. It bears emphasis that petitioners were given more than sufficient notice of their impending expulsion, as shown by the records.

We have narrated earlier the events which led to the questioned expulsion. From the undisputed testimony of Director Anthony Sayheeliam (now respondent), it is clear that, as early as 1988, the respondents-Board of Directors patiently and persistently reminded, advised and exhorted the erring members, including herein petitioners, to stop espousing doctrines, teachings and religious belief diametrically opposed to the Principles of Faith embraced by the CHURCH. The respondents-Board of Directors further warned them during Sunday worship gatherings, in small group meetings and one-on-one talk, that they would face disciplinary action and be dropped from the membership roll should they continue to exhibit acts inimical and injurious to the teachings of the Holy Bible which the CHURCH so zealously upholds.

When they ignored petitioners’ exhortations and warnings, the erring members should not now complain about their expulsion from the membership of the CHURCH by the Board of Directors on August 30, 9193.

The Court of Appeals, whose findings of fact is accorded great respect as the same is conclusive on us, made a precise observation on this matter:

“….the petitioners (now respondents) further state that the Board of Directors, before deciding to purge their list of membership, gave the erring members sufficient warning of their impending ouster. Thus:
‘… the records of the instant case indisputably show that the erring members of the corporation, including respondents (now petitioners) Lim Che Boon, Joseph Lim, Tan Hon Joc, Liu Yek See, Felix Almeria and Alfredo Long, were given more than sufficient notice that the perpetration of acts inimical to and inconsistent with the Articles of Faith of the Corporation will be subject to disciplinary authority of the Board of Directors:

(Testimony of Anthony Sayheeliam, member of the Board of Directors)

Q. You mentioned that former members of the Corporation were dropped or expelled due to violations of the principles of faith under the Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws, as well as for conduct which was dishonorable, improper and injurious to the character and interest of the corporation. When did the Board first note or observe these violations?
A. The Board noticed that since 1988.
Q. As a member of the Board of Directors, what actions did you take after the board observed these violations?
A. We warned them and advised them to correct their ways of doing these things.
Q. As a member of the Board of Directors, what did you say or do in order to convince these former members to correct their ways?
A. We told them that under the By-laws this organization is only for worshipping the true God, not to worship Buddha or men.
Q. You also mentioned that you gave warnings to these errant members. As a member of the Board of Directors, what did you do or say to warn these former members of the consequences of their acts?
A. Especially to the members of the organization, they should take all the consequences. Otherwise, they will be dropped.
Q. These warnings and statements advising them to correct their way, on what occasion were these statements made?
A. In a general service, Sunday, and also in small group meetings and even one-on-one, personally talking with them.
Q. How often were these warnings or advise to correct made?
A. Sometimes once a week we meet together.
Q. Since when?
A. Since 1988.” (TSN, December 1, 1993, Perea Case, pp. 9-12).

From the foregoing testimony of petitioner (now respondent) Anthony Sayheeliam during the hearing in the Perea Case on 01 December 1993, it remains undisputed that as early as 1988 private respondents (now petitioners) and their cohorts knew that their acts and conduct would be subject to disciplinary action. In fact, private respondents (now petitioners) never specifically denied or disputed the testimony of petitioner (now respondent) Anthony Sayheeliam, whether on the witness stand or in any pleading in the Perea Case or in the other cases between the parties, that they have been repeatedly admonished by the members of the Board of Directors that the introduction of teachings and doctrines inconsistent with the Principles of Faith of the Corporation is punishable with their expulsion (Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 41551, pp. 46-48.

“We find the stance of the petitioners (now respondents) more persuasive as it is more in accord with Section 91 of the Corporation Code which mandates that membership in a no-stock corporation and, for that matter, in a religious corporation ‘shall be terminated in the manner and for the causes enumerated in the articles of incorporation or by-laws.’ The respondents (now petitioners) make no protestation that the CHURCH’s by-law provision on expulsion has not been complied with….” (Emphasis ours)

Consequently, the expulsion was not tainted with any arbitrary treatment from the members of the Board of Directors who, since 1988 up to August 30, 1993, or approximately five (5) years, have patiently exhorted and warned the dissident members. This long period of time is more than adequate an opportunity for the erring members and their followers to contemplate upon their covenant with the CHURCH on their duty to protect and promote its Principles of Faith and not to violate them. It is a well-settled principle in law that what due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness; what it requires is fairness and justice; substance, rather than the form, being paramount. What it prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.

Clearly, although the By-laws of the CHURCH do not require the Board of Directors to give notice to the dissident petitioners of their impending expulsion, more than sufficient notice was given to them before they were expelled by the Board on August 30, 1993.
Petitioners, however, contend that the expelled members were not actually notified and warned of their impending expulsion. In support of this, they also cited the following testimony of Anthony Sayheeliam:

“ATTY. PAULITE:
Q. Did you go through the list one by one?
A. Yes.
Q. So do you remember how many were expelled because of conduct dishonorable, improper, injurious to the corporation?
A. At the time we did not count the number. We just talked it one by one, discussed …
Q. Okey, Did you notify them of the grounds for their expulsion?
A. No.
Q. You did not. Did you give them an opportunity to defend themselves?
A. No.” (Emphasis ours)

Petitioners’ interpretation of the above-quoted testimony of Anthony Sayheeliam was out of context. The question and answer focused on what the Board of Directors did during its meeting on August 30, 1993 wherein it evaluated each member’s standing and conduct in the light of the grounds for disciplinary action as provided in the CHURCH By-laws. This is plain from the underscored portions of Sayheeliam’s testimony. Thus, what Sayheeliam was saying is that on that very day of the expulsion, the Board of Directors did not notify the expelled members anymore. Obviously, such notice was not made by the Board of Directors simply because the By-laws of the CHURCH does not require the same, as already discussed earlier.

Incidentally, during the pendency of these cases in this Court, petitioners filed an application for a TRO/writ of preliminary injunction dated November 10, 1998, claiming therein that respondents are denying them access to the premises of the CHURCH for purposes of exercising their right of worship. Acting on the application, this Court required the respondents to comment thereon. In the meantime, it issued a Special Order on December 18, 1998 enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Court of Appeals’ decision "insofar as petitioners’ rights and privileges as members of the CHURCH are concerned." Accordingly, petitioners were allowed "entry into the CHURCH building of worship and participate in its religious and social activities."

On January 29, 1999, petitioners Lim Che Boon, Tan Hon Koc, Joseph Lim and Liu Yek See filed a petition to cite respondents in contempt for refusing to comply with the Special Order of this Court. This was docketed as G.R. No. 137135. Petitioners averred therein that respondents denied them access to the worship halls for their special conference involving the spiritual training of some 1, 800 college students from Regions I to VI.

In their comment, respondents opposed the petition, claiming that their refusal to lend the worship halls was due to the fact that the intended special conference is not a religious service/activity of the CHURCH and the participants are not members of the CHURCH. Thus, respondents assert that they did not violate the Special Order of this Court.

We agree with the respondents. The Special Order allows petitioners entry into the CHURCH building to “participate in worship or other religious activities” “as members of the CHURCH”. Clearly, the Special Order does not allow petitioners unlimited or unrestrained access or use of the premises and properties of the CHURCH. The intended special conference to be conducted by petitioners is not a CHURCH activity and the participants therein are not members of the CHURCH.

WHEREFORE, the present consolidated petitions are DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 29, 1998 and its resolution dated August 18, 1998 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

The Special Order dated December 18, 1998 issued by this Court is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., (Chairman), please see dissenting opinion.

SEC registration of churches

Related discussions (external links): Registering a local Baptist church with the SEC either as corporation sole or as religious society / aggregate (issues discussed include US Supreme Court decision on the two entities of the incorporated church; Does the concept of the corporation sole conflict with the Baptist distinctive of congregational church government? ) Sample Constitution and Bylaws for local churches Of Church Organization, Part Three: Constitutions by Dr. Kevin T. Bauder, Central Baptist Theological Seminary

If a church is not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, is it an illegal church?

A veteran pastor I talked to several months ago had problems with some members who eventually left and formed their own church. When these members found out that their original church was not registered with the SEC, they claimed that it was an illegal church.

Registration with the SEC gives the church a legal personality, but a church can exist and function even without registration. We will discuss more about the freedom of religion and non-establishment clauses of the 1987 Constitution later on. One good reason for registering a church with the SEC is so that the church property can be titled in the name of the church itself, not in the name of the pastor or of a church member.

The essential provisions of the Corporation Code relevant to churches are Section 2 (definition of corporation), Section 36 (corporate powers and capacity), Section 91 (termination of membership), and Sections 109 up to 116 (religious corporations). 

Steps in registering a church with the SEC

1. Name verification and reservation - you have to find out either through the SEC’s website or through its Public Research Unit/Name Verification office at EDSA whether the proposed name for your church is still available, that is, it is not already being used by another registered church. For example, there are already a lot of churches carrying the name “Faith Baptist Church.” What you can do if you still want to use that name is to add something else to the name, for example, “Faith Baptist Church of bgy. Diliman, Quezon City.”

If the church name you applied for is available, you can have the name reserved from 30 to 90 days; the longer the reservation period, the higher the fee. During that period, when you are working on the documents required for the registration, no one else can apply for registration with that proposed name.

2. The SEC has ready made forms for a Constitution and By-Laws (the last time I asked, these forms cost about four hundred pesos). After submitting all the requirements and paying all the fees, the certificate of registration will subsequently be issued by the Corporate and Legal Department of the SEC.

3. The SEC also asks certain reportorial requirements to be submitted to it on a periodic basis.

As you can see from the provisions of the Corporation Code cited above, you can register your church either as a corporation sole or as a religious society/religious aggregate. But the important thing is, the ready made Constitution and By-Laws provided by the SEC are not really suitable for local Baptist churches. (About two years ago, I urged the Asia Baptist Bible College Alumni Association during its meeting at San Mateo Bible Baptist Church to draft a Constitution and By-Laws appropriate for local Baptist churches.)

If you use the Constitution and By-Laws provided by the SEC, one good practice is to attach to the documents your church’s Articles of Faith. 

Submit updated list of members to the SEC regularly

The church should submit an updated list of members to the SEC at least twice a year through a General Information Sheet (GIS). The updated list is invaluable in case of a church conflict or split.

There are only a few churches which keep an updated list of their members. One church in Marikina I attended in the 1980’s besides keeping its membership list updated, also issues to its members identification cards renewable every six months.

Church property should be titled in the church’s name

 
The property of the church should not be titled in the name of the pastor or of any church member, but in the name of the church itself. That’s what SEC registration does, that is, give the church a legal personality. What’s even worse is titling the church property in the name of pastor and his wife. In this case, the property will be considered as conjugal property.

(Under the Family Code, any property acquired during the marriage is presumed conjugal, unless there is clear proof that the property was acquired through the separate means of either the husband or wife.)

This practice of titling the church property in the name of the pastor or of some church members will create a lot of problems later on. For example, one church in the Albay area had its property titled in the name of the pastor. When the pastor died, his children claimed that they own the land by right of succession (or “inheritance” in layman’s terms), and they demanded that the church vacate the premises.

Another church in the Bicol area had its property titled in the name of three pastors recommended by the mother church. The mother church thought (commendably, I might add) that if only one name appeared in the title, that person could possibly claim the land for himself later on. But the problem was, two of the pastors are already dead, and the only way the property can be transferred to the church is by way of donation or sale. But the heirs of the two deceased pastors can now claim that they are part owners of the property by right of succession (inheritance).

One church in the Metro Manila area had its property titled in the name of its two pastoral staff. But one of the pastors is already in the province, and the other pastor had to leave the church under unfavorable circumstances. There is now a brewing legal controversy among several parties over the ownership of the land and the church building.

Incorporate as soon as possible

Depending upon the policies, practices and beliefs of the sending/mother church, the mission work should be incorporated as soon as possible, either as corporation sole or religious society.

If the mission work has not yet been incorporated, its properties should be titled in the name of the sending/mother church. Later on, the mother church can transfer the title either by way of donation or sale.

Suggestion: sending/mother church should impose conditions on property donated to the mission work

If the money used to buy the property came from the sending/mother church, it is a good idea to impose certain conditions if the property will be donated to the mission work upon its incorporation. For example, the sending/mother church can impose the condition that if the daughter- or granddaughter-church strays from its doctrinal position as contained in the Articles of Faith attached to the SEC documents, the mother church can rescind the donation.

(Speaking of donation, the Civil Code requires that for donations worth more than five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance of the donation must be in writing.)

Also, the sending/mother church can impose the condition that in case of a split in the daughter- or granddaughter-church, the opposing parties must agree not to sue each other in court, and agree to a mediation or conciliation of the matter by the mother church or by a group of selected pastors. In case the opposing parties do not comply with this condition, the mother church can then rescind the donation.

Admittedly, this suggestion is difficult to implement or even to accept, since most Baptist churches in the Philippines subscribe to the doctrine of the autonomy of the local church. But until and unless we formulate a way to mediate or conciliate church splits, we will have the tragic spectacle of Christians suing each other in court, in total contravention of 1 Corinthians 6: 1-7, which state,

1. Dare any of you, having a matter against another, go to law before the unjust, and not before the saints?
2. Do ye not know that the saints shall judge the world? and if the world shall be judged by you, are ye unworthy to judge the smallest matters?
3. Know ye not that we shall judge angels? how much more things that pertain to this life?
4. If then ye have judgments of things pertaining to this life, set them to judge who are least esteemed in the church.
5. I speak to your shame. Is it so, that there is not a wise man among you? no, not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren?
6. But brother goeth to law with brother, and that before the unbelievers.
7. Now therefore there is utterly a fault among you, because ye go to law one with another. Why do ye not rather take wrong? why do ye not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?
8. Nay, ye do wrong, and defraud, and that your brethren.

I welcome your ideas as to how we can mediate and conciliate church splits. Incidentally, under the Securities Regulation Code, church splits would fall under “intra-corporate controversies” and are under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

I was told of one church split in the southern part of our country, where criminal cases have been filed by the former pastor against the incumbent pastor and some members. I do not know all the facts, and I do not wish to exacerbate the situation by needless speculation. But the problems could possibly have been avoided if the Constitution and By-Laws of that church had provided for a procedure or mechanism in the succession to the office of the pastor in case of death, disability, or resignation.

Also, the problem could have been avoided if the mother church had retained some form of control by imposing certain conditions in its donation (if any) of the property to the daughter- or granddaughter church.

Church leaders must educate members on the Constitution and By-Laws

This necessity will become more apparent to you as we discuss the 2001 Supreme Court decision in the case of “The Church in Quezon City.”

I have handled some cases involving homeowners associations, and it is amazing that the only time the members take time to read and study their Constitution and By-Laws is when there is already a brewing controversy or when cases have already filed by one party against another.

We cannot claim that the Constitution and By-Laws submitted to the SEC are merely pro forma, and that our only rule for faith and practice is the Bible. By registering with the SEC, churches in a way are giving up some of their autonomy by agreeing to be bound by the laws of our country. In case of disputes or disagreements that eventually reach our judicial system, the courts will refer to the Constitution and By-Laws for the resolution of the case. (In cases of disputes regarding doctrine however, there is a US Supreme Court ruling which states that such are beyond the jurisdiction of secular courts.) Romans chapter 13 is very instructive:

1. Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God.
2. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.
3. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same:
4. For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.
5. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake.

Note: Jerald Finney, a Baptist and a lawyer, in his book “Separation of Church and State” and in his blog of the same title argues strongly and passionately against the incorporation of churches. He states in Chapter 3 of his book:

“A New Testament church cannot be organized according to the principles of both the Bible and civil law. Should a church organize, even partially, according to the principles of civil law, that church cannot also be in conformity to the principles of church organization laid down in the Word of God. For example, a church which incorporates is not a New Testament church.”

Finney’s blog contains a lot more articles of interest for pastors considering whether or not to incorporate their churches or ministries. Biblical Law Center, a ministry of the Indianapolis Baptist Temple under Dr. Greg Dixon, also provides a lot of articles on the issue of non-registration of churches.